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I - ABSTRACT
 Despite the omnipresence of anarchy in IR, anarchist  political thought is 
only partly mobilized by the discipline. IR has been paying a great deal of 
attention to anarchy, but it failed so far to consistently incorporate anarchism into 
its conceptual repertoire. Conversely, anarchist theorists have demonstrated only a 
limited interest in joining debates about international politics. This research-
project addresses the incomplete and partial mobilization of anarchist political 
philosophy in IR, and offers a more holistic approach to the discipline’s grand 
themes. 
 Towards this particular end the thesis deploys a series of key-concepts 
central to classical anarchist thought, and inserts them into the context of 
contemporary IR-theory. The research departs from the hypothesis that an 
engagement of anarchism  with IR must run through a mobilization of 
constituent power. Anarchist political theory is somewhat neglected by the 
discipline of IR. Yet, apart from the evident lack of anarchism in IR there exists 
another gap in the literature, namely the inconsistent application of constituent 
power to the study of global politics. While the thesis focuses chiefly on the 
anarchist contribution to IR-theory, it also argues that this double-lacuna must be 
addressed jointly. 
 The project hence offers a critical narration of IR key-concepts along the 
lines of philosophical anarchism - a reading which is supported by the 
deployment of constituent power. Within this context the centrality of power to 
the study of IR is discussed, and the discipline’s underlying methodological 
assumptions are systematically evaluated. The project furthermore assesses 
anarchist philosophy against the backdrop of constituent force, and establishes a 
firm  connection between the two traditions of political thought. The conceptual 
implications of an amalgamation of constituent power and anarchist political 
theory are eventually explored by means of an engagement with a series of IR’s 
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I | INTRODUCTION: THE VIRTUES OF ANARCHY
1. Anarchy in inter-state politics
1.1 Kenneth Waltz, the reluctant anarchist
 One of the key questions addressed by Waltz in the 1979 classic Theory of  
International Politics deals with the challenge of how to regulate the circulation of 
violence within and across domestic and international political spaces. Departing 
from  the observation that the “state among states conducts its affairs in the 
brooding shadow of violence” Waltz motivates his readership to acknowledge an 
inconvenient truth, namely the intimate intertwinement of social life with the 
latency of violent conflict, before concluding - somewhat consternated - that “the 
hope that in the absence of an agent to manage or to manipulate conflicting 
parties the use of force will always be avoided cannot be realistically 
entertained”.1  While the latency of violence penetrates the deep-structure of 
social and political conduct, attempts to manage and regulate the occurrence of 
force vary across contexts. It is of importance to acknowledge at this point that 
the common distinction between ‘the domestic’ and ‘the international’ is not a 
qualitative one between non-violent and violent spaces. Politics is always 
- 8 -
1 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of  International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 102.
underpinned by violence, regardless of its location.2  The domestic/international-
binary highlights instead two fundamentally different regulative ideas, each of 
which employs a distinct mechanism for the coordination of  conflict. 
 Domestically the state monopolizes the deployment of force and puts 
itself in a position that enables it to appear as the exclusive and legitimate arbiter 
of violence. Through the government’s executive branches coercive structures are 
maintained, i.e. the police, state bureaucracy, or the military. These structures 
serve the single most important purpose of curtailing security-competition by 
means of disabling rivaling claims over legitimacy within a given political space. 
Violence hence does not disappear but becomes monopolized (through the state), 
institutionalized (through governmental agencies), and rationalized (through the 
principle of  authority and the monopoly of  violence).3
 While a veil of authority covers the latency of violence in the domestic 
setting, force becomes readily visible when directing one’s perspective towards 
‘the international’. Unlike dominant perceptions of the domestic, ‘the 
international’ lacks an authority-consensus and must govern itself devoid of 
overarching coercive structures. The prerogative to use violence does not rest in 
the hands of a single Leviathan, but see-saws through the capillaries of the 
international. The institution of sovereignty, which attempts to tame the 
unhampered spread of violence within states, is then also responsible for the 
ambivalence and unpredictability that harrows international affairs. States expose 
a certain possessiveness and defend their domestic prerogatives jealously. What 
translates into a situation of hierarchy within states leads to anarchy among them: 
domestically as well as internationally Westphalian polities do not recognize the 
existence of any higher power over and above themselves. The inter-state system 
is then characterized by the absence of government and the multiplied presence 
of sovereign polities, each of which possessing authority in its own right. It is the 
necessity to manage the circulation of violence in the first place - and the 




international zones - that leads to the emergence of anarchy in inter-state politics. 
Hierarchy and anarchy are the two opposing faces of the same coin, and while the 
regulation of violence seemingly pacifies one political space (the domestic is also 
a violent, juridical order), it leads to competition and enmity in another (the 
international).
1.2 The willingness to cooperate, and the fear to do so
 The multiplication of competing authority-structures on the international 
level severely limits the possibility of cooperation among states. On the domestic 
level the state solves the problem  of violence through monopolization, and by 
means of providing the guarantee to its citizens to care for their security and to 
protect them from violent assault. Citizens do not need to worry about their 
security and can instead engage in other, i.e. economic, activities. States even 
encourage the members of their societies to specialize in a given trade and to 
integrate as far as possible into a system of mutual interdependency. The lack of 
guarantees and the absence of an authority-consensus on the international level 
has the exact opposite effect, and encourages states to attain a level of the 
greatest possible autonomy and perhaps even autarky.4  While the state offers 
security to its citizens, no agent is capable of providing the same service to the 
state. 
 Waltz remarks that a “national system is not one of self-help. The 
international system is”, and further “The domestic imperative is ‘specialize’! (...) 
The international imperative is ‘take care of yourself ’”.5 The emerging situation is 
as undesirable as it is tragic: states do recognize that a deeper integration and a 
division of labour among them  would be much more beneficial than a continued 
insistence on their functional independence. Yet, the structure of the 
international forces states into a prisoners dilemma and encourages them  to 
remain only loosely connected in a mode of interdependency: collectively 
beneficial outcomes cannot be achieved due to the absence of a guarantor or 
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4 Ibid., 106.
5 Ibid., 104 & 107.
enforcer who would regulate states collective behavior.6  States can only control 
their own behavior and determine the payoff that results from their own actions - 
the actions of their peers remain beyond their control. States might even prefer 
to cooperate, integrate, and harvest the fruits of positive-sum games, but the 
absence of guarantees throws them back into a logic that makes them susceptible 
to relative gains, while bolstering their own security.7  Individual actions that 
attempt to defy the logic of interdependency and autonomy are incapable of 
changing it for good, since states that act counter to the logic of self-help risk 
falling prey to the exploitative behavior of  competing units.
1.3 The virtues of  anarchy. Or: why anarchy has its perks too 
Anarchy regulates interaction among units and puts constraints on their 
behavior. Yet, while the leaderless makeup of the international sensitizes actors 
for relative gains, encourages a self-help mentality among them, and limits 
cooperation to interdependency it is important to acknowledge that anarchy has 
its perks too. The heading of the section reads – somewhat heretically – 
“Kenneth Waltz, the reluctant anarchist”. Waltz was no anarchist, at least not in a 
strictly ideological sense, but he was certainly willing to acknowledge that anarchic 
modes of organization could offer a series of advantages. One could say that 
Waltz is a reluctant anarchist, an anarchist out of necessity not conviction, one 
that refrained from  openly endorsing anarchism as a political regime while 
concurrently advocating anarchist politics. The central theme that runs through 
Theory of  International Politics is concerned with the management of the circulation 
of violence in world politics. Waltz feared that if one attempted to break down 
the domestic/international-barrier and the well-established practices that regulate 
force within certain political spaces (i.e. the domestic monopoly of violence and 
the historically grown practices of international society) international affairs could 




Anarchy is a virtue because it simultaneously constrains and stabilizes 
political conduct. Furthermore, anarchic regimes do initiate a series of politically 
desirably outcomes that can lead to a number of beneficiary effects – a claim 
constantly advanced by anarchists since the 19th century, and phased into IR by 
Waltz in 1979. What are the virtues of  anarchy then? 
(I) Anarchic orders can be maintained easier and cheaper than hierarchic 
ones, mainly due to their decreased proneness to internal power-struggles. Waltz 
remarks that in cases of power-struggles “substantive issues become entwined 
with efforts to influence or control the controllers”.8  Especially larger, more 
powerful hierarchies can easily become the subject of hostile takeovers. Anarchic 
orders are certainly not immune against high-jacking, but their elevated degree of 
diversification hampers monopolization and centralization far more effectively 
than a hierarchical order does.
(II) Anarchic orders are pragmatic. The politics of the organization that 
rid hierarchies pressures them to justify their right to existence on a constant 
basis. Hierarchies develop a distracting interest in maintaining and protecting 
themselves, which diverts resources that could have otherwise been used for 
attending the organization’s original mandate.9  The decreased proneness to 
internal power struggles does of course not imply that anarchies are more cost-
efficient than hierarchies. Anarchic orders are indeed labor- and resource-
intensive and require ongoing coordination between their constituent parts. 
Anarchic orders are then not necessarily cheaper than hierarchies, but resources 
are directed towards more substantive issues, i.e. the coordination between units, 
instead of  allocating them towards fights over institutional control.
(III) Anarchic orders are resilient, and shocks such as war, or the private 
use of force, can only disperse with great difficulties through the system. 
Decentralization is self-stabilizing to the extent that it erects a multitude of 




isolated units might be threatened, but this applies hardly to the overall stability of 
the anarchic realm as such.10
 (IV) Anarchic orders are flexible and adaptive. Unlike domestic forms of 
organization international politics cannot rely on hierarchical modes of decision-
making, bureaucratic oversight, or effective policing. Out of necessity, and due to 
the absence of more complex institutional politics, decisions are necessarily made 
at the bottom  level. Accommodation and adjustment are realized through mutual 
adaption and not via top-down enforcement. The bottom-up nature of 
international politics, and the thin layer of actual policies, ensures that the system 
remains as flexible as possible while retaining a high degree of  adaptiveness.11
(V) Anarchic orders foster restraint. States are war-machines and their 
efforts to mitigate violence are not exclusively directed towards their inside. States 
monopolize, wield, and direct violence, and even small and supposedly less 
powerful states are still in the position to marshal disturbingly destructive 
amounts of lethal military capabilities. The omnipresence of violence, the 
absence of a durable authority-consensus, and the logic of self-help requires units 
to cautiously maneuver the political landscape. Manipulations of the system are 
possible, but they must happen within feasible boundaries. Demands can be made 
and interest may be articulated, but the ever presence of violence as the ultimate 
corrective requires restraint and prudence from actors.12
2. Anarchy without anarchism
The vices and virtues of anarchy have occupied one of the centre-stages 
of IR research well before Waltz’ 1979 reformulation of classical realist thought. 
Even IR’s predecessors, late 19th and early 20th discourses on geopolitics, have 
struggled with the question how newly emerging, territorially unified, 
economically potent, and increasingly militarized states would be able to regulate 




12 Ibid., 113 f.
origins of the anarchy problematique are embedded within these late 19th-century 
approaches to geopolitics and anthropogeography, and despite the fact that early 
geopolitical thinkers were not yet in the possession of the elaborate theoretical 
vocabulary of their 20th/21st-century IR-peers, they anticipated the discourse 
and its central questions well before the First Great  Debate and prior to the arrival 
of  the term ‘anarchy’ on IR’s conceptual scene.
 A discourse so readily willing to accept anarchy as one of its core tenets 
must have shown some interest in anarchist political though and in anarchism at 
some point!? After all, it were 19th-century anarchists who repeatedly highlighted 
the ‘virtues of anarchy’ that where later praised by Waltz. Yet, far from it! On the 
contrary, a systematic engagement of IR with anarchist political thought is still 
largely absent from the debate. There is certainly no lack of normative and 
analytical models in the IR-field that would make suggestions on the possible 
structure and the shape of global political regimes. Visions of a world state in the 
form of a supra-national body have been lined out by realists like Niebuhr and 
the late Morgenthau in the 50s and 60s, and more recently by Craig in Glimmers of 
a new Leviathan.13 Liberals and cosmopolitans14 are both imagining an ideal-type of 
global politics which rests on individualism  and Kantian universalism, while 
proponents of the communitarian camp suggest a particularist political project 
featuring collectivist, community-based social ontologies.15  On the functional 
level one will find EU-globalism and neo-medievalism, with suggestions for a 
federated political regime, and subsidiary dispersions of power.16  Additional 
approaches are presented by the English School and constructivism, which adopt 
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13 Note: Morgenthau still rejected this vision in Scientific Man versus Power Politics and in Politics Among 
Nations, but changed his opinion later on. For an example see Mitrany (1966): A Working Peace System; 
Craig (2003): Glimmers of  a New Leviathan.
14 For example: Rawls (1971): A Theory of  Justice; Koenig-Archibugi (2003): Taming Globalization: 
Frontiers of  Governance; Beitz (1979): Political Theory and International Relations; Pogge (1989): Realizing 
Rawls; Held (1995): Democracy and the Global Order; Held (1996): Models of  Democracy; Caney (2005): 
Justice Beyond Borders - A Global Political Theory.
15 For example: Waltzer (1994): Thick and Thin: Moral Arguments at Home and Abroad; Waltzer (1995): 
Towards a Global Civil Society.
16 For example: Pogge (1992): Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty; Linklater (1998): The Transformation of  
Political Community; Etzioni (2004): The Emerging Global Normative Synthesis.
realism’s state-centric ontology while highlighting the possibility of thick patterns 
of cooperation in a community or a society of states.17  These theories work 
within and across the confinements of the anarchy problematique. However, one will 
not encounter a framework that would make an effort to utilize the theoretical 
and normative insights provided by the philosophical tradition of theoretical 
anarchism.
 This absence of anarchism in IR is part of a larger lacuna in social theory. 
Apart from  some occasional upsurges in the 20th century, there exists no 
coherently developed body of anarchist philosophy after the Russian Revolution. 
A few, comparatively recent examples for the resurgence of political anarchism 
can be found in the writings of Bookchin and May. Bookchin was mainly 
concerned with the application of anarchist theory to the field of 
environmentalism, and suggested to organize political communities in 
confederative, decentralized, and self-sustaining structures, which would allow for 
the self-actualization of the individual, while preventing the emergence of 
localism, parochialism, or green luddism.18 May perpetuates a merger of anarchist 
philosophy and post-structuralist thought, which argues for an abandonment of 
essentialist social concepts, and develops a non-foundational political critique of 
traditional anarchism. This critique reveals how decentralized, non-representative 
theorizing can be achieved without the reliance on fundamental concepts or 
motifs.19
 Circling back to IR one must acknowledge that the presence of ‘anarchy’ 
in the debate is as evident as the absence of ‘anarchism’. The contemporary IR-
literature shows in fact a remarkable, and in some ways staggering, silence about 
the possibilities of global politics based on the premises of anarchist principles. 
IR-scholars have paid only partial attention to the question whether the discipline 
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17 For example: Bull (1977): The Anarchical Society; Buzan (2004): From International to World Society?; 
Wendt (1999): Social Theory of  International Politics.
18 Murray Bookchin, The Rise of  Urbanization and the Decline of  Citizenship (San Francisco: Sierra Club 
Books, 1987); and Murray Bookchin, Social Ecology and Communalism (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2007).
19 Todd May, The Political Philosophy of  Poststructuralist Anarchism (University Park: Pennsylvania State 
University Press, 1994).
should look at the dynamics of international politics through an anarchist lens. 
There exists a distinct anarchist approach to the study of global affairs, a fact 
highlighted already by Alex Prichard in the 2013 monograph Justice, Order and 
Anarchy on the international political thought of Pierre-Joseph Proundhon.20 Yet, 
while Prichard’s contribution to the debate is certainly invaluable in terms of 
historicising the emergence of anarchist political theory in relation to IR, it 
engages only partially with discipline-defining concepts. Others have made efforts 
to address this evident gap, and provided for distinctively anarchist approaches to 
ontology (Cudworth & Hobden21), sovereignty (Newman22), world politics 
(Newman23), global governance (Ashworth24), and the provision of global 
political goods (Falk25).
2.1 Research question: the anarchist contribution to IR-theory
 Despite the obvious omnipresence of anarchy  in IR, anarchist  political 
thought is only partly mobilized by the discipline. IR has been paying a great deal 
of attention to anarchy, but it failed so far to consistently incorporate anarchism 
into its conceptual repertoire. Conversely, anarchist theorists have demonstrated 
only a limited interest in joining debates about international politics. This 
research-project addresses the incomplete and partial mobilization of anarchist 
political philosophy in IR, and offers a more holistic and complete anarchist 
approach to the discipline’s grand themes. More concretely the thesis engages with 
dominant IR-key-concepts such as power, ontology, agency, sovereignty, and 
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20 Alex Prichard, Justice, Order and Anarchy (London: Routledge, 2013), 142.
21 Erika Cudworth & Stephen Hobden, “Anarchy and Anarchism: Towards a Theory of  Complex 
International Systems”, Millennium: Journal of  International Studies 39, no. 2 (2010): 399 ff.
22 Saul Newman, “Crowned Anarchy: Postanarchism and International Relations Theory”, Millennium: 
Journal of  International Studies 40, no. 2 (2012): 259 ff.
23 Saul Newman, From Bakunin to Lacan: anti-authoritarianism and the dislocation of  power (Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2001); and Saul Newman: The politics of  postanarchism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2010).
24 Lucien Ashworth, “Anarchism against anarchy. The global anarchical society as a statist world and 
the prospects for an anarchist international relations”, http://www.anarchist-studies-network.org.uk/
documents/Anarchism%20and%20World%20Politics/LA.pdf, presented at the PSA-conference 
Rethinking Anarchy: Anarchism and World Politics, University of  Bristol, 17-18 June 2010: 21 ff.
25 Richard Falk, “Anarchism without ‘Anarchism’: Searching for Progressive Politics in the Early 21st 
Century”, Millennium: Journal of  International Studies 39, no. 2 (2010): 385 ff.
ethics, and aims to scrutinize and destabilize them. The purpose of such an 
exercise is the cultivation of a critical narrative capable of creating room for 
accounts of transnational political agency beyond the confinements of 
Westphalian inter-state politics. Towards this particular end the thesis deploys a 
series of key-concepts central to classical anarchist thought, and inserts them into 
the context of contemporary IR-theory. The research departs from  the 
hypothesis that an engagement of anarchism  with IR must run through a 
mobilization of constituent power. Anarchist political theory is somewhat 
neglected by the discipline of IR. Yet, apart from the evident lack of anarchism  in 
IR there exists another gap in the literature, namely the inconsistent application 
of constituent power to the study of global politics. While the thesis focuses 
chiefly on the anarchist contribution to IR-theory, it also argues that this double-
lacuna must be addressed jointly. Departing from this hypothesis the project is 
guided by three major research questions:
 First, and in reference to constituent power: (i) can it be confirmed that 
constituent power is inconsistently applied in IR-theory?; (ii) is it possible to trace 
a potential lacuna through the field’s history?; (iii) if constituent power is in fact 
vastly absent from IR: what are the conceptual implications, and why would it be 
necessary to mobilize constituent power in IR?
 Second, to what extend is the anarchist tradition of political thought 
capable of addressing a lack of constituent power in IR-theory? Would the 
tradition be in a position to successfully institutionalize constituent power in IR? 
More specifically: (i) which author(s) are best suited for this particular task?; (ii) 
how would such a mobilization of constituent power look in concrete terms?; (iii) 
how would a joint deployment of anarchism and constituent power resonate with 
IR’s power-discourse?
 Third, to what extend might the co-mobilization of anarchist political 
theory and constituent power support the destabilization and reframing of IR’s 
grand themes? How would an anarchist approach to (i) power in international 
affairs; (ii) the ontology of the global; (iii) sovereignty; (iv) agency in international 
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politics; (v) the spatial ordering of the global; (vi) and the ethics of world politics 
look like?
2.2 Methodological approach and plan of  work
 A more detailed account of the study’s underlying methodological 
assumptions is provided at the beginning of chapter II. The thesis aims, as 
already mentioned above, to tackle the absence of anarchism in IR-theory 
through the engagement and subsequent deployment of constituent power. 
Diverging framings of power, it is argued, impact on how IR conducts its 
enquiries. The mobilization of qualitatively different types of power consequently 
touches upon the methodological dimension of knowledge-production, and 
impacts on how IR approaches the study global political phenomena in the first 
place. The study departs from the assumption that discourses on IR-theory have 
neglected constituent power so far, and privileged instead varying kinds of 
constituted power (i.e. direct or institutional force). This overly narrow framing 
impacts on how the discipline theorizes the emergence, maintenance, and 
transformation of global political space in general, and the exercise of agency in 
international affairs more specifically.
 The research-project offers a critical narration of IR key-concepts along 
the lines of philosophical anarchism - a reading which is supported by the 
deployment of constituent power in various ways: chapter II discusses the 
centrality of power to the study of IR, and engages in a systematic evaluation of 
the discipline’s underlying methodological assumptions. Chapter III and IV assess 
anarchist philosophy against the background of constituent force, and establish a 
firm  connection between the two traditions of political thought. Chapter V circles 
back to IR’s internal discourse on power, and discusses the potential contribution 
of anarchist philosophy to this particular part of the discipline. Chapters VI, VII, 
and VIII eventually explore the conceptual implications of an amalgamation of 
constituent power and anarchist political theory through an engagement with a 




II | THE POWER-TRAP
1. Introduction: power discourses
 The primary aim of this chapter is to assess whether certain types of 
power are indeed inconsistently applied in IR-theory. This part of the thesis 
discusses the centrality of power to the study of IR/geopolitics, and engages in a 
systematic evaluation of the discipline’s underlying methodological assumptions 
(section one). Section two investigates into the resonance of different 
conceptualizations of power through a close reading of the works of four 
prominent political theorists, namely Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjellen, Thomas 
Barnett, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. An engagement with these early and 
contemporary works of IR-theory has the aim  of tracing the presence of a 
potential lacuna through the field’s history. The third and final part of the chapter 
evaluates the findings and addresses the conceptual implications that might derive 
from a potential lack of  certain types of  power in IR-theory.
 Framing International Relations as a ‘power discourse’ might be 
unwarranted as it brings with it the danger of an undifferentiated and sweeping 
generalization, which fails to grasp the complexity and capillarity of an academic 
discourse that deals, in very broad terms, with political phenomena of a non-
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domestic nature. Ever since its genesis in the late 19th and early 20th century the 
discipline that dedicated much of its intellectual effort to the study of territorially 
organized, constitutionally independent authority-structures26 - also referred to as 
states - has tried to grasp the political relevance of institutions such as 
sovereignty, diplomacy, great power politics, the effects of market forces, 
nationalism, emerging notions of human rights and states responsibilities, and 
lately environmental stewardship.27  ‘Power’, however, has always held a special 
place in the minds of IR-researchers: diplomacy, the market, the nation-state, etc. 
are representations of global constitutional authority-structures which, at the very 
same time, denote and regulate the legitimate wielders of  power.28 
 ‘Power’ has been bracketed deliberately in inverted commas to shed light 
on the ambiguous and sometimes elusive nature of a concept that comes in 
various shades and hues: as a resource or capability29, a relational phenomenon30, 
an institutional mechanism31, to name just a few. The seminal Politics Among 
Nations carries The Struggle for Power and Peace in its title, and Morgenthau ensures 
with great care and particularity that his reader understands the momentousness 
of the power-concept for the study of international affairs. Politics as an 
autonomous realm  concerns itself with interests, “interests defined in terms of 
power”.32  Conceptual differences about the impact of units and structures aside, 
Waltz concurs that “neorealism sees power as a possible useful means, with states 
running risks if they have either too little or too much of it. (...) sensible 
statesmen try to have an appropriate amount of it”.33  A conscious prevalence of 
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power is also eminent in liberal studies of international politics. Keohane, for 
instance, argues for the prudent yet directed use of power for the purpose of 
furthering “liberal values”.34  Power might not be constitutive of IR, that means 
the concept does not define its essence as an academic discipline. Yet, IR is, at 
least to a certain extent, a ‘power discourse’, mainly due to its preoccupation with 
transnational-authority structures and its fixation on the question how global 
political outcomes are shaped and produced by certain resourceful actors. 
1.1 Power and epistemology
 There is, however, another reason why the term ‘power discourse’ serves 
as a suitable description of IR. As it will be argued in more detail further below 
power is more than a mere object open for the researcher’s curiosity and enquiry. 
The concept of power impacts on the study of international politics in ways that 
move beyond the question of ontology, namely what  is the unit or referent object  of 
IR’s analysis? Notions of power also define how the discourse conducts its 
enquiries. It consequently touches upon the epistemic dimension of knowledge 
production: how does IR generate knowledge about  global political processes in the first place? 
Or, more specifically, how does IR generate knowledge about the emergence and maintenance 
of  international political space? 
 The following analysis departs from the assumption that especially 
classical and neoclassical discourses of IR and geopolitics are underpinned by a 
very specific  and particularly problematic understanding of power and authority in 
international affairs: these notions of power are specific to the extent that power 
and authority are widely read as a coercive phenomenon; and they appear as 
increasingly problematic since these narrow conceptions of power severely 
impact on how the discourse theorizes the emergence and maintenance of global 
political spaces (i.e. the international). Explicit and implicit notions of power alike 
serve as epistemic devices, and impact on how geopolitics and IR conceive of the 
existence of political realms other than the state-form. The discourse has fallen 
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into a metaphorical ‘power-trap’ and is led astray towards an ontology of the 
international in which political space is constituted and populated by an 
assemblage of discrete, hermetic entities with the capacity to wield, first and 
foremost, subtractive or punitive power.
1.2 IR’s underlying epistemic assumptions (I): the territorial trap
 Before any further elaboration on the notion of a power-trap can take 
place it is indispensable to carve out the critical context into which the concept 
inserts itself. The term power-trap borrows from Agnew’s preceding concept, 
outlined in The Territorial Trap, in which he scrutinized geopolitics’ and IR’s 
narrow territorial focus. Agnew identified three distinct problems that emerge 
from  an epistemology which narrates space predominantly through a territorial 
lens: first, a conceptually entrenched vision of governance that leads into a heroic 
discourse in which the modern nation state is seen as without alternative for 
effectively governing a demos.35  Second, a static and a-historic framing of the 
international with a supposedly fixed geographical and territorial ontology that 
severs the ties between domestic and international zones.36  And third, a 
normalizing and naturalizing process, attached to the practices of territoriality 
and juridical sovereignty, in which states emerge as natural habitats of nations and 
containers of society.37 “The territorial state became not just a political hegemon, 
but a conceptual one as well”38, as Murphy put it.
 The addressee of Agnew’s criticism  are early and mid-20th-century 
discourses of geopolitics and IR, which revolve conceptually around a classical 
triad that comprises of the mutually reinforcing elements of territory, authority, and 
space. What this theoretical cluster signifies is that international political spaces in 
general, and geopolitical spaces in particular, are epistemically conceptualized 
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37 Agnew, “The Territorial Trap”, 68 ff. and Stuart Elden, “Thinking Territory Historically”, Geopolitics 
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through a geographical lens. Classical discourses on geopolitics essentially refer to 
this political construction of territorial entities, i.e. the modern nation-state. 
Consequently notions of authority in relation to political spaces are 
predominantly understood as an agent’s ability to control territory by means of 
contributing to an ontology that hinges at the geographical division of the 
political plane. 
 What Agnew and others propose is not to abandon geopolitics’ territorial 
focus and its geographical narrative altogether. Territory is still deemed important 
for understanding the underlying dynamics behind global political processes.39 
Yet, when applied as a monocausal explanatory factor it is also insufficiently 
equipped for grasping the political gravity of newly emerging spatial forms.40 
Geopolitical anomalies such as the rise of quasi-states - polities without legal 
jurisdiction over territory - challenge not only the juridical notion of sovereignty, 
but severs its intimate boundedness to a specific territory at the very same time.41 
Recent developments suggest that the discipline needs to come to terms with an 
alternative framing of space, which scrutinizes practices of bordering, and grasps 
the function of borders as a “flexible construct of (...) political power”42, 
manifest in cultural, economic, or ideational phenomena alike. Re-conceptualizing 
classical discourses alongside this line is not denying the validity of territorial 
epistemologies. It rather gives rise to a heteronomous account of space by means 
of analytically grasping the co-existence and co-constitution of political entities 
that expose patterns of non-territorial rule, a lack of territorial fixity, and are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive.43
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1.3 IR’s underlying epistemic assumptions (II): the power-trap
 The uniquely innovative element of Agnew’s critical approach is its ability 
to contribute to a reformulation of the space-authority-territory triad by means of 
going beyond territorial epistemologies. In pursuance of deepening and 
broadening the already advanced criticism this thesis suggest that targeting the 
remaining authority/power component will further augment geopolitics’/IR’s 
ontological horizon, and lead towards an anarchist-informed conception of 
geopolitics in which space is constituted by notions of constitutive and 
productive forms of power. Coupled to classical discourses of geopolitics and IR 
is a distinct apprehension of what authority signifies in international affairs, and 
how it affects both, the dynamics within the global political arena as well as the 
spatial representation of international political realms. Political authority is 
routinely equated with the ability to wield power, while power is narrated as the 
state’s potential to exercise causal, coercive dominance over other actors by means 
of pushing them towards decisions they would have not taken otherwise. In 
short: political authority in a classical framing is closely associated with the 
capacity to mobilize and exert coercive power and potentially violent forms of 
authority.
 This affiliation of the classical discourse with an admittedly narrow and 
perhaps even deliberately unequivocal reading of authority has two distinct 
effects: First, power is mainly understood as a resource that can be possessed, 
wielded, directed, and mobilized by states for the purpose of goal-attainment in a 
foreign policy context. Second, and more importantly for the argument to be 
developed in this chapter, a narrow fixation on one type of authority/power also 
affects the way in which geopolitics and IR as an academic discipline theorizes 
upon the constitution of geopolitical spaces, namely by means of mobilizing 
classical notions of coercive power. Hence, classical geopolitical space exists 
(supposedly) only by virtue of an underlying coercive process. The subsequent 
analysis sheds light on the fact that classical geopolitical thinkers such as Ratzel, 
Kjellen, or Haushofer were by no means ignorant of forms of power other than 
coercion. They had, however, good reasons to limit their theoretical endeavors to 
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geopolitical spaces that are qua definition formed and maintained through a 
coercive process: namely states. Haushofer, for instance, addressed his writings 
specifically to politicians, diplomats, and political practitioners and had no 
elevated interest in dignifying or ascribing agency and legitimacy to demoi other 
than the state-form.44 
 Murphy’s statement according to which “the territorial state became not 
just a political hegemon, but a conceptual one as well”45 then acquires a second 
meaning. The conceptual hegemony of statism  affects the making and thinking of 
geopolitical space beyond the notion of territorial exclusivity, and reaches out 
into the realm  of power: hegemonic territoriality accompanied by hegemonic authority  - 
territorial trap and power-trap side by side. Barnett and Duvall note that the 
“failure to develop alternative conceptions of power limits the ability of 
international relations scholars to understand how global outcomes are 
produced”.46  This chapter proposes that the very ability to conceive different, 
intertwining forms of power also directly influences the discipline’s ability to 
theorize the emergence of order beyond the state-form (i.e. the constitution of 
geopolitical space via the exercise of non-coercive forms of power). When 
questions about the nature of order in international politics is posed, notions of 
power must be conceived as an essential epistemic tool to grasp different types of 
structuring processes. The diverging qualities of power hence function as a lens 
and enable the scholar to grasp the multiple elements of the transnational’s 
ontological constitution.
1.4 A taxonomy of  power
 The subsequent analysis mobilizes Barnett’s and Duvall’s taxonomy of 
power, which provides a synthetic approach to the study of relational power, and 
conceptually amalgams aspects of direct control, institutional force, and social 
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constitution. The taxonomy has been chosen for two particular reasons: first, due 
to its ability of demonstrating the parallel activity of different forms of power in 
international politics, without giving primacy to one type of power over 
another.47  And second, because the taxonomy-model offers a blend of actor-
centered and constitutive approaches, which allows for a multidimensional 
conception of the phenomenon, while avoiding a ‘good’ vs. ‘bad’ power 
dichotomy.48 Departing from the assumption that power is first and foremost a 
relational phenomenon that operates “in and through social relations”49  and 
shapes the “capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate”50 
Barnett and Duvall suggest to conceptualize power alongside two axis: relational 
specificity, and the kind of social relation through which actors capacities are 
affected.51 The resulting matrix leads to a taxonomy of power which comprises of 
compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive elements.52
 Compulsory  power comes closest to the capability-model which is widely 
exposed by realist IR theories: states are constructed as rational actors, black 
boxes even, that possess intentionality and operate within a self-help system 
under the premises of maximizing their chances of survival. Conflicts of interest 
are resolved by material, symbolic, or normative means, which are perceived of as 
resources and can be mobilized for the purpose of goal attainment.53 
Compulsory power is structured around A’s ability to constrain and limit B’s 
actions, while actor A has power over actor B only “because it has material and 
ideational resources at its disposal” which allow for effective goal attainment - 
devoid of  these resources A’s power is lacking. 
 Institutional power overlaps with compulsion in so far as both stress 






51 Ibid., 45 ff.
52 Ibid., 43.
53 Ibid., 49.
governing biases of institutions.54  Contrary to compulsion institutional power 
permits action at a distance, and acknowledges actors ability to exercise control by 
indirect means, i.e. through formal and informal institutions.55  Institutions are 
seen as “instrument(s) of compulsory power”56  and privilege certain actors by 
means of providing them with act-capacity. An empowered actor does not need 
to dominate the institution in question - holding an elevated position, or being 
equipped with certain rights, is already a phenomenon deriving from institutional 
power.57
 Structural power, pays attention to the “co-constitutive internal relations”58 
that determine actors subject-positions within a socio-political system and 
presupposes a certain degree of direct relationality. Internal relations hence need 
to be understood as mutually constitutive, which means an actor A “exists only 
by virtue of its relation to structural position B”.59 A and B are not always already 
socialized political subjects, as they would have been in a setting where coercive 
power reigns, but owe their very existence to a reciprocal, generative, and co-
constitutive process - A could not come into existence without B, and vice versa. A 
master-slave relationship, were subject positions are dependent on mutual co-
constitution, or the capital-labor nexus in the capitalist economic system are 
prime examples for structural forms of  power.60
 Productive power, departs form  the structural model by leaving the 
necessity of direct structural relations behind, favoring instead diffuse process of 
social generation.61 Productive power is post-structural to the extent that it allows 
to conceive power in terms not necessarily defined by hierarchical relations.62 











discourse, for instance, is heavily charged with binaries.63 However, due to the fact 
that productive power puts a special emphasis on the diffuse character of 
constitutive power it allows for a greater variety of overlapping and intersecting 
systems of knowledge, discourses, or practices which can but don’t have to be co-
constitutive, i.e. discourses on gender, failed states, universal ethical norms and 
standards, and so forth.64
2. Power and the making of  political space
 The overarching question that guides the following section is: which type 
of power is predominantly mobilized by classical and neoclassical discourses of 
IR and geopolitics, and how does it impact on the conception of global political 
space? The analysis focuses on four specific writers: Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf 
Kjellen, Thomas Barnett, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. This particular set of 
geopolitical theoreticians has been chosen because they represent different stages 
in the development and evolution of geopolitical thought. While Ratzel and 
Kjellen count as early geopolitical thinkers (late 19th to early 20th century) with 
decisive influence on subsequent generations of theorists, Barnett and Brzezinski 
stand last in a line of the still evolving discipline, and represent contemporary 
forms of geopolitical reasoning. Furthermore, the selected authors represent 
distinct and quite heterogenous approaches to the field of geopolitics: for Ratzel 
the state counts as a mere tool which safeguards the integrity of the soil, while 
Kjellen stresses the ethico-politico underpinning of (geo)political conduct. 
Barnett falls in the category of liberal institutionalism, whereas Brzezinski 
represents a strand of state-based multilateralism. It is the prime objective of this 
section to flesh out the theories underlying notions of political authority, in order 
to gain a more comprehensive insight into how power as an epistemic lens 




2.1 Friedrich Ratzel: Anthropogeographie
 In Ratzel’s view states are first and foremost purely instrumental 
constructs - associations of need - which come into existence through a social 
contract that hinges at the aggregation of subjective and individual wills, hence 
they are aggregated organisms (Aggregatorganismus).65  The soil, a second political 
key element in Ratzel’s thought, secures the survival of the nation, and the state 
acts as its protector.66  Initially the state’s activity is limited to safeguarding the 
integrity of the land, but the farther states progress the more competences they 
take on in supporting the development of capabilities, i.e. through fostering trade 
relations, which feeds back and increases the state’s strength as well - its ultimate 
purpose, however, remains the provision of  protection.67
 What determines the nature of the state - and the types of power 
mobilized - becomes visible if one looks into the relation between the state and 
the nation. As mentioned the state serves as the soil’s protector, and the soil is the 
guarantor for a nation’s survival. The state-soil-nation relation is, however, not 
transitory, and the state is not necessarily the protector of the nation - in fact, the 
state-nation relationship is at times heavily charged with tensions and the state’s 
ability to manage territory effectively interferes with the nation’s permanent 
moves of occasional contraction and, more importantly, its desire to expand. 
Verdichtung, literary translated into compression, or, more suitable in this context, 
overcrowding is the key to the notion of power and order that defines the state-
form.68  Ratzel’s state is clearly a self-sufficient security maximizer and has the 
inherent tendency to value the status quo and the prevailing balance of power 
within the international system.69 The state does not know organic expansion - if 
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it expands, it does so politically. As an aggregated organism (Aggregatorganismus) its 
growth presupposes a, and is causally dependent on, the prior existence of a 
political will to expand.70  The nation on the other side is ignorant of political 
borders. Other than the state it grows similar to an organism  and won’t be limited 
by the narrow territorial confinements of the state-form.71  It is in fact this 
permanent tendency of the nation to expand that keeps it alive as a socio-cultural 
body: nations that can not grow, or clash with other nations, lose out against 
competing entities that have enough space at their disposal to strive and expand 
unhampered.72
 It is now up to the state to react to this pressure and to regulate internal 
friction.73 In cases were the perspective of expansion is not given the state will 
turn against the nation by means of curbing its organic drive to grow: practices 
such as abandoning sickly newborns or permitting blood vengeance for libel are, 
in Ratzel’s understanding, archaic mechanisms for population control.74 
Regulating population growth is a viable option for decreasing internal friction in 
the short term  - in the long run the state will attempt to keep pace with the 
nation’s growth and synchronize it with its own political and territorial 
expansion.75  This forceful political expansion of the state - the Kampf um Raum 
and the strive for Großraum76 - is eventually a means that supports and fosters the 
nation’s desire for growth.77 
 While Ratzel’s geopolitical narrative exposes traits of productive, 
structural, and institutional power it rests on a predominantly compulsory 
foundation into which the other three types collapse: states do indeed mobilize 
certain forms of productive power, i.e. when permitting the above mentioned 
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their inside and exercise control over life through positively sanctioning certain 
practices which contribute to the production of governable subjectivities. 
However, the mobilization of the nations’ productive potential is only 
instrumental and has the purpose of protecting the soil and strengthen available 
capabilities. Fostering trade relations through institutional arrangements functions 
in the same vain: states engage in economic exchange with each other, but they 
do so only for the purpose of developing their capabilities - the prime objective 
of the state remains the protection of the nation’s territory.78 In structural terms 
states mutually constitutive positions are dictated by the exogenous logic of the 
international system: the nation’s growth and the resulting compression forces all 
states - as guardians of the soil - into an exhausting and attritional battle of 
political and territorial expansion, which they cannot chose to fight but are forced 
to take on, since they are in the first place constructed as war-fighting machineries 
with the ability to mobilize extensive forms of  compulsory power.
2.2 Rudolf  Kjellen: Der Staat als Lebensform
 Kjellen suggested that a comprehensive science of the state must put itself 
in a theoretical position which allows it to conceive the state as a synthetic and 
integrated socio-political phenomenon. The juridical and administrative side 
(authority and sovereignty) is accompanied and supplemented by sociopolitical, 
politico-economic, ethnopolitical, and geopolitical elements.79  While the first 
three elements constitute a realm of creativity and genesis (Kulturseite), ethno- and 
geopolitics fall into the realm of necessity (Naturseite) which is dominated by a 
struggle for growth and existence and cannot be entirely governed or controlled 
by law or economic rationality.80  Kjellen finally arrives at an anthropomorphic 
conception of the state and argues that the instrumental rationality of the liberal-
juridical model fails to capture the state’s organic feature: its ability to cultivate a 
personality, the will to expand, the struggle for live, and the capacity for 
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developing purely self-referential interests.81  The state is quite literarily a living 
organism82 - human-like in fact - and is as such driven by rationality (expressed 
through law, culture, economic exchange, c.f. Kulturseite) and appetite (the desire to 
expand culturally and geographically, c.f. Naturseite).83
 Ratzel and Kjellen disagree over the characteristics that describe the state-
form best: state-as-a-person (anthropomorphic) vs. state-as-an-institution (aggregated 
organism). This disagreement leads to a number of competing interpretations 
about the functioning and the purpose of the state and its relation to the soil and 
the nation. However, despite a series of disagreements, Ratzel’s and Kjellen’s 
states have in common that they act predominantly under the premise of 
compulsory and direct power. For Ratzel this has already been demonstrated in 
the previous section. Regarding Kjellen’s theory of geopolitics one needs to look 
closely at the external realm of necessity (Naturseite) where state-organisms 
perform  the struggle for life, this most basic, highly essential, fiercely fought 
Kampf um Dasein.84  The state as a synthetic phenomenon also comprises of a 
generative Kulturseite which entails creative politico-juridicial, politico-economic, 
and socio-economic elements. This suggests that there should be plenty of room 
for structural and productive accounts of power within the political process. 
Kjellen notes, however, that the state’s structural and productive side is 
predominantly inward facing and, much more importantly, completely enwrought 
by the logic of compulsory power represented in the Naturseite-elements of 
ethno- and geopolitics: “the state as the wielder of power and force precedes the 
state as a politico-juridicial phenomenon - not vice versa”.85 If lost in its extreme 
the nature-culture hierarchy can even go so far that the state’s generative powers 
cease to exist entirely when the struggle for life intensifies and the desire for 
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growth and expansion wreaks havoc on the previously established order86: “states 
cherish the law, but they value their survival even more”.87 
 The emergence of the nature-culture hierarchy begs the question where 
the structural fixity that forces states into a life-or-death struggle, which can only 
be fought by means of mobilizing compulsive power, eventually comes from? The 
answer lies in Kjellen’s anthropomorphic metaphor which strongly suggests that 
states are possessive individualists, pre- or auto-constituted by their own virtue, 
jealously protecting their uniqueness and individuality in an agent-to-agent battle 
for survival. The geopolitical element of this “natural urge for delimination”88 
can be found in the principle of geographical and ethnical individualization: if 
the state is a person, then the territory is its body and the nation its character.89 
States attempt to emancipate themselves from  other geopolitical entities and must 
strive for autarky and self sufficiency, which allows them to preserve their 
uniqueness and independence.90  While autarky is the bedrock for self-
determination, expansion and conquest are the guarantors for continued 
existence. States are not necessarily characterized by a raw appetite for territorial 
expansion, but the “categorial imperative of self-preservation”91, which is tied to 
the necessity of acquiring new living-space in order to prevent debilitating stasis, 
forces states onto the battlefields92  and nurtures their egoistic will to power.93 
Great power politics hence is a quasi-biological phenomenon and the geopolitical 
version of a struggle for life which derives from  states natural drive towards 
geographical and ethnical individualization. The biological determinism  leads to 
persistent rivalry, naturally given relatedness, and the death of states which are 
subject to perishableness like all other organisms.94 The struggle for life and death 
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is necessarily fought by means of mobilizing direct and coercive forms of power 
which are the only guarantors for surviving in the external realm  of necessity 
(Naturseite) and which enwroughts the domestic realm of genesis (Kulturseite) 
where institutional, structural, and productive power can be found.
2.3 Thomas Barnett: The Pentagon’s New Map
 Barnett’s The Pentagon’s New Map is situated in the area of conflict- and 
security studies and attempts to work out a new operating theory for the post-
Cold War (and post-9/11) environment that helps to identify threats, delineate 
conditions for stability, and establishes a new rule-set for the legitimate use of 
violence in international affairs.95 Barnett notes that the attacks of September 11 
had a catalyzing effect on the search for a new grand strategy that could replace 
the outdated Cold War-policy of containment. September 11 served as a system 
perturbation and demonstrated how “globalization was remaking the global security 
environment”.96 And it hinted towards the necessity of devising new rule sets for 
international security politics.97  This newly emerging perspective urges policy 
makers to “view the global security environment as divided between those states 
that adhere to globalization’s security rule-set (the Core) and those that do not 
(the Gap)”.98 The Core is defined as the ‘connected’ states that synchronize their 
domestic affairs with the flows of globalization and foster a domestic order that 
goes on par with norms such as democracy, rule of law, and free market 
capitalism.99 The Gap is ‘disconnected’ from globalization and not willing or able 
to accept its newly emerging rule-set. While the Core is governed by a condition 
that comes “awfully close to Kant’s perpetual peace” the Gap resembles the 
Hobbesian state of  nature in which live is nasty, brutish, and short.100 
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 Barnett’s ostensibly liberal-institutionalist paradigm is heavily dependent 
on, and backed by, compulsory and direct power and a centralized vision of 
order. Barnett favors, as mentioned, a rule-based approach to global security: 
rules provide for predictability and security, and the process of globalization, in 
concert with the prospects of socio-political integration, is one possible paradigm 
that could lead to the delineation of a new security-consensus. The problem that 
emerges in this context is that rule-sets do not necessarily spread on their own, 
and, more importantly, are often refuted by actors who prefer diverging norms. In 
the present case in which adherence to the rules of globalization equals 
connectedness (the Core) refusal to commit to certain politico-economic norms 
(disconnectedness, the Gap) breeds danger.101 
 Barnett repeatedly reiterates his call to engage in the “historical process of 
shrinking the Gap”102  and of “making globalization truly global”103, mainly by 
means of tackling rogue states, bad leaders and warlords.104 The market needs an 
enforcer for properly spreading its rules in the Gap (military-market link), and the 
U.S. and its military are the only agent capable of acting as the much needed Gap-
Leviathan.105  This Leviathan-force operates under the premises of preemption 
and has a strong focus on military capabilities which allows it to function as a 
global police force: its major emphasis lies on rapid deployment into the Gap, it 
preempts where and when possible, stays offensive, and acts unilaterally.106 
Barnett adds that military intervention and the frequent policing of globalization’s 
frontiers is not enough, and calls for the supplementation of the Leviathan by a 
System-Admin-force: after breaking the resistance of Gap-actors who wish to 
disconnect themselves from the market the System Admin steps in and 








globalization.107  While the Leviathan is a “force for might”, the System  Admin 
represents a “force for right”.108
 In terms of the underlying notions of power the strategy of “waging war 
within the context of everything else”109  exposes clear patterns of institutional, 
structural, and productive power which is mainly wielded by the System Admin 
force. Barnett clearly understands that security defined as adherence to the rule-
set of globalization can only exist within the setting of the market place (which 
represents institutional power). In order to establish this novel security landscape, 
subject-positions and subjectivities need to be manipulated: the implementation 
of mutually constitutive structural relations between capital and labour is required 
(utilizing structural power), in concert with a deep commitment towards 
individualism, economic rationality, and the maximization of personal gains 
(through discourses which represent productive power). 
 The institutional/structural/productive power exposed by the System 
Admin force is however only secondary to the war-fighting Leviathan-force. 
Barnett’s framework must collapse into compulsory power and a highly 
centralized vision of order. The military-market link subordinates other forms of 
power to the Leviathan’s ability to ‘wage war in the context of everything else’. 
This happens by means of mobilizing its clearly superior military capabilities for 
the purpose of establishing, maintaining, and policing a global security 
environment which revolves around the politico-economic reality of globalized 
liberalism. Power in this case is first and foremost compulsory, and only in second 
instance institutional/structural/productive - the attached vision of order is again 
first and foremost centralized, and only then characterized by institutional, 
structural, and biopolitical patterns.
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2.4 Zbigniew Brzezinski: Strategic Vision
 Brzezinski’s Strategic  Vision presents the reader with a sober and 
levelheaded approach to US foreign policy and is underpinned by a cautious and 
hesitant optimism. For Brzezinski the international is no frontier that awaits 
domestication, but rather a finite and carefully calibrated system whose 
manipulation requires outmost care and great, foresightful prudence - instead of 
changing the rules underpinning international affairs one must learn how to act 
within the close confinements of an already established system. Similarly to 
Barnett Brzezinski wishes to delineate the margins of US foreign policy for the 
upcoming decades. Where Barnett and Brzezinski disagree is the role of the U.S. 
in world affairs: Barnett is convinced of the progressive expansion of the United 
States’ military and ideological influence, while Brzezinski notes that its 
“leadership is increasingly questioned”.110  Instances of terrorism, small-scale 
conflicts, and bad leadership in the Gap are, however, not the prime concern of 
Brzezinski when he notes that “terrorism can intensify international turmoil but it 
cannot define its substance”.111  Much more attention should instead be paid to 
the system-level dimension of the international, and the fact that the ascension of 
some Asian economies disturbs the prevalent balance of power.112  Despite the 
relative decline of Western hegemony the U.S. is still in a position to manage the 
transition and assert itself, if not as hegemon then at least as a remaining super 
power: as “balancer and conciliator between major powers in the East”113  - and 
not as a Gap-Leviathan.
 In terms of the notions of power and order that underlies Strategic Vision 
one can identify two separate operational layers: a mode of power that is active 
exclusively at the domestic level, and another one which gets mobilized by the 
state on an international level. 
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 In order to understand how power works at the domestic level, it is 
necessary to pay close attention to the strategic assets at a state’s disposal, namely 
its capabilities. Brzezinski comes up with at least five different categories that are 
of importance for evaluating the endogenously generated strength of a state: 
these are economic, material, political, geographical, and ideological in nature.114 
The first category, economic performance, is of outmost importance, since the 
global ranking of power has changed dramatically due to the economic success of 
some Asian states.115 There exists a power-economy nexus, and the strength of a 
state is inseparably tied to its commercial basis.116 It is hence in the interest of a 
state to cultivate and develop its capabilities as far as possible - and in order to do 
that it has the opportunity to work across the entire spectrum of power: it can 
take care of a decaying national infrastructure by means of public contracts, 
direct investment, and subsidies (direct power)117; a gridlocked and partisan 
political system can be fixed through institutional reform (institutional power)118; 
social unrest, income inequality, and stagnating social mobility ought to be tackled 
by a new consensus between capital and labour (structural power, i.e. the New 
Deal)119; and a demos susceptible for reactive mobilization could be united under 
the umbrella of a narrative that conveys a sense of purpose, pride, strength, and 
progression (productive power, i.e. the American Dream).120
 However, on the international level the multiple resources at a state’s 
disposal quickly collapse into a national-power-approach in which constitutive 
elements (structural and productive alike) do not resonate in international affairs. 
Brzezinski emphasizes that patterns of order in the international realm  are 
predominantly dependent on an international pecking order, which is influenced 
by the capabilities actors are able to mobilize. The best strategy for survival in the 









state to pursue its national interest free from the interference of others.121  A 
rising China counts as a powerful actor, not by virtue of successfully translating 
all four dimensions of power into its international conduct, but due to the fact 
that it marshals direct, institutional, structural, and productive forces for the 
purpose of increasing its national power.122 The parallels to Ratzel and Kjellen are 
immediately visible: states develop their Hilfsquellen (capabilities, c.f. Ratzel) for 
the purpose of achieving autarky (c.f. Kjellen). Constitutive forms of power are 
exogenous to the international - they are mobilized for developing capabilities, 
but they do not spill over into global politics. International politics is then 
primarily characterized by the workings of compulsory power. Brzezinski 
acknowledges however that institutional power can play a decisive role in 
international politics as well. Institutional power is endogenous to international 
politics since states can attempt to position themselves most favorably within the 
system by means of building alliances destined to alter the international pecking-
order: “America can play a constructive role in promoting restraint between the 
key players (...) through active political, diplomatic, and economic support for a 
regional balance of power”.123  Power, and the resulting patterns of order in 
international affairs, are then characterized by a second, considerably thinner, yet 
less centralized institutional layer which sits on top of the already discussed 
compulsory basis.
3. Conclusion: the power-trap and the ontology of  political space
 It was the main purpose of the preceding analysis to expose the type of 
power predominantly mobilized in classical and neoclassical discourses of IR and 
geopolitics. The analysis was based on the working hypothesis that the ability of 
the discipline to theorize the nature of geopolitical space depends heavily on the 
underlying notion of authority, through which the ontological constitution of the 
international is framed. To recall, critical geopolitics (most notably Agnew) 
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succeeded in reframing geopolitics’ understanding of space by means of 
abandoning its territorial focus - Agnew attempted quit literarily to evade the 
territorial trap. To paraphrase Agnew: this section of the thesis wishes to evade 
the power-trap. The chapter opened with the argument that classical geopolitics 
exposes a narrow focus on direct and compulsive forms of power. This leads the 
discipline into a framing of geopolitical space as an assemblage of discrete and 
hermetic entities, dominated by a quantitatively limited set of actors that wield 
first and foremost subtractive or punitive power. It was further argued that power 
functions as an epistemic lens and that notions of order are functions of power. 
If the discipline would mobilize a greater variety of epistemic lenses when 
looking at international affairs it could arrive at a very different understanding of 
what order and space in geopolitics signifies.
 The previous section clearly demonstrates that a red thread runs through 
the reviewed writings, and that their exposed vision of international affairs is 
almost exclusively based on direct forms of power and centralized visions of 
order. This insight is even more remarkable if one considers the heterogenous 
nature of the analyzed texts: almost 130 years separate the earliest piece of 
writing (Ratzel, 1882) from  the latest (Brzezinski, 2012). And while all authors 
speak to the wider discipline of geopolitics, their respective theories operate 
across a highly diverse set of political traditions: for Ratzel the state is a means to 
an end, a tool, whereas Kjellen claims that states are ethico-political phenomena 
and similar to organisms. Barnett is closely associated with liberal institutionalism 
and economic cosmopolitanism, while Brzezinski aligns with the tradition of 
defensive realism. What binds them together is their common framing of power 
in international affairs as necessarily compulsive. For Ratzel the state acts as the 
‘guardian of the soil’ who responds reluctantly to the nation’s natural urge to 
expand. In the emerging scramble over living-space it prevails because of its 
ability to mobilize compulsive forms of power. In Kjellen’s anthropomorphic 
concept the nation and its territory coincide, and form  the character and the body 
of the state, which must wield compulsory means if it wants to survive in the 
epic battle for Lebensraum. A century later Barnett proclaims the United States as 
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the ‘guardian of globalization’, whose expanding frontiers must be backed by 
military force. Brzezinski’s much more cautious policy-proposals rest heavily on a 
national power approach in which a state’s chances of survival depends on its 
ability to translate domestic assets into military-backed foreign policy actions.
 Bottom  line all four authors do indeed expose a heavy reliance on 
compulsory forms of power in international affairs. This is problematic, as 
Barnett and Duvall point out, because the “failure to develop alternative 
conceptions of power limits the ability of international relations scholars to 
understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors are differentially 
enabled and constrained to determine their fates”.124 The exposed narrow focus 
on compulsory power impacts on how the discipline conceives the possibility of 
order in international affairs, which is, in the cases at hand, necessarily dependent 
on a central orderer who organizes space by potentially violent means. If power is 
predominantly framed as being compulsive, the international is ontologically 
constituted around centralized clusters of order-making mechanisms: Ratzel’s 
guardians of the soil, Kjellen’s state-organisms, Barnett’s Gap Leviathan, and 
Brzezinski’s international pecking order of  states.
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CHAPTER THREE
III | THE EARLY ANARCHISTS
1. Introduction: the anarchist tradition of  political thought
 Chapter II diagnosed a general lack of productive (or constituent) power 
in IR-theory and discussed the potential implications for the study of world 
politics. The upcoming three chapters depart from this initial analysis, and ask to 
what extend the anarchist tradition of political thought would be capable of 
addressing the absence of constituent power in IR-theory. Is the tradition in the 
position to successfully institutionalize constituent power in IR? And, more 
specifically, which author(s) are best suited for this particular task? How would 
such a mobilization of constituent power look in concrete terms? And how 
would a joint deployment of anarchism and constituent power resonate with IR’s 
power-discourse? 
 Towards that end chapter III takes a closer look at mutualist, collectivist, 
communist, and individualist strands of anarchist political theory, and aims at 
presenting a series of theoretical approaches who might be capable of evading 
and circumnavigating the previously identified power-trap. The authors chosen 
for this first round of evaluation are Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Michael Bakunin, 
Peter Kropotkin, William Godwin, Max Stirner, and Gustav Landauer. Chapter 
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III is of a largely descriptive and deliberately broad nature, and aims at presenting 
the often diverging trajectories of a philosophical tradition hitherto neglected in 
IR-theory. The chapter performs preparatory or contextualizing work for chapter 
IV, which then deals much more explicitly with constituent force in the context of 
Proudhon’s theory of power. Due to the close connection between chapter III 
and IV the transition from  the former to the latter proceeds without a separate 
conclusion. This conclusion, which reflects on the co-mobilization of anarchism 
and constituent power, is provided for at the end of  chapter IV.
2. Anarchist key-authors: surveying 19th-century anarchism
2.1 Pierre-Joseph Proudhon
“Liberty is not the Daughter but the Mother of  Order”
 Social individualism constitutes the point of departure of Proudhon’s 
political theory. In his narrative the individual receives priority for all types of 
normative reasoning, and constitutes the starting point, as well as the ultimate 
goal, of community.125  The social-individualist ontology evolves in concentric 
circles on three stages: justice does not derive from  a distant and abstract 
principle (such as god or reason) - it is rather the individual which constitutes the 
primary source of ethics and morality. The individual, however, does not exist in 
isolation and solitude, and is deeply rooted in social environments and 
communities of various types and scales (the second circle). The third layer 
comprises of the norms and institutions which have been developed within a 
specific social setting. These practices feed back into the individual and shape the 
moral intuition of the person - a process that can be beneficial, but equally 
derogatory to the composition of moral instincts.126 Although Proudhon might 
look like an idealist at first glance his anarchism  draws from  a rationalist 
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perfectionist epistemology and a semi-teleological concept of history.127 In Justice 
in the Revolution and Church he emphasizes mankind’s capacity for rationality and 
portrays historical progress as a quasi-deterministic process.128  Accordingly 
human nature is, at least to a certain degree, unalterable, and basic traces of moral 
knowledge are always already present in the person.129  It is contestable whether 
Proudhon can be regarded as a utopian thinker: in General Idea of  Revolution in the 
Nineteenth Century  he parades a believe in the perfectibility of man, whilst 
regarding the process of moral evolution as indefinite.130  The process is hence 
open-ended and utopia can never be reached. Proudhon’s anarchism becomes 
evident in his comments on government and statism in General Idea of  Revolution in 
the Nineteenth Century. He perceives both as an insult to mankind’s immanent 
morality and the rational process in which justice unfolds in the course of history. 
To be governed meant for Proudhon to be “authorized, recommended, 
admonished, prevented, reformed, set right, corrected”, all in the name of an 
obscure public good.131  Instead of deriving the conditions for authority from 
governance, government, and public law he recommends their replacement with 
contracts that are negotiated individually between political subjects and have the 
purpose of  bringing back autonomy, responsibility, and justice to the social realm.
 Three core elements of Proudhon’s philosophy need to be regarded as 
genuinely innovative: the federal principle, the concept of socio-economic 
mutualism, and his takes on property. In The Principle of  Federation Proudhon 
elaborates extensively on a form of government which abandons centralization 
and rests instead on federal arrangements. Federalism represents the embodiment 
of freedom, as it is conductive to the truly anarchist principle of self-
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government.132 In this reading government has a rather positive connotation and 
is no longer perceived as coercive, but instead as a platform conductive to 
anarchist political activities. The ensuing federation should ideally comprise of 
multiple units of property-owning, independent labour-associations. Certain 
forms of stratification would be permissible in order to initiate and coordinate 
political action.133 Likewise one will find in The Principle of  Federation a proposal for 
an exchange-system between political units governed on the basis of mutualist 
practices. The functioning of such a regime is supposed to be ensured by a 
number of imperatives, i.e. respect for individual liberty, reciprocal benefits of 
capital, and the constitution of government by industrial groups.134  What is 
Property? elaborates on the relation between autonomy and property, and provides 
a strong argument against socialist and communist visions of the nationalization 
of private wealth.135 Proudhon viewed private property as necessity for obtaining 
autonomy, and labeled the aforementioned collectivist ideologies ‘enemies of 
freedom’: “The communists in general are under a strange illusion: fanatics of 
state power, they claim that they can use the state authority to ensure, by 
measures of restitution, the well-being of the workers who created the collective 
wealth. As if the individual came into existence after society, and not society after 
the individual”.136  What is Property? speaks favorable of private ownership, while 
arguing for the monitoring of its usage by the public. This highly differentiated 
view puts Proudhon in equidistance to authoritarian socialists and communists on 
the one side, and radical capitalists on the other.137
 Proudhon’s political philosophy is also characterized by an overly 
optimistic take on the possibilities offered by decentralization and contract-based 
governance. As already mentioned above, The Principle of Federation suggests to 
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replace public law with individualized contracts, effectively permitting each 
citizen, town, union, etc. to formulate its own laws. Moral relativism is certainly 
looming here, and under conditions of true ‘self-law’ (autonomy) anti-
emancipatory practices such as slavery would become possible. In The Principle of 
Federation Proudhon falls victim to his own rationalistic and teleological method, 
and to an overly faithful believe in the ‘invisible hand’ of immanent justice. By 
means of relying on these forces, and by claiming that if they were given the 
opportunity to unfold in an unrestricted fashion, he adopts a problematic fatalism 
in which an abstract principle of justice trumps the concrete moral reasoning of 
the individual. Deriving from this assumption Proudhon introduces an equally 
problematic divide between politics and economics, which gives rise to a heroical 
discourse in which the latter receives priority over the former: “political function 
have been reduced to industrial functions, and social order arises from  noting but 
transactions and exchange. Each may then say that he is the absolute ruler of 
himself ”.138  While dismissing the model of society governed by a state-centric 
logic, Proudhon puts much faith in the problem-solving capacity of economic 
rationales, while leaving the question of how to address and prevent potentially 
emerging localist and parochial tendencies unanswered.
2.2 Michael Bakunin
“Freedom without  Socialism is privilege and injustice, and Socialism without freedom is slavery 
and brutality”
 Bakunin counts as the founder of a thread of collectivist anarchism and 
focuses in his works predominantly on the organizational, emancipatory, and 
revolutionary potential of groups, communities, and other types of 
associations.139 The collectivists depart from a different social ontology than the 
aforementioned mutualists (i.e. Proudhon) and hesitate to put the individual into 
the centre of theoretical and normative reasoning. The singular person is rather 
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understood as part of larger, collective entities. While Proudhon had a rather 
Kantian understanding of reason and rationality, Bakunin opts for a slightly more 
Hegelian interpretation in which reason can only develop through the very 
practices of a society. The imperative of community-centrism  is formulated in 
The Paris Commune and the Idea of  the State, which argues that humans are unable to 
prosper if they position themselves outside of societal arrangements.140  Even 
strong and intelligent individuals cannot escape the attractions of solidarity, as it 
is claimed in Marxism, Freedom, and the State.141 Based on this assumptions Bakunin 
develops the following definition of liberty and autonomy: it is the collectivist’s 
attempt to realize “the liberty which consists in the full development of all the 
material, intellectual and moral powers which are to be found as faculties latent in 
everybody, the liberty which recognized no other restrictions than those which 
are traced for us by the laws of our own nature”.142  The Revolutionary Catechism 
defines, complementary to the preceding formulation, justice as equality143, and 
freedom as the “absolute rejection of every authority including that which 
scarifies freedom for the convenience of the state”.144 Bakunin drew a sharp line 
between society and the state and opposed in particular Rousseau’s idea of the 
social contract. The argument developed in Federalism, Socialism, Anti-Theologism 
highlights mankind’s inherent sociability, which was always exercised in various 
social contexts, and designates states as effectively artificial, liberty-depleting 
constructs: “The state is in one way an immediate product of nature. Unlike 
society, it does not precede the awakening of reason in men”145 and further “In 
either case it dominates society and tends to absorb it completely”.146  Statism and 
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Anarchism draws from the state-society-dichotomy and argues that human 
organization should follow a clear bottom-up movement and prioritize 
community-practices, while limiting the influence of supposedly higher-ranking 
entities such as the state.147 Since man is not only “the most individualistic being 
on earth”148, but also “the most social”149, it would be a misconception to deduce 
organizational modes from transcendental principles.150
 The most important contribution of Bakunin’s collectivist anarchism is 
certainly his recognition of the revolutionary potential of all parts of society. 
While early marxists tended to label peasants or the lower working class as 
Lumpenproletariat, it was Bakunin who insisted on a holistic notion of social 
change which attempts to mobilize all members of a society - not only an elitist, 
urban, industrial proletariat.151  The tension between marxism and collectivist 
anarchism becomes most evident in their respective understanding of 
revolutionary practices: while marxists didn’t shy away from potentially 
authoritarian and centralizing practices, involving the seizure of state power, the 
nationalization of the means of production, and the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, (collectivist) anarchists opt for a libertarian and federal organization 
under the control (not the dictatorship!) of workers associations.152  The 
skepticism against the marxist interpretation of Plato’s philosopher-king, and the 
fear of the rise of extensive bureaucracy or an ‘expertocracy’, is uttered in On 
Science and Authority. While Bakunin can certainly not be labeled a leftwing luddite 
or an enemy of scientific reason, he voices concerns against the deployment of 
science as a means of governance.153  This skepticism derives from his latent 
idealism  in which reason is not born outside society but rather in its very centre. 
Finally, and in respect to the desired form of societal organization, it can be said 
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that although Proudhon and Bakunin departed from different analytical plateaus, 
both do arrive at a similar conclusion when it comes to the formal structure of 
the post-statist world. Bakunin’s Revolutionary Catechism advocates for federal and 
communal autonomy, and suggests an association of free federations which are 
supposed to be structured in a bottom-up-like fashion, and divided into 
provinces, nations, and, eventually, the United States of  Europe.154
 While the holistic revolutionary concept of Bakunin is certainly a strength 
of his approach, the vision and the coordination of the revolutionary process 
gives rise to concern. Bakunin concluded in Statism and Anarchy that only a violent 
uprising will be capable of releasing a durable revolutionary momentum. He also 
introduced a clear distinction between the pre- and the post-revolutionary world, 
and leaves little room for transitional stages, while advocating instead for harsh 
and violent moments of rupture. There is no space left for incremental efforts of 
change (like in Landauer’s approach), and a stale aftertaste remains due to the 
potentially totalizing practices and destructive forces which might accompany 
such substantial and severe instances of transformation. Revolutionary  Organization 
and the Secret Society confirms this apprehension, and Bakunin seems to have lost 
all faith in the revolutionary potential of the masses when he suggests to engineer 
revolutionary moments, and to force uprisings through the provocative actions of 
professional insurgents.155 The question is, of course, what kind of revolution is 
triggered by such a potentially violent strategy? In the worst of all cases it might 
put an institutionalized, professional class of vanguards in power, who 
understand themselves as keepers of a revolutionary grail, and are prepared to 
defend their allegedly sacred achievements at all cost.
2.3 Peter Kropotkin
“Nature has thus to be recognized as the first ethical teacher of  man”
 Complementary to the collectivist Bakunin and the mutualist Proudhon a 
third strand of anarchist thought was developed by Kropotkin: the anarchist 
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communist line of reasoning. This position rests, as formulated in The Conquest  of 
Bread, on two pillars: first, the abolition of the state-form (a decidedly anarchist 
component), and second, a system of material distribution which would not be 
directly related to the labour-efforts of individual workers (the communist 
element).156  Under such a regime Kropotkin wishes to introduce a type of 
hedonistic, post-scarcity, agro-industrial communism where “the greatest amounts 
of goods necessary to the well-being of all, with the least possible wast of human 
energy” is produced, and “after bread has been secured, leisure is the supreme 
aim”.157  The anarchist component derives from, and is developed in more detail 
in, his most widely know piece Mutual Aid: A Factor of  Evolution. Departing from 
Darwin’s theory of evolution Kropotkin argues that sociability (mutual aid) is the 
most crucial factor for determining a species success in the process of evolution. 
While animals and humans who live in solitude are doomed, those who cooperate 
and work together have the greatest chances of survival. Struggle as such is not 
taking place within a species, but is rather directed against adverse conditions in 
nature. By refusing social darwinism and its radically individualist implications, 
Kropotkin interprets the theory of evolution from a mutual-aid-perspective. The 
unit of competition is then the species as a whole, and the unit who realizes 
cooperation best is likely to prevail.158  Kropotkin deduces his anarchist theory 
from  the implications of mutual aid: humans are characterized as a priori social 
beings, capable to organize communal life devoid of artificial, external impulses. 
Society and the state are hence essentially different: the former constitutes the 
ideal (read: natural) form of existence, whereas the state-form  emerges at a later 
stage and usurps already existing structures: “the states, when they were called 
later into existence, simply took possession, in the interest of the minorities, of 
all the judicial, economical, and administrative functions which the village 
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community already had exercised in the interest of all”.159  In taking the next 
consequent step Kropotkin argues in Modern Science and Anarchism that the 
political theory of anarchism has nothing to do with metaphysics, dialectics, or 
normative reasoning, but is rather based on scientific insights: “Anarchism  is a 
conception of the universe based on the mechanical interpretation of 
phenomena”, and further “which comprises the whole of nature, including the 
life of human societies and their economic, political, and moral problems. Its 
method is that of natural sciences, and every conclusion it comes to must be 
verified by this method if it pretends to be scientific”.160  Prior to Kropotkin 
others have also made attempts to identify fixed rules and eternal patterns of 
order for the purpose of anchoring anarchism  on firm methodological grounds. 
Kropotkin, however, was the first to derive an anarchist model of society from 
comparatively rigid, scientific investigations.
 While the scientific method upon which Kropotkin bases his communist 
anarchism  is extremely vulnerable to critique (see below), his investigations on the 
origins of the modern state are certainly enlightening. In The State Kropotkin 
elaborates further on the above mentioned distinction between society and state, 
and argues that the latter is not the only form of political organization adopted by 
humankind in the course of history. Before the emergence of nationally unified 
territories in the 16th and 17th century humans lived in clans and tribes, 
patriarchal families, federal communities and villages, free cities and guilds, and 
adopted the state-model only very recently. In a familiar anarchist fashion he 
criticizes the monopolization of political power by a singular sovereign agency, 
and argues against the concentration of social life in the hands of a few politically 
powerful agents, mainly due to the potential dangers of oppression, extensive 
policing, and anti-emancipatory politics.161 Kropotkin’s genealogy of the modern 
state is of importance since it opens up room for conceptual maneuver: so far 
anarchists did an excellent job in refuting the state, and point out why it is 
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undesirable or defective. By means of historicising developments towards more 
extensive and complex human communities Kropotkin goes a step further and 
presents the state as a historically contingent phenomenon which can only claim  a 
transitional status. Memoirs of  a Revolutionist might be particularly helpful in 
bolstering the argument agains statist ‘one size fits all’-solutions. Kropotkin 
portrays society as an entity in permanent flux and argues that forms of statist 
organization should satisfy the demands of the community destined to be 
organized, not the other way around.
 The most problematic issue with Kropotkin’s anarchist communism is the 
deployed scientific methodology. His anarchist theory tries to comprehend the 
origins of social phenomena by rooting them in a naturalist ontology. The past, 
present, and future of humankind are not understood as a set of man-made 
events, but are rather subordinated to the holistic dynamics of evolution and the 
mutual-aid-paradigm. As Marshall points out, Kropotkin can be easily attacked on 
the grounds of his semi-materialistic (actually naturalistic) philosophy, and the 
mechanistic fatalism deriving from it.162  One can be a materialist and still value 
the creative momentum arising from human-made institutions and practices. In 
Kropotkin’s narrative, however, the ideational element seems to be missing 
entirely, and agency gets subordinated to the supposedly mechanical forces of the 
universe.
2.4 William Godwin
“Morality is, if  anything can be, fixed and immutable”
 Godwin is regarded as the founder of anarchist political theory, despite 
never calling himself an anarchist. His major work An Enquiry Concerning  Political 
Justice introduces one of the principles still held valid by the majority of anarchists 
today: in order to form  a workable society only a limited amount of institutions is 
necessary, while an overly obtrusive regulatory corset can be severely damaging to 
the development of political freedom and social justice. Godwin’s concept of 
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justice rests on two pillars: necessitarianism  and immaterialism. While the latter 
acknowledges the existence of an external world created by human imaginability, 
the former highlights the workings of providence in an essentially rule-governed 
social environment. These rules, or first causes, are ‘reason’ and ‘justice’: 
immutable reason is the true legislator, and it should be society’s ultimate goal to 
interpret the laws of reason and justice through rational inquiry. While positive 
law is defective, the law of justice constitutes an irrefutable moral truth. When 
investigating questions of right and wrong humans are hence obliged by the duty 
of private judgement: “man must recognise what is right by his own 
understanding, and here it is evidence, not authority, that should move him”.163 
The emphasis is on ‘recognise’, since justice will not reveal itself, but has to be 
uncovered through individual reasoning (the aforementioned private judgement). 
This judgement must be private, since no institution can replace individual 
accounts of responsibility. Godwin displaces Plato’s philosopher-king and brings 
reason, as well as the duty to make use of it, into the political realm. In respect to 
the organisation of communal life Godwin favours a strictly administrative 
public, one that is mainly occupied with collective inquiries into the nature of 
justice, while abstaining from concrete matters of  enforcement.164
 Godwin’s political theory offers three particular advantages: first, it 
introduces a sort of cosmic optimism, which rests on the assumptions that 
sociability and justice are already present in humans, and that man does not 
necessarily have to be man’s wolf. This optimistic take on human nature opens up 
the possibility of infinite perfectibility through education: if man gets the 
opportunity to be good, he will most likely do good. Second, the idea of infinite 
perfectibility also creates room  for a velvet revolution and the unfolding of social 
change in incremental steps. Eduction and the emancipation of small groups (i.e. 
anarchist affinity-groups) are instrumental to the realization of liberty. This 
notion constructs a counterweight to the violent revolutionary visions of later 
anarchist such as Bakunin. Third, the act-utilitarianism  on which Godwin’s 
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philosophy is based emphasizes that every case is a rule in itself, and that unique 
social circumstances should not be forced into a procrustean bed. In a modern 
context this argument can be turned against the one-size-fits-all narrative of 
liberal universalism.
 As problematic appears the fatalistic belief in the power of reason. 
Although Godwin rejects the liberal ideal of law as a necessary evil for the 
protection of individual freedoms, his political theory remains liberal in its core, 
mainly because of its orthodox treatment of private judgement. Instead of 
investigating in desirable man-made principles of government, Godwin’s relies on 
a supposedly universal principle of justice, which can only be encountered 
through the rigid application of reason itself. Godwin promotes a very Kantian 
ideal of politics, without being aware of the contradictory implications of such 
an approach, especially if contrasted with the previously highlighted act-
utilitarianism.
2.5 Max Stirner
“We have only one relations to each other, that of  usableness, of  utility, of  use”
 Contrary to the philosophers introduced above Stirner does not belong 
into the collectivist/mutualist camp of anarchist political thought. Rather he 
needs to be understood as an extreme individualist and as a proponent of 
individualistic anarchism.165  Stirner never published extensively, and apart from 
some minor works (e.g. The false principle of  our education) The Ego and His Own 
remains his sole, yet invaluable, contribution to the anarchist canon. The central 
category in Stirner’s writing is the role played by ‘ego’.166 The ego - the will of the 
self - must be regarded as the starting point for all social and political reasoning, 
and it should be the primary goal of humankind to allow for the ego’s 
unrestricted development. While the ego itself consists of three elements, namely 
desire, intellect, and will, it is the last factor which receives major attention: will 
dominates the ego, it subordinates desire and intellect, and it seeks power over 
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things, person, and even the individual itself. The ego is the moral reference-point 
of Stirner’s philosophy and holds an almost sacred status: it is non-perfectible 
since every individual ego has always already reached its finite stage: “We are 
perfect altogether, and on the whole earth there is not one man who is a 
sinner”.167  And it can be regarded as a sort of perpetual motion machine, 
overflowing of literal ego-centrism  and I-relatedness, constantly reassuring itself 
of its primacy and superiority over anything else: “I am nothing in the sense of 
emptiness, but I am the creative nothing, the nothing of which I myself as 
creator create everything”.168  The ego is by no means dependent on existing in 
concert with others, but rather represents the most extreme form of an atomistic 
concept of the self.169  Stirner’s aggressive individualism rejects the existence of 
immutable moral laws, and proposes instead will and desire as the only significant 
legislative sources: “I can make very little of myself, but this little is everything, 
and is better than what I allow to be made out of me by the might of others”.170 
Consequently no social code, no moral obligation, and no artificial construction 
of human origin shall obstruct ‘the march of ego in the world’, to paraphrase 
Hegel. It is no surprise that Stirnerian philosophy is less than convinced of the 
value of positive freedom.171  Positive freedom is nothing more than “slavishly 
performing ones duty”172, and real freedom can only be found in ownness: the 
existence of the self (and its will) by its own means and for its own sake, achieved 
through uncompromising self-mastership and unconditional self-possession. 
Freedom can only be realized in a situation where this unobstructed awareness of 
one’s ownness and the unhindered exercise of will is possible: “All freedom  is 
essentially - self-liberation - that I can have only so much freedom  as I procure for 
myself  by my ownness”.173  The culmination-point of liberation can be found in the 
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figure of the conscious egoist, an inward-looking, self-sustaining subjectivity, 
existing in, for, and through itself, effectively representing the pure essence and the 
most unhindered expressions of one’s ego’s will. The only truth for Stirner’s 
conscious egoist is liberty - liberty represented by ego’s will. A conscious egoist 
rejects not only ethics and right, but is also unwilling to bind him- or herself to 
any sort of permanent human association. Whereas Proudhon or Bakunin have 
stressed the importance of the social bond for the ethical development of the 
individual, Stirner labels any sort of association, be it the state or society, as 
potentially coercive and latently oppressive. Instead he proposes a union of  egoists 
in which individuals are recognised not as part of a collectivity but as irreducible 
individuality, and in which conscious egoists can unite and part freely. Since no moral 
bond or normative consensus is required for the formation of this type of 
association the relation between subjects is characterised by pure instrumentality: 
“For me you are nothing but - my food, even as I too am food upon and turned 
to use by you. We have only one relation to each other, that of usableness, of 
utility, of  use”.174
 Although Stirner sits quite uneasily in the anarchist canon he has made an 
invaluable contribution towards theorizing the basis of non-hegemonic 
communities through the most radical and consequent application of social 
individualism. Stirner’s ideal of the conscious egoist is nothing less than 
individualism  thought through until its very end. The union of egoists suggests 
that under the absence of any type of order (not even thin patterns of society) 
there can indeed be structure and justice. The forceful application of the ideal of 
negative freedom needs to be regarded as a powerful thought-experiment which 
pays attention to the question where an aggressive individualism will lead. 
Stirner’s philosophy counts as the anti-thesis to radical power politics, and it 
offers an opportunity to challenge Hobbesian narratives of the ‘state of nature’, 
or Machiavellian assertions on the purpose of politics. Stirner counts as anti-
Hobbesian since he draws an entirely different picture of society under the 
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absence of a centralized orderer. Whilst Hobbes feared the rise of an all-
embracing civil war, Stirner suggests that conscious self-centrism  prevents 
conflict, since man will retreat into solitude while having no intrinsic interest in 
inflicting harm on others. Stirner can also be regarded as anti-Machiavellian: 
whereas Machiavelli emphasizes the will of  power over others, Stirnerian philosophy 
is more concerned with the will of power over oneself. Power is not an end in itself, 
but, if anything, a means for achieving the fulfillment of the ego. Only if this 
fulfillment is genuinely self-motivated it can also be sustainable. Stirner’s latent 
Hegelianism, and his implicit drawings from the master-slave-relationship, 
prevents him  from turning his worship of egoism into a feast of power and sheer 
arbitrariness. If the egoist wants to be really free he must derive his sincerity from 
himself alone, and not from  his recognition as a master by others. If the strong 
egoist oppresses weaker ones, his egoism  becomes relational and dependent on 
the acceptance by outsiders. The conscious egoist can only be really free if he is 
fully aware of himself through endogenous affirmation. A Machiavellian scenario 
in which the prince does as he pleases would be unthinkable, since the egoist 
would realize that the entering of a master-slave-relationship is the end of his 
freedom. The conscious egoist is only sure of  himself  and of  nothing else.
 The downside of Stirner’s philosophy lies in the fact that it can (and 
should) hardly move beyond the realm of a thought-experiment. The anarchist 
literature is of course quite fond of concepts that theorize the possibility of 
domination-free association, but Stirner’s retreat into anti-social forms of 
existence, and his dogmatic reliance on negative freedom, have little to offer to 
collectivist/mutualist strands of thought. Anarchists have so far stressed the 
realization of individual freedom in and through collective agency. They strove for a 
reconciliation of the particular and the whole, and understood that the autonomy 
of the person has to be a prime goal, but that this autonomy can only be achieved 
in relational and mutually constitutive social contexts. The rejection (or criticism) 
of the artificial state-form is a legitimate strategy if one wishes to highlight the 
importance of organically grown social arrangements. The dismissal of society, 
not because it is coercive but has the potential to be so, is however not 
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conductive. In fact, one can argue that Stirner’s conscious egoism  is the best 
justification for the existence of the state-form in the first place: the Stirnerian 
subject would indeed feel quite well in an entirely rationalized or bureaucratized 
environment, governed predominantly by instrumental, formalized relationships. 
In this respect one has to be very cautious about the broader repercussions of a 
union of  egoists.
2.6 Gustav Landauer
“The state is a condition, a certain relationship among human beings, a mode of behavior 
between them”
 Landauer is, similar to the earlier discussed Proudhon, a proponent of 
mutualist anarchism  and social individualism. Mühsam characterized Landauer’s 
anarchism  as the ideal of a “social order founded upon a voluntary contract”.175 
According to Arnold anarchism of the social-individualist type has to be 
understood “in the sense of an order that is organic in its structure, and order 
bases on free-willing associations”.176  By following the Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft-
distinction (community/society) of Toennies Landauer differentiates between the 
community as an organic, long-standing order, and society as atomized, 
mechanical, and transitory form of association. Landauer had a particularly 
positive, and sometimes overly idealistic understanding of the Volk (folk) and the 
Nation (nation) in an libertarian rather than an authoritarian sense, and 
understood them as communities of practice, bound together by intersubjectively 
shared norms and customs. The nation is framed as a stepping stone (and not an 
obstacle) to internationalism, since it exists “within the everwinding circles from 
the individual to the whole of humanity”.177  Landauer’s anarchism thus 
introduces a positive idea of nationalism  which is not exclusive or xenophobic, 
but demonstrates instead the existence of community-structures above and 
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beyond the formalized, artificial boundaries of the state. The state is then not 
only interfering with the people’s unity, but is one of the greatest obstacles to the 
political unification of humankind, since “states are natural enemies, nations are 
not”.178 Despite his rejection of the state Landauer is unwilling to go along with 
the diagnosis of former anarchist philosophers who declared it as essentially alien 
to human nature. Landauer’s understanding of the state is much more nuanced 
and insightful. The state - although defective and insufficient - turns the will of 
the people into institutionalized structures, and it represents their relationships 
towards each other: “The state is a condition, a certain relationship among human 
beings, a mode of behaviour between them; we destroy it by contracting other 
relationships, by behaving differently toward one another. (...) We are the state, and 
we shall continue to be the state until we have created the institutions that  form a real 
community and society  of  men”.179  In this reading the state becomes a Janus-faced 
figure: it represents “social death”180, while being produced and reproduced by 
the common will and the intersubjectively accepted practices of the people. The 
individual does, however, never fully accept this form  of association - it 
anticipates the involuntary nature of society, and intrinsically desires an organic, 
naturally grown, and more substantial form  of community.181  While the state is 
the ‘association per force’, born by and sustained through coercion, the nation - 
the Volk - is regarded as ‘association per affinity’, emerging and living through 
voluntariness. For Socialism attempts to deliver an answer to the question how to 
escape this strained relation: Laundauer opts for an overcoming of the state 
through a reconfiguration of mankind’s relation towards itself. In the course of 
this reconfiguration it is necessary to build new institutions alongside the already 
existing ones, and to render the old ones redundant.182  Since the state is a 
“condition of relationships among subjects183 only a structural renewal will pave 
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the way towards spiritual reforms: “there comes a time in the history of a social 
structure, which is a structure only as long as individuals nourish it with their 
validity, when those living shy away from it as a strange ghost from the past, and 
create new groupings instead. Thus I have withdrawn my love, reason, and 
obedience, and my will from that which I call the ‘state’. That I am able to do so 
depends on my will”.184
 Landauer’s proves to be valuable for the anarchist canon for several 
reasons: first and foremost because he provides a foil for an anarchist auto-
critique and counters Bakunin’s idea of a necessarily violent, vanguard-driven 
revolution. Revolutionary means and post-revolutionary ends should, and can, 
never be separated from  each other. A tyrannical revolution will produce 
tyrannical outcomes and enforces, in the worst of all cases, the state’s basis of 
legitimacy. Furthermore Landauer is supportive of a holistic revolution through 
the vast reconfiguration of social relations. The vanguard-led revolution of 
Bakunin does not fit very well into Landauer’s narrative, mainly due to his 
negligence of sustainable transformation through changes of social practices. 
Contrary to Kropotkin’s evolutionary anarchism, Landauer argues against 
naturalist ontologies as justifications for anarchist politics. Landauer values the 
concept of mutual aid and cooperation, but stresses the necessity of an 
immanent mutualism, which derives from the people’s will, and not from a 
supposedly natural impetus. Beyond the opportunity of formulating a mild yet 
powerful auto-critique Landauer dovetails - to a certain degree - with his much 
more extreme and individualistic counterpart Stirner. While this seems to be 
counter-intuitive at first glance, the overlaps become apparent when looking into 
the respective contributions to anti- and micro-politics. Both, Stirner and Landauer, 
searched eagerly for structures and strategies which would allow the individual to 
live outside (or at least parallel) to mainstream society. Stirner simply suggests not 
to participate in existing institutions and live a life characterized by radical self-
relatedness. Landauer develops a more positive account of anti-politics and 
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chooses sociability over solitude. Yet, similar to Stirner, he advocates a 
revolutionary strategy of non-participation into existing institutions. A downside 
of Landauer’s philosophy can be found in his overly optimistic attitude towards 
organically grown communities. He pays little attention to the coercive potential 
of local practices and phenomena such as parochialism, hyper-nationalism, or 
clientelism. By means of lacking a healthy Foucaultian pessimism in regards to 
symbolic violence, Landauer’s philosophy tends to replace the hegemonic and 
formalized power-structures of the state with the decentralized and informal 
forces of  discourse.
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CHAPTER FOUR
IV | CONSTITUENT ANARCHY
1. Introduction: anarchism and constituent power
 While the preceding chapter offered a platform  to understand the varieties 
of 19th-century anarchist political thought, and made a first attempt of 
highlighting the importance of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s work in regard to 
serving as an anarchist bridge-head into IR, this chapter will explain in a more 
detailed fashion why the works of Proudhon have been chosen for a re-
evaluation of the anarchy-problematique in IR. In the following chapters it is 
argued that IR suffers from a systemic neglect of constituent power among its 
conceptual ranks, and that a re-framing of international politics along the lines of 
constituent power offers new perspectives on ontology (ch. VI), agency (ch. VII), 
and ethics international affairs (ch. VIII). This chapter ties these somewhat 
separate strings of the argument - anarchism in IR and constituent power in IR - 
together, and argues that Proudhon’s political thought is underpinned by a 
decidedly constituent interpretation of power, which is ready for mobilization in 
IR-theory.
 Chapter IV is divided into three sections and underpinned by the 
following questions: (1) what is constituent power in the first place, how does it 
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differ from constituted power?; (2) who is capable of mobilizing constituent 
power and what types of agents wield constituent force?; (3) how is constituent 
power reflected in anarchist political theory, most notably in the works of Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon? 
 The second section of this chapter clarifies the concept of constituent 
power and explores some of the debate’s capillaries. By means of focusing on 
three prominent participants to the debate it is intended to display the vast 
overlaps between their respective positions, while simultaneously highlighting 
conceptual differences and disagreements. For Hardt constituent power is a 
potentially universal force which stands in opposition to sovereignty, whereas 
Lindahl highlights constituent power’s reliance on a necessarily bound nomos and 
an initially passive demos. For Kalyvas the demos possesses agentic force from 
the very outset (contra Lindahl), and there exists a compatibility between 
democratic force and sovereignty (contra Hardt). Section three takes a closer look 
into the conceptions of agency in the context of constituent power, and discuss 
two additional contributions to the debate. This section engages in a comparative 
reading of Hardt and Negir’s Empire and Multitude, as well as Schmitt’s Political 
Theology and The Concept  of  the Political. The purpose of the analysis is to determine 
which agentic forces are deemed capable of mobilizing constituent power. The 
fourth  and fifth part of the chapter engage in a contextualized assessment of 
Proudhon’s anarchist philosophy through the lens of  constituent power.
2. Approaching constituent power
 Hardt’s interpretation of constituent power bears a strong republican 
imprint and is presented as the “the essence of modern democracy and modern 
revolution”.185  The necessary co-articulation of the concept’s core qualities - 
namely its essentially collaborative nature in combination with its inherently 
transformative potentiality - draw a firm line of demarcation between constituent 
power and its ‘alter ego’, constituted power. While the former is inscribed in 
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society’s ability to mobilized and harvest its own transformative capabilities, the 
latter attempts to capture such democratic forces and turn them back against their 
source in an attempt to command and control society. Constituent power must be 
regarded as a decidedly historical force, since it displaces the status quo in favour 
of novel socio-political arrangements.186  Constituted power, on the contrary, is 
characterized by its decidedly a-historical appearance, which stems from a 
tendency to crystallize and stiffen prevalent social divisions and hierarchies.187 
This firm division between what Agamben has term  life vs. law, or auctoritas vs. 
potestas188, leads Hardt towards the conclusion that a general incompatibility exists 
between constituent types of power on the one side, and sovereign notions of 
authority on the other. Both powers do exemplify moments of political 
exceptionalism. Yet, while sovereign force (constituted power) “is imposed on the 
constitution from above”, democratic force (constituent power) initiates an 
“‘exception’ that emerges from below”189, which makes it dissimilar to its coercive 
counterpart.
 Despite their equal importance in either making or maintaining political 
orders constituent and constituted power are not treated equally in political theory - in 
fact, the latter is often privileged over the former. This bias implies that control, 
command, and the tranquility of the present, are regarded as the ‘normal’ state of 
political affairs, as the core of what defines the political, while transformative 
passages are reduced to limited, scarce, and isolated episodes of unruliness and 
turmoil, which are captured quickly by the pacifying intervention of an arrestive 
sovereign force.190  This heroic discourse privileges coercive order over supposed 
chaos, it pits sovereignty against anarchy, and institutes constituent power as the 
norm.191 In an attempt to break free from the constraints of the prevalent debate 
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afterthought of sovereign routine, but as the first cause of the political per se. 
Other than constituted power, which lingers on the surface of the political 
process and has a mostly distributive effect, constituent power possesses a more 
substantial, ontological status: “Constituted power is empty; it merely falls back 
on, contains, and recuperates the constituent forces” while “constituent power is 
primary in the sense that it is the locus of social creativity, political innovation, 
and historical movement”.192 By means of interrogating the hierarchical division 
between sovereignty/anarchy and constituted/constituent power Hardt directs 
attention to the productive forces of democratic immanence. The essence of the 
political is then not defined by an external, transcendental sovereign’s ability to 
maintain the status quo, but is rather inscribed in a democratic multitude’s 
immanent potential to challenge and displace the present state of affairs through 
acts of permanent, creative play.193 Constituent power must hence be understood 
as the “the sole source of  political creation”.194
 Lindahl’s take on constituent power is decidedly juridical and hinges at the 
ability to initiate and create novel legal orders.195 Other than for Hardt, for whom 
constituent power operates below the surface of formalized politics, and resides 
in the ontological deep-structure of the political, Lindahl’s interpretation places 
constituent power into the heart of the legislative process. Hardt’s interpretation 
of constituent power is first and foremost structural, whereas Lindahl opts for a 
formal-juridical reading. For him constituent power “refers to the capacity to 
bring forth a new legal order, whether by revolutionary means or otherwise, in 
contrast to the capacity to enact legal norms with an extant legal order: 
constituted power”.196  Constituent and constituted power are then strongly 
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maintains them and enforces the rules upon which they rest. This constitutes a 
first important departure from Hardt’s theory of constituent power, for whom the 
productive forces of creation (democratic immanence) and the coercive forces of 
control (transcendent sovereignty) are downright incompatible. 
 A second important difference between Hardt and Lindahl lies in their 
respective takes on the spatial arrangement of power’s constituent loci. Hardt’s 
immanent interpretation opens up the possibility to inscribe agency into a 
potentially boundless democratic multitude, whereas Lindahl’s strong emphasis 
on legalism  and law necessitates the existence of a bound political community, 
which implies the spatially delimited character of constituent power.197 In siding 
with Arendt and her interpretation of nomos Lindahl proclaims: “the space of 
political community is necessarily bounded (…) [for which reason] no polity is 
thinkable that does not raise a claim to an inside as the community’s own 
space”.198  This plea leads directly into a third important distinction between 
Lindahl and Hardt. Hardt’s theory of constituent power depicts constituent 
forces as self-generative and capable of creating the conditions necessary for the 
exercise of their own agency. This claim is, from Lindahl’s perspective, not 
defensible. Rather, the constituent agent depends itself on its constitution 
through an external force, which helps to define the demos in the first place. If 
constituent power is tied to the creation of novel legal norms, and if these legal 
norms can only exist in a closed community, some agent needs to designate the 
community (the ‘us/we’) and dedicating it as a political subject (one that is 
qualitatively different from an external ‘them’).199  This move cannot be 
accomplished by the demos itself in an ex nihilo like fashion – in other words: the 
community does not know itself, or its boundaries, unless an external force, 
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which is necessarily non-identical with the latent demos, initiates closure and 
creates the initial condition for the later realization of  constituent force.
 This paradox of  constituent power highlights the complex interplay between 
constituent and constituted types of force, and emphasizes that the former 
cannot come into existence without the latter’s midwifery: “someone must seize 
the initiative to provide an initial determination of what interests join a group of 
individuals and who, at least implicitly belongs to the group. This initiative 
renders the ‘leader’ or ‘leaders’ the constituent power, and the collective a 
constituted power”.200 The idea of the founding act as an act of non-democratic 
violence also reveals the symbolic dimension of constituent power, which is 
largely absent from Hardt’s theory. For Hardt constituent power is primarily 
defined by the democratic multitude’s ability to interrogate, destabilize, and play 
with sovereignty’s absolute claims to power. By virtue of this capacity the 
multitude has always already emerged, while the moment of its foundation is 
obscured, and relegated to a non-event which belongs to an indeterminate past. 
Lindahl’s legalism and his insistence on the necessary existence of a nomos breeds 
skepticism towards the narrative of constituent power’s ‘immaculate conception’ 
and highlights the concept’s deeply symbolic character: the ability to discursively 
constitute a society, and to symbolically articulate an internal-external division, 
becomes an integral part to the exercise of  any constituent force.
 Despite their differences in locating constituent power’s referent object - 
for Hardt it can be found in democratic potentiality, whereas Lindahl favors 
juridical actuality – both agree on constituent power’s ontological importance and 
its immanent state of existence. Lindahl notes: “human activity depends on a 
world that human beings do not create from nothing”201, yet he also 
acknowledges such a world’s continued reliance on the ontological productivity 
and dependent spontaneity of political agents, without which a concrete, 
conceivable reality couldn’t come into existence.202 This ability to make the world 
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conceivable, understandable, and most importantly relatable cannot spring from a 
transcendent, i.e. divine or sovereign source, but must first and foremost reside in 
the immanent will to order and shape a deeply contradictory world without 
immediately binding characteristics.203  The ability to shape the world, and the 
sheer necessity to do so, positions constituent power as an ethico-political 
phenomenon, and as the clearest manifestation of  freedom as autonomy.204
 Kalyvas ties constituent power to the exercise of republican agency (similar 
to Hardt) and identifies the democratic multitude as the genuinely sovereign, 
constituent subject.205  This democratic reading of constituent power overlaps 
strongly with the ethico-political dimension previously discussed in the work of 
Lindahl, for whom  constituent forces serve as distinct expressions of freedom. 
Self-legislation as the public event of self-alteration, in which the authors of laws 
become their addressees, feeds into a republican type of positive freedom and 
accounts of  political autonomy.206
 Where Hardt and Kalyvas differ is on their respective takes on 
sovereignty. Hardt favors a strongly dichotomous interpretation in which a 
constituent force, namely the productive democratic multitude, is pitted against a 
constituted power, represented by an inhibiting, coercive sovereign. In conclusion 
he diagnoses the functional and ethical incompatibility of the two concepts. 
Hardt’s interpretation of sovereignty reinforces a popular assumption in political 
theory according to which accounts of sovereignty are widely irreconcilable with 
democratic traits - an assumption which makes Hardt complicit to a reductionist 
reading of sovereignty as a passage of pure control and command.207  This 
interpretation either identifies sovereignty and democracy as distinctively separate 
entities, or it permits the existence of democratic action only within Westphalian 
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and renders privileged readings, in which either democracy or sovereignty assume 
primacy over one another, as conceptually unwarranted. Instead he points 
towards the possibility of arriving at a co-articulation of sovereign and public 
wills.208  This is not an exceptional move, but rather represents a hitherto 
neglected strand in modern political though, according to which political 
modernity can “be viewed as constituting of two forms of sovereign power and 
two visions of politics: the democratic and the monarchical, the constitutional 
and the absolutist, the federalist and the statist, the power of the Many to 
constitute versus the power of the One to command”.209 What Kalyvas suggests 
is the possible existence of sovereign political action outside of a Westphalian 
context, one simultaneously carried by a democratic rationale: sovereignty turns 
from  the power to command into the power to constitute.210  Interpreting 
sovereignty through the lens of constituent power destabilizes its prevalent 
interpretation as a coercive property, and it frees democratic action from its 
Westphalian straightjacket. Eventually it becomes possible to conceive of 
genuinely sovereign politics, which are embedded within a set of democratic 
practices, while existing simultaneously beyond a statist horizon.
 Kalyvas adopts a decidedly formal and juridical perspective and defines 
the sovereign “as the one who determines the constitutional form, the juridical 
and political identity, and the governmental structure of the community in its 
entirety”.211  The exercise of constituent power is then not only superior to 
ordinary legislation212, but must also lead to concretely visible institutional effects 
and depends, once more, on the existence of a nomos within which constituent 
force can be wielded. Similar to Lindahl Kalyvas also identifies a paradox at the 
heart of the constituent process. The supposed non-relation between constituent 
and constituted power is then not as cut and dry as depicted by Hardt, but rests 
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instead on a mode of co-dependency and co-constitution. The specific problem 
identified by Kalyvas addresses law’s actuality in relation to its potentiality, and sheds 
light on the fact that although constituent power “is outside established law, it is 
nevertheless of the law”.213  This diagnosis reveals the ambiguous relation 
between constituent power and the legal context which it creates: constituent 
power must, on the one side, reside outside of the very context it changes and 
cannot be bound by pre-existing norms (otherwise it would be constituent 
power). Yet, it must still remain attached to, and exist within, this particular 
political sphere in order to retain its transformative momentum. Such a complex 
intertwinement leads to the puzzling constellation in which constituent power 
must be regarded as an autonomous dependency: its actions aren’t subject to any pre-
given laws (hence it is autonomous), whereas its status as the potentially 
omnipotent law-giver remains strongly dependent on the recognition by the very 
political community destined for transformation. Constituent power must hence 
transform the source of its own emergence, while never being able to break free 
entirely.
3. Constituent power and the question of  agency
 The preceding section has demonstrated the capillary nature of the 
debates surrounding constituent power in (international) political theory, and it 
has introduced a number of relevant key-terms and concepts central to the 
current discourse. This sub-section departs from the previous findings and pays 
particular attention to questions of agency in the context of constituent power. 
Whilst the previous paragraphs have focused primarily on the nature of 
constituent power, the following pages attend to the question how constituent 
power is mobilized, by whom, by what means, and towards what end. For that 
purpose the section discusses two somewhat heterogenous takes on constituent 
agency, namely Hardt and Negri’s neo-marxist multitude, with its focus on 
biopolitical production and living labor, vis a vis Schmitt’s statist sovereign, an 
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agency that wields constituent power through decisionist and exceptionalist 
practices.
3.1 Multitude and living labour
 Hardt and Negri suggest a mobilization of constituent power through the 
figure of the multitude, a biopolitical agency which generates its own, immanent 
act-capacity from  its ability to function as a force of living labour. Multitude 
counts as a decidedly modern phenomenon due to its emergence in the context 
of immanent Enlightenment politics, and its post-structural, network-like 
appearance. The special, and somewhat elevated status of multitude, stems from 
its involvement in immaterial production: whilst industrial labor is confined to the 
creation of material goods - cars, televisions, clothing, food, and the likes - 
immaterial production encompasses the constitution of social life.214  Within the 
post-industrial paradigm of immaterial production labor “tends to produce the 
means of interaction, communication, and cooperation for production 
directly”.215  Immaterial labour mobilizes non-material means of production and 
focuses primarily on the affective aspects of work: the manipulation of language, 
the stimulation of affects, analyzing and solving problems, or the creation of new 
symbols is the core business of affective labor - in short: the biopolitical 
production of  all aspects of  society.216
 Within the context of immaterial production multitude emerges as an 
agency capable of wielding constituent power due to its ability to produce ‘the 
common’. Similar to the notions of constituent power discussed in the previous 
section, multitude possesses the ability to create novel socio-political contexts 
while synchronously being able to withdraw from  its very own creation when it 
feels the need to reshape it. In its most basic sense the common appears as the 
multiple, intertwining, and criss-crossing sets of relations of modern, global life. 
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The common symbolizes the affective tissue which permeates contemporary 
mass societies and prevents them from disintegration. In addition it serves as an 
enabling force, fostering the emergence of complex modes of interdependence, 
i.e. the division of material labor or communication across previously locked 
societal contexts. The common is produced in an “expanding spiral 
relationship”217  and not limited to a specific field of social or political activity. 
Instead it produces frameworks, norms, and symbolic orderings, and works 
outside and across traditional economic, political, social, or cultural 
compartments.218
 Against the backdrop of immaterial labor and the production of the 
common a rhizomatic, de-centered manifestation of constituent agency begins to 
surface. Kalyvas and Lindahl have repeatedly stressed the necessary existence of 
an agentic center of some kind, which needs to serve as the crystallization-point 
of any constituent force. Devoid of such a juridical or political hub constituent 
power remains incapacitated. Hardt and Negri’s multitude resists such centralizing 
tendencies and “can never be reduced to a unity or single identity”.219  The 
multitude’s ability to wield constituent power hinges on its capacity to process 
individualized, divergent, intersecting, and heterogenous accounts of knowledge 
and information, and to transform them into ‘common knowledge’.220 
 Whilst transcendental models of constituent power depend on a sovereign 
center that imposes order on society from the outside, the forces sustaining the 
multitude are purely immanent and allow for the biopolitical organization of 
society from within.221 Even without a governing center multitude still retains its 
agentic capacity and can arrive at decisions: it produces the common in  common 
and “is not only a model for political decision-making but also tends itself to 
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constituent power towards a decidedly democratic edge by means of ensuring 
that constituent force wielded within the multitude’s context can create the pre-
text for genuinely democratic relationships.223  It then appears not only as a 
machinery for the immaterial production of the common, but also as a genuinely 
political apparatus for the provision of democratic goods by means of initiating 
the passage “from  Res-publica to Res-communis”.224 Labour and the immaterial (re-)
production of multitude through the public turns into a decidedly democratic 
performance.225
 Yet, political modernity is not only defined by the emergence of 
immanent democratic momenta, but is also characterized by omnipresent and 
recurring attempts to capture these forces through the deployment of 
transcendental and representational political mechanisms. This logic of 
modernity, namely the synchronous liberation and incarceration of republican 
force, attempts to downplay and control the role of non-representational agency 
in global affairs and prevents immanent power from unfolding its full democratic 
potential.226  Multitude stands for the immanent properties of constituent power, 
whereas its opponent, empire, represents the inhibiting and controlling 
mechanisms of constituted force. Multitude and empire are in no way capable of 
superseding the dialectic struggle between constituent and constituted power, and 
keep fighting it on a post-structural terrain: what changes are the means of 
engagement, not the operational logic of the confrontation as such. In the post-
modern setting constituent  power is then represented by forms of immanent 
biopolitical production and creates relationships and collaborative forms of labor, 
while constituted power gets mobilized in the context of biopower, which stands 
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3.2 Sovereignty, decisionism, and the state
 Whilst Hardt and Negri locate the source for constituent agency in the 
figure of a rhizomatic and network-like multitude, it is Schmitt who pitches the 
state as the principle agent behind constituent force. Schmitt’s take on constituent 
power emerges through an engagement with exceptionalism  and works across the 
strained relation between politics and law. In this context he famously proclaims: 
the “sovereign is he who decides on the exception”228 - genuine sovereign agency 
hence occupies the fringe lines of politics, the zone of indeterminacy and 
political action, impossible to associate with standardized procedure and routine. 
The ability to decide on the exception confers a status of unlimited authority and 
allows for a suspension of pre-established, legal orders. Real sovereignty affirms 
the superiority of the political over the juridical, and positions the state as the 
principal agent: “In such a situation it is clear that the state remains, whereas law 
recedes”.229 The state and law aren’t identical - in fact, the first can exist devoid of 
the latter. With this move Schmitt degrades law to an afterthought of statism, to a 
subordinate mechanism, governing routine, and remaining qualitatively inferior in 
the face of the actual sovereign. This very distinction points towards a strong 
hierarchical division between constituted (juridical) and constituent (statist) 
agency, and it establishes the critical moment of ultimate constituent power 
through the actions of an unbridled sovereign force. The decision realizes and 
initiates this demarcation and invokes the figure of an omnipotent lawgiver who 
decides autonomously on the margins of  what is considered as ‘normal’.
 This interpretation of exceptionalist agency represents more than the 
embodiment of blunt power politics. Read through the lens of constituent power 
the decision and the exception reaffirm the autonomous quality of genuine 
political action, which mounts resistance against its subjugation to pre-given 
norms or rules. Auctoritas, non veritas facit  legem230 appears as both, a warning and a 
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promise: the foundation of any given political and social order, of what is 
perceived as the ‘present’ and regarded as ‘normal’, is underpinned by latently 
violent founding acts (c.f. Lindahl for an in-depth discussion). Yet, the decision 
on the exception also stands for a moment of heightened, extraordinary creativity 
and mobilizes decisionist violence for the purpose of creating the ‘new present’, 
the ‘new normal’.231  It is Nietzsche who perfectly captures this destructive 
creativity inherent to constituent power in the Genealogy of  Morality:
Such beings cannot be reckoned with, they  come like fate, without  cause, reason, 
consideration or pretext, they appear just  like lightning  appears, too terrible, 
sudden, convincing  and ‘other’ even to be hated. What they  do is to create and 
imprint  forms instinctively, they are the most involuntary, unconscious artists there 
are: (...)  They do not  know what guilt, responsibility, consideration are, these born 
organizers; they  are ruled by that terrible inner artist’s egoism which has a brazen 
countenance and sees itself  justified to all eternity  by the ‘work’, like the mother in 
her child.232
Such a take on constituent power is quite different from Hardt and Negri’s model 
of biopolitical agency. Multitude defines the ‘normal’ and shapes the common 
through efforts of immaterial labor. Schmitt’s sovereign, however, decides on the 
separation of the common in accordance to its will. Multitude creates without 
imposition and is capable of accommodating multiple heterogenous subject-
positions. The sovereign creates through imposition and knows only itself as the 
exclusive center of constituent agency. Despite their contrasting appearances 
both, multitude and the state, assume the status of ontologically productive 
forces. Schmitt’s decisionist agent is ontologically distinct  from  the remainder of 
societal actors due to its capacity to act outside of established moral, aesthetic, or 
economic contexts. The sovereign assumes, furthermore, an ontologically  productive 
status through its structuring effects on society. In the same way the multitude 
‘produces’ the common through immaterial labor, the state ‘produces’ society 
through constituent efforts of symbolic ordering (c.f. Lindahl), for example by 
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means of invoking the most intense of all decisions, the one on the political and 
the friend-enemy-distinction.233
 Hardt and Negri’s constituent agency is capable of existing devoid of a 
governing center, a feature that can’t be applied to Schmitt’s sovereign. In his case 
constituent power must know a center in order to be mobilized properly. This 
conclusion stems from the intimate intertwinement of constituent force and 
exceptionalist/decisionist thought. The privilege to decide on the exception 
appears as a personalized and charismatic form of rule in the Weberian sense, and 
can be traced back to a secularized image of a divine, omnipotent lawgiver.234 
Political modernity disposed of god and puts the sovereign state in its place, but 
it also retained a sense of necessity for the existence of a superior, authoritative 
political force.235  Schmitt then ties the existence of constituent power closely to 
decisionist and exceptionalist forms of governance, and links these practices in a 
second step firmly to the state. The state, however, requires separateness in the 
form of organized people and discrete territorial spaces236, which leads to the 
inevitable conclusion that constituent agency can only be materialized in closed 
political contexts. Schmitt notes that “the exception in jurisprudence is analogous 
to the miracle in theology”237, a statement which immediately prevents any 
immanent (i.e. biopolitical) interpretation of constituent power, and relegates 
constituent agency into the realm of  the transcendental.
4. Constituent power and the anarchist tradition of  political thought
 The previous section provided a survey of the debates surrounding 
constituent power and constituent agency in (international) political theory. 
Despite their heterogeneity there exists a general consensus across the assessed 
approaches, according to which constituent power must always appear in the 
form of a founding force, capable of defining the ontological ordering of a given 
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or emerging political community. Disagreement persists in terms of constituent 
power’s location and agency. In this respect two camps have emerged from the 
debate: a communitarian or statist branch, represented by Schmitt and Lindahl, 
and a post-structural and revolutionary wing, headed by Hardt, Negri, and 
Kalyvas. The former emphasizes that constituent power can only be wielded 
properly within the confinements of a closed community, and by the hands of a 
centralized ordering force. The latter, however, sheds light on pluralist and 
decentralized moments of  constituent force. 
 Yet, one of the most remarkable features about the current debate is a 
general lack of global accounts of constituent power. Only Hardt and Negri’s 
multitude makes an attempt to highlight the relevancy of constituent power in the 
context of international and transnational politics. Yet, multitude suffers from  a 
series of defects rife to be addressed and remedied (see chapter VII for an in-
depth discussion).238  Among other issues multitude is criticized for its elitist 
approach to revolution, which privileges immaterial work over other forms of 
productive activity, and assigns revolutionary potential exclusively to a specialized 
class of highly skilled, affective laborers. The following chapters aim  at 
developing a much-needed alternative to such prevalent forms of constituent 
power in international affairs, and argue in favor of a closer engagement with 
Proudhon’s anarchist political thought. It is problematic, however, that Proudhon 
never explicitly used the concept of constituent power in his own work, which 
makes it necessary to read his political philosophy through a constituent lens 
prior to its deployment into global politics. Hence it is the aim of the final section 
of this chapter to engage with a number of Proudhon’s key-concepts (through a 
closer reading of his key-writings) and explain to what extent conceptions of 
constituent power resonate through them.
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4.1 Mutualist politics: Justice in the Revolution and the Church
 The core argument of Proudhon’s anarchist philosophy is developed in 
the 1858 magnum opus Justice in  the Revolution and the Church. Justice needs to be 
understood as a conceptual key-document and positions itself at the center of 
mutualist anarchist thought. It develops an immanent approach to revolutionary 
philosophy, and pits itself against the absolutist ideological claims of the church 
and the state. In that regard Justice is working alongside clearly defined lines, and 
distinguishes sharply between absolutist and revolutionary forms of political 
conduct - this division takes place against the backdrop of a struggle between 
authoritarian (constituted) and anarchist (constituent) political practices. Justice 
strives towards cultivating an immanent account of human conduct by means of 
opposing transcendental and representational ethical schemes. 
 Despite its decidedly anti-foundational approach towards politics and 
ethics, Justice still relies on a series of ontological core-assumptions about human 
nature and societal development. Man is perceived as being driven by two 
diverging traits: egoism  and sociability. Humans are portrayed as “egoistic by 
nature, rightful egoists, capable of great sacrifices, but opposed to 
subjugation”.239  Yet, they’re equally “social animals (...) unable to advance and 
evolve other than within the confinements of society”.240  This unresolvable 
antagonism positions natural egoism and social rationality in opposition to one 
another241, and requires certain accounts of ‘justice’ in order to be managed and 
coordinated properly. Justice is then first and foremost a purely instrumental, 
value-free, and regulative mechanism. It coordinates society’s diverging forces and 
can be realized in two different ways: first, through imposition, in which case 
justice, as an external property, assumes power over the individual. Society, the 
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collective being, then shapes the individual agent in accordance to its needs.242  Or, 
alternatively, through immanent processes of mutual recognition. This second 
approach to human emancipation serves as the backbone of mutualist anarchism. 
Emancipatory justice can only be realized in cases were political agents have the 
opportunity to sense and experience their own personhood in and through 
others: “Justice, I must repeat, is to sense our ownness through the other”.243  This 
reciprocal account of justice requires that humans strive actively towards socio-
political conditions under which they can retain their own individuality, while 
simultaneously encountering themselves through the other’s dignity.
 The rejection of the first, obtruded type of justice takes place on the 
grounds of a general refutation of transcendental and representational modes of 
ethical conduct, and can also be interpreted as a critique of constituted power. 
The main target of this critique is religion in general, and the church in particular. 
Both count as agents that wield authority in an attempt to construct and maintain 
ethical systems whose originating source is relegated towards an in-transparent, 
divine, transcendental realm.244  Divine law then counts as a prime example of 
constituted power, since humans are subjected to the word of god and the 
teachings of the church. Religious authorities command an otherwise subordinate 
mass, whereas the ability to constitute is the privilege of a distant divine presence 
and its earthly representatives. Humans have little say in the appearance of god-
given law, which presents itself as an absolute and coherent truth awaiting 
realization, not questioning, change, or transformation. Transcendental ethics as a 
form of constituted power assume the general inability of human agents to make 
their own history.245  Furthermore, they are preventing immanent ethics from 
emerging, since all potentially productive human encounters are filtered through a 
set of  a priori established sacred norms.
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 Against the ethical prescriptions of ‘the absolute’ the system of 
‘revolution’ is fielded - a principle of ethical immanence based on the constituent 
elements of human agency.246  Authority and ‘the absolute’ deliberately 
circumnavigate non-transcendental normative agency, and deactivate immanent 
constituent capacities through modes of representation. ‘Revolution’, however, 
discerns justice as an entirely political product whose existence depends on 
intersubjective processes of co-constitution. Justice reveals itself as a faculty of 
the mind and of human consciousness. It displaces god as the ultimate authority 
capable of telling good from evil, and puts political agents in its place instead.247 
Individuals, through their mutual relations towards one another, give rise to their 
own accounts of justice. Only through such unmediated and immanently 
productive processes is it possible to experience one’s dignity and personhood 
through the dignity and personhood of ‘the other’. Justice hence develops a 
contract theory in strictly practical, or rather processual, sense: instead of 
arranging the contact points between individuals and society through a social 
contract that is later removed from the demos and governs it from above, 
immanent accounts of justice rely on an ongoing, open-ended process of 
negotiation whose dynamics cannot be limited by pre-established moral, political, 
social, or cultural standards.248  A conscious political agent will always prefer 
immanent accounts of justice over transcendental ones, mainly due to an 
inherently egoistic motivation: if I can experience my own dignity only through 
reciprocal encounters with others, and if systems of representation are not 
conductive to this endeavor, it is in my own (read: best, egoistic, rational) interest 
to cultivate immanent systems of justice, for the purpose of removing 
transcendental barriers, and foster unmediated social encounters instead.249
 In order to realize immanent justice society must hence overcome the 
system of the absolute (transcendence and representation; authority and 
- 80 -
246 Ibid. I-83 ff. & I-88.
247 Ibid., I-88.
248 Ibid., I-187.
249 Ibid., I-189 & I-191 ff.
constituted power) and replace it with a revolutionary mode of being. Revolution 
amounts to more than a mere event and needs to be understood as a novel way of 
living, of relating, to one another. It breaks the straight-jacket of providence and 
fatalism, and puts representational and transcendental authority-structures - i.e. 
economic classes, hegemonic ideologies, or the reason of the state - into 
question.250 The agentic force behind such a transformation is society itself, since 
the revolutionary principle necessarily amounts to strictly immanent processes. 
The revolutionary mode of existence is also a clear manifestation of constituent 
power, since it affirms the generative potential inherent to the demos, and assigns 
the power to create, sustain, and transform political realities to society itself - not 
to god, the state, or the church. Eventually there exist two concrete and 
complementary manifestations of constituent power through which the desired 
transformation can be achieved: collective force, a material aspect251, and collective 
reason, an ideational one.252 The purpose of mobilizing constituent power jointly 
through collective force and collective reason is to arrive at a new form of 
freedom, one that doesn’t present itself as a fixed, immutable end. Instead, 
freedom is decidedly republican in nature and revealed as the capacity to act in 
concert with others for the purpose of collectively shaping the conditions of 
communal existence: “Freedom is a force that emerges out of the synthesis of 
diverging human abilities”253, and it can only be found in the pure manifestation 
of  constituent power.
4.2 Collective reason: Political Capacity of  the Working Class
 Political Capacity  of  the Working Class presents the theme of constituent 
power through an engagement with ‘collective reason’, and works again across the 
previously addressed division between absolute and revolution. Political Capacity 
mobilizes constituent forces towards a very particular end and highlights their 
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generative momenta in a particularly revolutionary sense. The aim of all political 
struggles must amount to the weakening and eventual dissolution of centralized, 
i.e. statist, structures (‘the absolute’) for the purpose of initiating the realization of 
a multi-layered and heterogenous network-society with strong institutional 
groundings in the mutualistic principle.254  The practice of mutualism as the 
organizational pinnacle of political activity represents an institutionalization of 
the two antagonistic principles ‘sociability’ and ‘egoism’, which were previously 
discussed in the assessment of Justice. A mutualistic society won’t make any 
messianic attempts to mend its members behavior in an effort to better them, but 
will instead institutionalize the perpetual possibility of conflict that stems from 
the occurrence of individual egoism. These potentially destructive traits will, 
however, be backed and hedged with accounts of  guarantees and reciprocity.255 
 Centralized political structures are incapable of realizing such objectives 
because they only cater to their own needs. The intended transformation towards 
mutualistic social arrangements is hence only possible through collective and 
immanent acts of social transformation.256  Political Capacity of the Working  Class 
picks upon on the topic of socio-political change and discusses the practical 
conditions for reform  by means of mobilizing the constituent and transformative 
momentum of collective ideas.257 While another one of Proudhon’s major works, 
What is Property, highlights constituent power’s material side, namely the material 
conditions that underpin the deployment of constituent power, Political Capacity 
focus instead on the ideational preconditions for realizing emancipatory change. 
Political Capacity works almost like a manual, and alludes to the question how social 
groupings and entire populations may be able to realize their immanent, 
transformative potential, through an affirmation of their constituent force.258  In 
that respect it is deemed necessary for them  to develop an idée ouvrière, a joint self-
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awareness in the form of collective reason. Similar to humans, which need to 
recognize themselves through others in order to realized their full potential as 
political actors, groups need to conceive of themselves as political forces if they 
are planning to realize their revolutionary capabilities.259
 The collective exercise of constituent power, and the subsequent 
realization of mutualistic practices, is supposed to initiate structural political 
change on at least two interconnected levels. From a distributive perspective 
mutualism  is destined to reform the allocation of economic gains and decrease - 
through principles of fairness and reciprocity - the occurrence of social inequality 
and injustice. Mutualism has, furthermore, an explicitly ethical dimension to it 
and is also expected to account for the widespread politicization of society, in an 
attempt to reform  an otherwise passive and politically disengaged demos.260 The 
desired rise of mutualistic structures through the development of an idée ouvrière 
asks then for a far-reaching mobilization of constituent power. The order of the 
absolute - patterns of hierarchy and coercion – is supposed to be replaced by a 
revolutionary, mutualistic federation, in which politically matured agents realize 
and regularly practice the demos capacity for self-alteration. Exercising 
constituent power in such critical moments of self-alteration and self-generation 
is then necessarily a public and immanent event (through the creation of a 
collective reason) and cannot be captured through instances of transcendental, 
political representation.261  Hitherto passive individuals are encouraged to take 
political matters into their own hands and to realize their republican potential as 
active citizens. Proudhon notes that all social arrangements that exist prior to the 
arrival of collective, constituent agency are characterized by their attempt to 
prohibit, deny, and obstruct. However, after successfully transitioning into a 
mutualistic social state, institutions such as law will be transformed in their 
meaning and assume an enabling and guaranteeing character, since the constituted 
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power they hold over society has been sized by immanent, constituent forces.262 
Proudhon’s prophecy about the changing nature of law - from  punitive to 
facilitative - sounds quite similar to Agamben’s take on a post-juridical world in 
which “one day humanity will play with law just as children play with disused 
objects, not in order to restore their canonical use but to free them from it for 
good”.263 The insistence on the possibility to exercise constituent power through 
the mobilization of collective reason makes an important contribution to the 
contemporary debate on constituent agency. Certain authors, i.e. Lindahl, but also 
Schmitt, willingly acknowledge the demos generative potential, but deny its 
eventual ability to act in a productive fashion. The exercise of constituent power 
requires, according to them, an act of violence in which the power exalted by ‘the 
many’ is monopolized by ‘the few’ and directed into a specific direction. In this 
particular moment the multitude becomes an agent of sovereign command, and 
falls victim  to exercises of constituted power. The vehicle of collective reason 
resists such claims and demonstrates instead a democratic multitude’s status as a 
founding-force, capable to successfully marshal concrete, political act-capacity.
4.3 Collective force: What is Property?
 What is Property  approaches the theme of constituent power not in a 
strictly political manner, unlike later works such as Justice in  the Revolution and the 
Church  or The Political Capacity  of the Working  Class. The matter driving What is 
Property? is not so much the question how constituent forces can be mobilized for 
political ends, but rather how (1) the demos constituent capacity - the founding 
power of the working class to be more specific - resonates in collective acts of 
labor; (2) how these joint efforts create economic value; and (3) how certain 
societal institutions - most notably property - lead to an appropriation of 
constituent power through a class of proprietors (agents of constituted power). 
What is Property  offers a decidedly economic take on constituent power, which 
presents itself as the collective forces that underpin and sustain labor processes. 
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A main emphasis is put on the collective and generative aspects of labor, and how 
the joint efforts of economic groups and classes produce, in common, the 
materiality of  modern life. 
 Whereas collective reason was labeled as a deliberate and summoned product 
of joint political action, employed by a demos or a multitude for the purpose of 
creating a collective consciousness, collective force is always already, hence latently, 
present. Modern life as such is underpinned, made possible, and sustained by 
operations which mobilize constituent power, and produce the common through 
collective efforts of labor: “The fallacy in this argument lies in the false 
supposition, that each producer is not necessarily association with every other 
producer”.264  And further: “With the exception of the proprietor, we labor for 
each other; we can do nothing by ourselves unaided by others, and we continually 
exchange products and services with each other. If these are not social acts, what 
are they?”.265 A series of ethical questions is raised in this particular context. 
While later works such as the previously discussed Political Capacity  of  the Working 
Class engage with the question how the producing fraction of society might 
mobilize collective reason for their political ends, What is Property concerns itself 
primarily with questions of how the products of collective force - excess- or 
surplus-value - can be retained within the locus of their own production. The 
argumentative linchpin in that regard revolves around the matter of capitalist 
wage labor and how monetary compensation fails to properly reflect the surplus-
value created through conjointly arranged collective forces: “The price is not 
sufficient: the labor of the workers has created a value; now value is their 
property. But they have neither sold nor exchanged it; and you, capitalist, you 
have not earned it”.266  Collective force hence produces value, but this value is 
often captured and appropriated in places and by agents who haven’t been 
involved in its initial generation.267
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 What is Property undertakes an extensive and directed effort do debunk the 
myth of property. Property serves as the main target of the critique, due to the 
institution’s centrality to capitalist efforts of appropriating surplus-value (and of 
collective force and constituent power). Property in that regard operates as a 
phenomenon of constituted power due to its function as a disciplinary tool. As 
such it is part of a larger effort to control and command the productive forces of 
society, and make them extractable to the formalized and legalized modes of 
capitalist production. The appropriation of collective force through capitalist-
legalist efforts leads into a hierarchical relationship between proprietor and 
possessor, which gets entrenched through the institutions of private property and 
wage-labor. What is Property works through a variety of founding myths, 
interrogates them, and offers explanations to why the institution of property 
must be viewed as a myth, charged with malice, and employed by the bourgeoisie 
and the property- and land-owning class to deprive the agents of constituent 
power of the results of their collective efforts.268  What shimmers through the 
discussion is a theme that only comes to full fruition 18 years later in Justice’s 
diagnosis about the ongoing tension between absolutist and revolutionary forms 
of governance. What unites property as a social institution with monarchic or 
aristocratic forms of governance, and what makes them both complicit to 
constituted forms of power, is their shared, static understanding of ownership 
and politics: “The proprietor, the robber, the hero, the sovereign - for all these 
titles are synonymous - imposes his will as law, and suffers neither contradiction 
nor control; that is, he pretends to be the legislative and executive power at 
once”.269  The main target of What is Property’s critique is ‘pure’ or ‘naked’ 
property, namely property in the tradition of Roman law as an absolute domain 
(jus in re): a proprietors right to use and abuse, apart from and in separation to, the 
social context in which value was initially produced.270
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 What is Property advocates instead for a revolutionary (or rather 
democratic) definition of ownership, in which property is abolished and replaced 
by a right to use. The underlying argument leads away from  pure property and 
towards possession (jus ad rem), and it highlights the possibility of ownership in a 
relational and contextualized sense - one that does justice to the products of 
collective force and joint efforts of labor.271  The concept of property (a 
monarchical and aristocratic principle) separates the usage of a resource from its 
control, but possession amalgamates both elements in a democratic sense. Those 
who use a resource on a regular basis acquire the right to control it: “Possession is 
a blessing, but property is robbery”.272  This approach to collective force shows 
great similarities with the strategy concerning collective reason and the way it is 
developed in Political Capacity of  the Working Class. Both writings argue for the 
mobilization of collective force and collective reason by revolutionary means and 
for the purpose of freeing the productiveness of constituent power from its 
constituted, absolutist, and anti-democratic constraints. What is Property  mounts 
not only a strong critique against liberal and capitalist monopolizations of 
property, but leashes out against communism as well.273  Making property 
common and a part of the state-apparatus will only aide the perseverance of 
fixed and immutable property-titles, while perpetuating the appropriation of 
constituent power through the centralizing forces of constituted power. 
Communism in that regard only leads to a transfer of ownership-titles from 
individual to common ownership, and leaves the anti-democratic principle of 
property intact.
4.4 Revolutionary ontologies: The Philosophy of  Progress
 The preceding discussion on the role of constituent power in the context 
of Proudhon’s anarchist philosophy has mainly been touching on practical 
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through the employment of collective force and reason. Philosophy  of  Progress is 
only partly concerned with the activist side of constituent force, and engages 
instead with questions on the ontological climate in which constituent power is 
able to flourish. Towards that end it develops conceptual parameters for a 
political theory in which ‘revolution’ and ‘progress’ are understood as ontological 
conditions required for the exercise of genuine political action: ‘progress’ denotes 
a state, a condition, of contingency and indeterminacy, and serves as the pretext 
for constituent social activities. In the opening section of this chapter it was made 
clear that constituent power’s main marker of distinction comprises of being an 
unfettered, unfounded, and spontaneous force. Constituent power was not only 
regarded as productive in the sense of possessing the potentially to create novel 
social and political arrangements. It was also depicted as ‘exceptional’ due to its 
ability of creating contexts, while at the very same time retreating from  them. The 
precondition for constituent power’s ability to perform such tasks is the existence 
of an ontological void which offers space for the enactment of begründende Gewalt, 
of founding power. The absence of such a void, i.e. the existence of a supposedly 
permanent, non-negotiable context, would incapacitate constituent force and turn 
it into constituted power by means of making it subject to pre-given rules and 
regulations. Constituent power would then be bound by certain ontological 
preconditions (i.e. Hegel’s teleological concept of history), which would preempt 
the possibility of acting in a genuinely constituent fashion. The existence of an 
almost nihilistic ontological void is then a necessary requirement for the 
projection of constitutive force. The Philosophy  of  Progress charts this ontological 
terrain and defines ontological anti-essentialism as the pre-text for the exercise of 
constituent power.
 The developed argument works along the lines of two opposing 
philosophical traditions, one of which subscribes to ‘the absolute’, the other to 
‘progress’ – this binary distinction is in fact very similar to the overarching theme 
of Justice in the Revolution and the Church. Against this backdrop one must 
understand Philosophy of  Progress as a manifesto in favor of an anti-essentialist, 
non-foundational, and process-based ontology which seeks to demonstrate the 
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implausibility and undesirability of substantialist assertions. The bedrock 
assumption driving this philosophical manifesto is the commitment towards an 
ontological dynamism termed ‘movement’ or ‘progress’. The realm  of authority 
and constituted power - i.e. the state, social-contract-theories, ideological 
absolutes, etc. – attempt to foreclose movement:
The Absolute, or absolutism, is, on the contrary  the affirmation of  all that 
Progress denies, the negation of all that it affirms. It  is the study, in nature, 
society, religion, politics, morals, etc., of  the eternal, the immutable, the perfect, the 
definitive, the unconvertible, the undivided; it  is, to use a phrase made famous in 
our parliamentary debates, in all and everywhere the status quo.274
Progress, on the other side, preserves movement through its firm commitment to 
constituent power: 
Progress, once more, is the affirmation of  universal movement, consequently the 
negation of every immutable form and formula, of  every doctrine of  eternity, 
permanence, impeccability, etc. applied to any being whatever, it is the negation of 
every permanent order, even that of  the universe, and of every subjection or 
objection, empirical or transcendental, which does not change.275
Alongside this binary distinction between substantialism and anti-foundationalism 
The Philosophy  of  Progress advances a process-ontology which favors synthetic 
modes of being and interrogates monadic approaches to political theory (see 
chapter VI for an in-depth discussion). All of social life is synthetic and 
grouped276, but substantialist and monadic political theories are incapable of 
grasping the dynamism  that underpins political activity. Instead they depart from 
the assumption of fixed categorizations in which ideologies, identities, modes of 
belonging, etc. are perceived of as if  they had an unalterable substance, awaiting to 
be realized and enacted.277 Progress-centered theories on the other side accurately 
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grasp the improvised and emerging nature of political existence, and they 
understand the modularity of communal life. In opposition to their substantialist 
counterparts they question essentialist assumptions and expose them as 
implausible reductions of complex, and sometimes indeterminate, political 
dynamics.278
 Circling back to the topic of power it becomes apparent how these more 
abstract, ontological observations resonate in political practice. Substantialist 
ontological assumption lead to an affirmation of ‘absolutist’ politics and privilege 
accounts of constituted power. Primacy is given to the realization of a telos, a 
higher purpose, or an absolute truth, which results in the potential obstruction of 
social dynamism. “History is closed by constituent power or, rather, the history it 
determines is restricted to the continual repetition of the same social divisions 
and hierarchies”279, Hardt notes. The same holds true for substantialist political 
theories, due to the neglect of social dynamism in the wake of a commitment 
towards ontological givens. Anti-essentialist takes on ontology favour accounts of 
constituent power instead. Their focus on processes and the synthetic, grouped 
nature of communal life, makes them  susceptible to the foundationlessness of 
political configurations and the centrality of constituent forces, which are 
required for facilitating the existence of  any kind of  social arrangement.
4.5 Constituted and constituent power in other works
 The previously discussed core-themes of revolutionism, collective force, 
collective reason, and ontological progress provide for a framework through 
which other works by Proudhon can be read as well. What becomes visible is the 
continuous reappearance of different types of constituent force, and their 
ongoing struggle with constituted modes of power. Confessions of  a Revolutionary 
diagnoses a general incompatibility between the people and government. 
Government is portrayed as an agent of constituted power – immobile, 
conservative, counter-revolutionary, incapable of initiative. The people, on the 
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other side, represent a constituent force through their generally revolutionary 
leaning and their productiveness in the labor-process.280  The arrangement of 
societal forces hence follows two broad schemes: communal life can either be 
organized around a centralized, inhibiting, and hierarchical authority-structures, 
or, alternatively, affirm the principles of collective force by means of employing 
economic activity and labor as society’s major form-giving doctrines.281 Confessions 
of a Revolutionary exposes an overall strong, and sometimes uncritical, focus on the 
virtues of living labor, and advances a sweeping, general rejection of politics, in 
favor of productive, decentralized, and non-hierarchical economic activity. It also 
bears a decidedly functionalist imprint and suggests to reduce government to a 
purely administrative apparatus with the power to initiate, but not to execute.282 
Industrial activity – the product of collective force - is supposed to replace 
governmental activity and create multiple, independent centers of constituent 
power.283 The overall aim is to arrive at a type of democratic governance in which 
popular activity is exercised regularly through acts of labor which originates in 
multiple, heterogeneous locations.284
 The General Idea of  Revolution shares this strongly functionalist undertone, 
while declaring societas a fiction and universitas a social reality. When people gather 
they’re usually grouped in and around economic activities, and refrain from 
associating beyond the immediately necessary.285 Collective force and constituent 
power can flourish best in functional arrangements such as cooperatives. More 
permanent configurations have the tendency to solidify and reproduce the habits 
of government and constituted force. Similar to Confessions of  a Revolutionary one 
can find suggestions about the absorption of centralized authority-structures, i.e. 
significant parts of the state apparatus, into economic forms of societal 
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organization.286 As part of this effort The General Idea of  Revolution also suggests to 
foster a form of commutative justice through the advancement of a contractually 
governed communities. “The idea of contract excludes that of government”, 
Proudhon notes, and continues that “what characterizes the contract is agreement 
for equal exchange”.287 Members of permanent associations must surrender parts 
of their personal sovereignty for the purpose of becoming part of a group, 
whereas commutative and contractual justice is supposed to give rise to forms of 
ad-hoc associations in which the contracting parties retain their liberty and act-
capacity.288  The theme of constituent and constituted power becomes visible 
again in the particular conflict between permanent associations and contractual 
arrangements. The former are labeled the despotic and dogmatic agents of 
unproductive, constituted power, but the latter ones are expected to foster 
constituent power through the unhampered development of  collective forces.
 The Principle of  Federation  sides with the previously introduced lines of 
reasoning to the extent that it divides the political landscape into orders founded 
upon either authority or liberty.289  Yet, while the foregoing discussion has 
suggested the possibility of pure political orders, i.e. fully developed democratic 
or anarchic regimes, The Principle of  Federation  arrives at a much more differentiated 
conclusion, and proposes the unresolvable and antinomic co-presence of liberty 
and authority.290  All political orders are consequently perceived of as blends of 
authoritarian (constituted power) and revolutionary elements (constituent power), 
which leads to the conclusion that the form of government is determined by the 
respective distribution of authority and liberty, and not by a definitive choice 
between the two principles.291  This insight leads to the reluctant acceptance of 
the necessity of some degree of government. What is retained is The General Idea 
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such as providing guarantees, or devising frameworks for societal action. The 
system best capable of reducing constituted power’s inhibitive influence, while 
fostering constituent power’s productive capacity, is a federal arrangements based 
on synallagamtic and commutative contracts.292 These contracts are designed to 
ensure that each political agent has “as much to receive from the state as he gives 
up” and keeps “all his liberty, his sovereignty and his initiative, minus what is 
related to the special objects from which the contracts is formed (...) for”.293 The 
federal system is consciously built around the permanent mobilization of 
constituent power. Accounts of constituted power are deliberately curtailed 
through the limitation, separation, and diffusion of centralized authority 
structures, and the reduction of government to a mere federal authority.294 
Constituent power, on the other side, can be exercised continuously in economic 
clusters through the mobilization of  collective force and collective reason.
5. Conclusion: constituent anarchy
 A directed reading of Proudhon’s key-texts sheds light on the close 
proximity between one of anarchism’s key-thinkers and the philosophical 
tradition of constituent power. Proudhon’s heightened awareness for constituent 
political momenta has become apparent on several occasions, and resonates on an 
ontological (revolutionary ontology in Philosophy of  Progress), a material (collective 
force in What is Property?), and an ideational level (collective reason in Political 
Capacity of the Working Class). The exercise of constituent power is in all cases and 
on all levels accompanied by the occurrence of an ontologically productive 
juncture, a founding-act of some sort, and instances of elevated creativity. 
Towards that end anarchist constituent force also alludes to the possibility of a 
political exceptionalism from below. The anarchist approach does not relegate, in 
opposition to Schmitt, the exercise of constituent power to the fringe-lines of 
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politics (i.e. in the form of an ‘exception from above’).295 Rather than dividing the 
common arbitrarily through the exercise of a sovereign decision, anarchism 
highlights the occurrence of constituent power through acts of political and 
economic labour. Cultivating an elevated awareness for the possibility and 
existence of such an ‘exceptionalism from  below’ also sheds light on the 
immanent nature of constituent anarchy. Statist or legalist takes on constituent 
force assign the performance of founding-acts to a transcendental source of 
authority. The anarchist approach points in the opposite direction and towards 
the necessarily immanent character of constituent power. The existence of an 
immanent, democratic exceptionalism multiplies the possible occurrence of 
political founding-acts, and removes them from  the supposedly necessary 
existence of  a sovereign center.
 In relation to sovereignty anarchist constituent power highlights the 
importance and robustness of acts of self-legislation through the performance of 
democratic agency in the context of public events of self-alteration.296 The critical 
importance of such collectively driven, transformative acts lies in their ability to 
re-assess the basis for genuinely sovereign action. Sovereignty is not longer 
framed in a narrow, transcendental, and coercive Westphalian fashion, and reveals 
instead its decidedly democratic and republican edge. Justice in the Revolution and the 
Church  alludes to the split nature of sovereign practices when it distinguishes 
between absolutist and revolutionary practices. Both modes of political activity 
fall under the heading of sovereign action. Yet, while ‘the absolute’ operates 
under a putative and inhibiting pretext, ‘revolution’ stands for a mode of 
republican performativity and a moment of autopoiesis in a genuinely anarchic 
context. The relation between constituted and constituent power is, however, not 
as clear cut as the simple binary division between absolute and revolution would 
suggest. The Principle of  Federation grasps the mutually constitutive nature of 
constituted and constituent politics when it advocates in favour of an institutional 
scaffolding for labor, provided for by the state. Such an interpretation of the 
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interrelatedness of power brushes against the grain of Hardt and Negri’s empire-
multitude-binary, which diagnoses a general incompatibility between constituted 
and constituent types of force. The anarchist take on power sides instead with 
Kalyvas’ interpretation, for whom the structuring presence of constituted force is 
tolerable as long as solidified power-structures remain accountable to, and 
transformable by, republican agencies.
 Lastly it has also transpired that political agency and act-capacity in the 
context of anarchist constituent power bears strong imprints of ‘groupness’. The 
power to maintain and significantly transform prevalent political orders has been 
assigned to collective entities and their ability to wield collective force and 
collective reason through their joint activities. Exercising constituent power 
depends indeed on the existence of a somewhat bound demos. Yet, since 
constituent force can be exercised through acts of political and economic labor, 
the borders of such groups can, and actually must, remain permeable. Confessions 
of a Revolutionary, The General Idea of  Revolution, and The Principle of  Federation reject 
firm  and permanently bound associations in favour of contractually bound social 
arrangements, and point towards the necessarily porous nature of political 
groupings. Constituent anarchy is then exercised by overlapping and intertwining 
‘natural groups’, whose efforts materialize either through economic or political 
labor. These groups exist in an environment populated by nested, semi-bound, 
and semi-detached units, which wield diverging amounts of  constituent force.
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CHAPTER FIVE
V | FROM POWER TO FORCE
1. Introduction: power in International Relations theory
 The contextualized reading of Proudhon’s political theory in the 
preceding chapter revealed the close relation between mutualist anarchist thought 
and constituent power. Chapter V will now come to a full circle and return back 
to the dominant theme of chapter II, namely the incomplete mobilization of 
productive force in IR-theory. This chapter engages once more with the theme of 
power in IR, and utilizes the insights gained in chapter IV. The main aim  of this 
chapter is to see how the deployment of anarchist notions of power resonate 
with IR’s power-discourse. After having completed the analysis the argument sets 
off to a re-evaluation of ontology and agency (ch. VI), sovereignty (ch. VII), and 
ethics (ch. VIII) along anarchist lines.
 The argument developed in this chapter progresses in three consecutive 
steps: section two opens the complex by means of discussing three prevalent 
notions of power in IR, namely realism’s hard-power or capability model, the 
poststructural take on power as an immanent property to discourses, and finally 
the hybrid-approach of ‘soft power’, which attempts to combine interest- and 
discourse-based foci of inquiry. Section three analyzes the diagnosed divide and 
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argues that IR’s power-discourse operates within these specific silos due to a 
conceptual division along the lines of distributive and constitutive politics. The 
discrete alignment of materialist/capability-based models on the one side, and 
ideational/discursive notions of power on the other emerges through distinctively 
different epistemic approaches. Sections four and five provide, as already indicated 
above, an anarchist take on IR’s power-discourse through the mobilization of 
Proudhon’s concept of social force. This section discusses the theory of force 
against the backdrop of aggregated, agglomerated, cooperative, and commutative 
concepts of power, and offers a series of concluding thoughts as to why IR needs 
to be more open to the contributions of  classical anarchist thought to its canon.
2. Capabilities, discourses, and the power of  persuasion 
 The concept of power in IR-theory is characterized by its Janus-faced 
appearance. Power certainly counts as one of the key-terms central to the study 
of international political processes, and questions about its conceptual essence 
(What does power mean?), its relational qualities (What does power do?), its effect on the 
historical configuration of socio-political arrangements (How and why  did certain 
powerful actors develop historically in ways that allowed them to unfold significant amounts of 
influence?), and last but not least its practical applicability (How can power be mobilized 
towards certain political ends?) deeply permeate the field. Yet conversely, and despite 
its centrality to the study of global politics, power resists any conclusive attempt 
of having its definitional meaning settled for good. The concept of power is 
essentially contested within IR, and for quite some time political realism has held 
a quasi-monopoly on its (preliminary) definition. With the emergence of 
poststructural IR theorizing in the 1980s this monopoly did certainly not break 
down. However, previously dominant materialist notions of power have been 
complemented by newly emerging ideational, relational, and discursive 
interpretations. The emerging divide has further contributed to a diversification 
of the IR-field and gave rise to a seemingly insurmountable divide between 
‘power as capability’ versus ‘power as discourse’.
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 Power in IR is then most commonly underpinned by a notion of capacity. 
Powerful actors have the ability to inflict decisive and lasting change on their 
socio-political surrounding. This active or positive account of being “able to 
make, or able to receive, any change”297 puts a special emphasis on potentiality, 
actuality, and the realization of will. It brings with it the condition that power is 
closely connected to some form of intentionality or directness. Intentionality and 
directness represent, however, only one facet of the power matrix. Lukes remarks 
that power can also operate through acts of passivity and negative action, i.e. by 
means of receiving change while remaining inactive, or initiating change through 
a chain of unintended consequences.298 The extension of power’s scope into the 
realm of mediated effectiveness does not suffice to negate the importance of 
immediate forms of power as structuring and potentially transformative forces, 
yet it highlights power’s structural facets and demonstrates that intentionality and 
the positivity of actions are potentially insignificant for the mobilization of 
capacity.299 Departing from this understanding of power as the precondition for 
being able to exalt a transformative momentum - induced either actively or 
passively - one can identify three traditions that analyze the effects of power as 
act-capacity.
2.1 Capability-based models: classical and structural realism
 Materialist takes on power assume that it can be possessed, accumulated, 
quantified, and utilized. It is consequently enshrined in an actor’s capabilities such 
as military capacity, its economic base, demographic developments, or geopolitical 
location. Power, if understood as an accumulation of capabilities, operates largely 
on the surface of the political plane and contributes to an ever shifting balance 
among actors.300  Despite impacting decisively on the international system’s 
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distributive hierarchy materialist notions of power do not have any influence on 
its operating-principles. The deep-structure of the state-based international 
system remains essentially leaderless, and the distribution of capabilities changes 
only relations among states, but leaves the anarchical character of ‘the 
international’ intact. Power as capability becomes then a necessary means for 
survival in a world of states that lacks a centralized ordering force. Over the past 
decades theorists have offered various explanations for states behavior in this 
particular setting.
 Classical realists such as Morgenthau301 and Niebuhr302  are typical first and 
second-image thinkers, for whom  individuals as well as states are characterized by 
a deeply rooted drive for domination - an animus dominandi - that translates into a 
fierce quest for power. International politics is routinely perceived as being driven 
by this virtually limitless lust for power and embraces tragical elements of 
passion, fear, glory, and self-interest.303 Although third-image explanations, which 
take the structuring effects of anarchy on the international system into account 
are not absent from  Morgenthau’s theory of international politics, they are none 
the less heavily under-theorized and trumped by first- and second-image 
interpretations. What drives international politics is then not inscribed into the 
anarchical makeup of the international system  as such, but can rather be traced 
back to the behavior of individual states and their respective desires for syndetic 
domination. Any notion of anarchy - a concept absolutely central to structural 
realism  - counts only as a second-order phenomenon and springs from  the initial, 
individually rooted urge to dominate. In this narrative power does not count as a 
means to an end that would increase competitiveness across units. Its is rather an 
end by and in itself, utilized for the sole purpose of increasing superiority in 
opposition to ones competitors. The facets of power offered by classical realism 
are, however, much more dazzling than the ones mobilized in the neo-realist 
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school of thought, since as they pay attention to both, material capabilities and 
relational forces in international affairs.304  Central to Morgenthau’s national 
power-approach are not only material capabilities, i.e. industrial capacity or 
military preparedness, but also relational factors such as national character, 
national morale, and the quality of diplomacy.305  All of these factors are 
supposed to enhance the state’s fitness for the purpose of dominating other 
states and to resist, conversely, its own domination: keeping power (securing the 
status quo), increasing power (an imperialist or revolutionary element), and 
demonstrating power (for the purpose of deterrence) are the recurring logics of 
international affairs.306  Unpredictability and uncertainty are ever present 
conditions in global politics, and since there is virtually no stabilizing or ordering 
element present in the international environment the only way of safeguarding 
ones survival comprises in the cultivation and maximization of all sorts of 
capabilities and the enhancement of  a state’s national-power-score.
 Structural realism shares with its classical predecessor the general conviction 
of an inseparable intertwinement of politics and power. Yet, classical realism’s 
power-centered first- and second-image interpretations (with their respective 
emphasis on the actions of individuals and states) has become dislodged in favor 
of a security-centered reading which claims that “the quest for power is due not 
to any desire for power as such, but to a general human craving for security”.307 
Structural realism substitutes “tragedy for evil” by means of replacing the “‘mad 
Cesar’ (...) of the pure power model (...) by the ‘hysterical Cesar’ who” is haunted 
by fear.308 By shifting the focus of its analysis away from  ontological claims about 
human nature, and gearing its inquiry decidedly towards the structural 
determinisms immanent to the international system, neo-realism moved anarchy 
into the spotlight of IR theorizing. Anarchy - or the absence of an overarching, 
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centralized, ordering force in international affairs - disembogues into a condition 
of general insecurity and portraits the international as a realm dominated by a 
self-help logic: in order to further the state’s primary interest of survival it needs 
to marshal its own capabilities as effectively as possible in order to enjoy a 
maximum degree of non-domination. A strategy favored by states for the 
purpose of securing their survival is the accumulation of sufficient assets - i.e. 
offensive military capabilities - that help to deter competitors, allow for limited 
freedom of action, and guarantee a sufficient degree of independence. The 
international’s anarchical makeup is stabilized in the form  of a fragile equilibrium 
manifest in the figure of  balance of  power.309 
 In this context defensive realism stresses the security-maximizing 
character of states: cautious sovereign polities only wish to accumulate an 
appropriate amount of power that helps them  to secure their essential interest in 
survival, without triggering significant balancing-responses from competing 
sovereigns.310  On the contrary offensive realism  leans heavily towards the 
previously discussed classical reading of international affairs and argues that 
power-maximization is the best way of safeguarding the integrity of ones 
interests. Consequently expansionist and hegemonic foreign policies are perceived 
as a legitimate way of securing a state’s survival under anarchy and in the context 
of  a self-help system.311 
 Neo-realism  offers an important contribution to the field of IR research 
as a result of highlighting the elements of structural power. It portrays the 
international not only as a discrete political realm, but highlights its qualities as an 
autonomous facet of power in its own right due to its prolific effects on inter-
state relations: in the same way the market dictates the logic of profit to a 
corporation, the international dictates the logic of security to the state.312 
Regardless of its valuable contributions to the IR-field neo-realism  also suffers 
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from  a poverty of imagination since it abandons power’s relational features 
(which were so vividly drawn by Morgenthau) in favor of a reductionist 
materialist/capability-based perspective. The complications that loom when 
slashing power down to its discrete and non-relational components, as well as the 
conceptual limitations attached to Waltz’ lump-concept of power, will be 
addressed in greater details in section three.
2.2 Discursive approaches: post-structural takes on power
 Post-structuralism overlaps with classical and structural realism to the 
extent that both emphasize the ontological primacy of power that lies at the heart 
of the political process. Where post-structuralism  differs from the previously 
discussed realist school of thought is in its objection to a reading of power as a 
predominantly material property. It highlights instead power’s covert 
functionalities which operate beneath a material, capability-dominated surface and 
permeates the deep-structure of the international system by way of creating and 
reproducing distinctive socio-cultural practices. Power’s efficacy is difficult to 
quantify since it works through this variety of criss crossing discourses, some of 
them hegemonic, others subordinated and secondary, which, in turn, condition 
the fabric of the international and sculpt shared institutions, intersubjectively 
constructed knowledge, agent-to-agent relations, and even the ‘management’ of 
bodies.313  Power is then, to use a chess-analogy, not the sum of knights, rooks, 
and pawns at a players disposal, but rather the discourse that surrounds the 
chessboard itself - a discourse that creates, maintains, rationalizes, and enforces 
the game and its rules while synchronously opening and delimiting space for 
maneuver of  an actor’s resources.
 Whilst realism  affirms the actor-driven role of power that is underlined by 
the capacity to initiate and receive change, poststructuralism  follows a subject-
centered approach in which agents slip into a much more ambiguous role. Instead 
of being reduced to discrete and detached handlers of power that wield their 
- 102 -
313 Sterling-Folker & Shinko, “Discourses of  Power”, 637.
capabilities like tools, agents themselves are seen as being part of a complex web 
of capillary relations in which hitherto clear cut subject/object-, handler/
handled-, powerful/powerless-distinctions break down and bleed into one 
another. This dissolution of the modern subject-object barrier happens against 
the backdrop of biopolitical production, immanent socialization, permanent 
normalization, pervasive acts of control, and subtile mechanisms of policing.314 It 
does not come as a surprise then that power is predominantly characterized as a 
disciplinary force and works through hegemonic discourses. Relations of power 
are taken for granted and continue to resonate as an integral part of an 
intersubjectively composed reality in which naturalized and unchallenged 
perceptions of the world are manifest in the uniformity and regularities of 
behavior.315 Foucault notes, however, that power can never be exercised without 
certain acts of defiance and that every demonstration of power produces its own 
form of resistance. Power is dispersed through the gauze of intersubjectively 
accepted meanings and produces subjects capable of repositioning themselves 
within the social matrix. Especially the expression of difference, i.e. through 
novel practices and the conduction of previously undiscovered or unimagined 
alliances, opens up productive spaces, and challenges naturalized and normalized 
perceptions of  how our political surroundings are supposed to function.316
 It is this prospect of dissent which demonstrates the clearest demarcation 
from  the realist concept of power. As previously discussed, IR-realism works 
under the assumption that either human nature or the anarchical makeup of the 
international system forces actors into a corset of rules which define - in an 
aprioristic fashion - how agents are supposed to conduct themselves within the 
international environment. The strength of discourse-based framings of power 
does then not lie in their ability to devise strategies that would allow actors to 
navigate this system  more successfully, but can rather be found in their de-
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naturalizing character that asks questions about the very origin of this 
competition. Instead of taking anarchy, uncertainty, self-help, and survivalism as 
non-negotiable facts the post-structural analysis of power pays attention to the 
productive discourses surrounding these taken-for-granted concepts. As an 
example, Ashley’s analysis of the anarchy problematique destabilizes the universal 
narrative of sovereignty and demonstrates that inter-state competition is neither a 
direct consequence of bellicose human nature nor an effect of systemic anarchy, 
but rather the result of a heroic discourse which establishes a hierarchical binary 
where supposedly stable patterns of centralized order and sovereignty are 
privileged over the allegedly chaotic conditions of anarchy.317  In a different 
fashion Reid argues that the notorious War on Terror does not count as an exercise 
of classical imperialism, but is instead part and parcel of a larger global projection 
of biopolitical power wit the aim  to strategically reshape subject-positions in the 
context of ‘empire’.318  Last but not least, Hardt and Negri contend that the 
current international order is characterized by a decidedly novel form  of 
postmodern sovereignty which replaces anarchical inter-state competition with a 
transnational hierarchy of imperial, biopolitical patterns of control and 
command.319
2.3 Soft power: the power of  persuasion
 A third possible angle from which the complex of power in IR can be 
accessed is via a ‘soft power’ framing. Soft power could be perceived as an 
attempt of bringing realist and poststructural notions of power closer together 
since the approach combines the intentionality of the former with the discourse-
centered elements of the latter. Nye defines soft power as the ability to shape 
other’s preferences and to co-opt rather than coerce them  into doing something. 
Soft power hence differs from influence - which rests on hard power - and works 
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instead through mechanism of attraction. 320  While hard power has to use 
coercion and intimidation in order to produce effects, soft power relies instead on 
more subtile techniques that generate lasting patterns of positive affirmation, for 
example by means of  fostering attraction and appeal for one’s ideas and ideals.321
 Due to soft power’s strong ideational underpinning it is no capability in 
the classical sense on whose possession states would have a monopoly. Contrary 
to the previously discussed material capabilities it is possible to distribute soft 
power-resources widely among a broad array of domestic and international 
political agents. Soft power then counts as a resource also available to non-state 
actors, and it allows them to develop an arsenal of talk-centric capabilities 
through the mobilization of symbolic resources and their work as norm 
entrepreneurs. A level playing field emerges, and similar to states NGOs can 
utilize language as a tool to alter social structures, shape preferences, and generate 
patterns of expected behavior. Holzscheiter demonstrates that the power politics 
of the supposedly powerless matters especially within international organizations 
where one can find the discursive economy of global politics. Within these 
institutions and organizations a language-market exists and symbolic capital is 
traded vividly. In this context NGOs function as ‘honest brokers’ and norm 
entrepreneurs, and infuse content into intergovernmental discussions that would 
otherwise go unnoticed by state-actors.322  Although most NGOs suffer from a 
situation of chronic underfunding they have none the less an invaluable asset at 
their disposal, namely their credibility. A nimbus of alleged altruism and 
unselfishness often surrounds none-state actors, and the general public usually 
assigns great credibility to them, which bestows NGOs with the unofficial 
mandate of acting as the ‘people’s voice’. Although non-state actors are routinely 
excluded from the diplomatic part of intergovernmental negotiations they can 
play a crucial role when it comes to agenda-setting and opinion-building. In this 
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process the presumably soft element of language can be utilized for a great 
variety of maneuvers, such as attracting followers, mobilizing public opinion, 
formulating accusations, or the mounting of  an extra-parliamentary opposition.323
 The attractiveness of the soft power-approach lies certainly in its attempt 
to transform  the mechanisms of power politics by dint of substituting latently 
violent coercion in favor of cooperatively oriented modes of persuasion. In the 
wake of this positive affirmation it needs to be acknowledged that soft power is 
none the less in a position to marshal representational force and non-material 
threats.324  An audience is then menaced with unthinkable mischief unless it 
submits: “the harm  promised is to the victim’s own ontological security - it is a 
threat that exploits the fragility of the sociolinguistic ‘realities’ that constitute the 
victim’s Self ”.325  As a sociolinguistic compound an actor’s self-perception 
depends heavily on its recognition by fellow agents. Certain powerful actors find 
themselves in positions that allow them  to challenge and transform  this identity: 
they can then inflict severe damage on a peer’s self-image and alter its social 
standing within the community that grants recognition and ontological security in 
the first place.326 
 An example that reveals the coercive potential inherent to soft power is 
the US’ effort of alliance-building in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. 
Back then it was of outmost interest to the government to forge and control the 
narratives that unfolded around the event, mainly for the purpose of rounding up 
allies that would approve of a military intervention. As part of this attempt the 
US had to articulate the conditions of its own attractiveness, and it did so by 
invoking the rhetorical figures of the coalition of  the willing and the axis of  evil. The 
manichean division of the world into good and bad, us and them, helped to alter 
the nature of the War on Terror. Instead of selling it as what it was, namely one 
possible choice among a plethora of political options, it was pitched as the only 
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logical and remaining way of action if one wishes to remain in the camp of the 
good, the willing, and the free. Opting for this strategy had nothing to do with 
increasing ones attractiveness and counting on voluntary induced pledges of 
allegiance - it was instead a clear cut case of forming an entourage molded by 
non-material threats and representational force.327  Actors whose social identity 
relied to a great extent on the endorsement of the US - Egypt, Jordan, Syria - 
needed the join the coalition of the willing, regardless of their actual preferences, 
in order to protect their identities from damage, harm, and ‘social death’. Others, 
who could draw from identities firmly rooted in alternative social matrixes - 
France and Germany for example, with their european identity -, were less 
dependent on US’ approval and unreceptive to the exercise of representational 
force.
3. Common grounds and insurmountable divides
 The previous section has demonstrated that power operates on various 
levels and through a multiplicity of media, and that the concept is, first and 
foremost, an either material or ideational force which imposes certain ways of 
doing things.328  In consequence it needs to be acknowledged that power is not 
crystalline but appears instead as an amorphous structure, able to create and 
maintain forms of social interactions, while exposing these structures to flux and 
change at the very same time. These modes of change take place within certain 
corridors of possibility. For realism change occurs within a configuration of 
state-based agents which attempt to survive in an anarchical environment. In a 
post-structural reading transformation is imminent when acts of resistance 
towards hegemonic discourses rupture structural fixity.329 The brief survey into 
IRs takes on power has also demonstrated that the discipline is far away from 
speaking with one voice, and incapable of providing a definitive answer to the 
question what power is, how it operates, and where it comes from. This frayed 
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nature of the discourse and its division into hard, poststructural, and soft 
readings of power suggests a divide alongside epistemic lines. All three branches 
of IR-theorizing agree on the ontological primacy of power - the question 
remaining unanswered is how to access this ontological core: through the study of 
material capabilities, hegemonic discourses, or ideational attraction?
 Lipschutz offers a helpful disentanglement of this dilemma and positions 
power as an object with at least four facets, each of which constitutes a separate 
social force. The major line of division runs between power’s distributive and 
constitutive layers. So far the power-discourse has largely been focusing on these 
distributive dimension which inquires into the “authority to divide, distribute, 
expropriate” - who gets what, when, how? -, eventually paying major attention to 
direct and institutional forms of force.330 While direct power enables the sovereign to 
“use force, coercion, manipulation or influence to protect or pursue its interest”, 
institutional power is the ability of a social subject to “engage in agenda-setting, law-
making or role-setting to distribute resource to favoured interests”.331  What is 
largely neglected by the realist tradition and finds recognition only in certain 
poststructural approaches are forms of power concerned with the constitutive 
aspects of politics, entailing the “authority to define, decree, decide”332  (see. 
chapter II for an in-depth discussion). Again it is possible to subdivide this 
category once more, namely into structural and productive power. Structural power 
refers to the capacity to “structure conditions through rules governing political 
economy.” Productive power is a collective agent’s capacity to “affect [the] ethical 
basis of action through language, habitus or structuration”.333  A more 
comprehensive approach on power in IR-theory needs to take this multi-facetted 
appearance of force into account if it wants to do justice to the complexity of 
global politics. What is required is a synthetic approach to power in IR, capable of 
paying equal attention to the distributive and constitutive aspects of  force.
- 108 -




4. From power to force: anarchist contributions to IR’s power-discourse
 In taking the claim about the multilayered quality of power seriously the 
chapter’s final sections conveys an alternative reading and suggests to conceive of 
power as a synthetic phenomenon, capable of operating outside the 
aforementioned materialism/idealism- and distribution/constitution-divides. As 
pointed out, problem-solving realism  focuses primarily on the distribution of 
material capabilities, while rationalizing discourses are largely taken for granted. 
Conversely, post-structuralism  concerns itself prominently with such constitutive, 
disciplining, enabling, and constraining aspects of global politics, and assigns only 
a secondary status towards distributive effects.334 The anarchist notion of power 
in general, and Proudhon’s concept of force in particular, differs from the 
entrenched dualism  of the prevailing discourse and allows for a more fine-grained 
approach towards power in global affairs. This section of the chapter discusses 
Proudhon’s take on power and contrasts force with the aforementioned 
interpretations. Proudhon’s Little Political Catechism - part of his magnum opus 
Justice in the Revolution and in the Church - provides the basis for this discussion. The 
Catechism offers a condensed, yet rather explicit description of Proudhon social 
ontology and its intimate intertwinement with collective force. 
4.1 Power as collective force
 At the beginning of the Catechism Proudhon asks “what constitutes the 
reality of social power?” and imminently delivers a short, yet rather straight 
forward answer: “The collective force”.335  Upon proceeding further the text 
offers a more detailed definition of  the quality of  this force:
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Any being, and by  that  I mean only  what  exists, what is reality, not a phantom, a 
pure idea, possesses in itself, to whatever degree, the faculty  or property, as soon as 
it  finds itself  in  the presence of  other beings, of  being  able to attract  and be 
attracted, to repulse and be repulsed, to move, to act, to think, to PRODUCE, at 
the very least  to resist, by  its inertia, influences from the outside. The faculty of 
property, one calls force.336
This short paragraph makes two important statements about the nature of 
power: first, and foremost, force can only be found in the realm of the palpable, 
which highlights the decidedly non-transcendental character of power. Proudhon 
stresses the actuality of power, whose exercise is closely tied to the physical 
existence of an agent who wields social force in the first place. The tangible 
existence of ‘the reality of social power’, and the possibility to generate force, are 
hence inseparable intertwined. Upon highlighting the actual character of power 
Proudhon emphasizes the humanist origins of act-capacity, which can only derive 
from  concrete material or ideational relations, but never from a removed agent 
such as god, fate, providence, or spirit. 
 The second insight to be derived from  the opening sequence of the 
Catechism concerns power’s strict relationality: the force wielded by a social agent 
manifests itself ‘as soon as it finds itself in the presence of other beings’. Power 
shouldn’t be perceived as a property that would exist autonomously and 
independently of the social context into which it is embedded. The inherent 
sociability of humans gives rise to the concept of social force in the first place, 
and demonstrates the productive nature of  human interaction.
 Especially this second claim is of importance when deploying the theory 
of social force into an IR-context. Certain capability-centered IR theories tend to 
conceive of a state’s military, its industrial capacity, or its demographics as 
fragmented elements of national power which contributes individually to the 
overall fitness of the state.337 Perceiving of the state as an agent is, in Proudhon’s 
reading, defensible and it could indeed be argued that a state as an actor is 
constituted by agglomerated force. Problems arise as soon as capabilities are 
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framed as discrete entities that exist in a condition of subordination towards the 
larger complex of the state-force. What is at stake here is the qualitative difference 
between aggregative and agglomerated types of  force.
4.2 From aggregation to agglomeration
 It has already been indicated that Proudhon concurs with certain strands 
of contemporary IR-theory to the extent that the nature of politics in general, 
and the state in particular, is closely underpinned by multiple sets of power-
relations. Yet, the relationship between state and power is by no means 
unidirectional. A state is not simply a handler of powerful resources, but, at the 
very same time, constituted by a complex interplay of forces in itself. In this 
respect it is important to draw a sharp line between the state imagined as an 
aggregation of force - like in Waltz’ lump concept of power338  - and the state 
understood as an agglomeration of forces, in which new forms of power can emerge 
solely by virtue of productive social interaction. Departing from  this 
understanding that individual and collective agents are respectively equipped with 
force, Proudhon explains the relationship between individuals, collectivities, and 
their mutually constitutive capacity to power339:
To speak here only of  human collectivities, let  us suppose that  the individuals, in 
such number as one might wish, in whatever manner and to whatever end, group 
their force: the resultant of  these agglomerated force which must not  be confused 
with their sum, constituted the force of  power of  the group.340
Assigning the power, or more accurately the social force, that is exalted by 
collective agents such as the state to the mere summing up of individual 
capabilities would hence be erroneous. It is rather the constitutive interplay 
between the initial carriers of force - i.e. individual political agents - which gives 
collectivities their power. This line of reasoning has a fairly abstract taste to if, for 
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which reason it is applicable to link Proudhon back to the IR-discourse. In Theory 
of International Politics Waltz describes the capability-based lump concept of power 
as follows: 
States, because they are in a self-help system, have to use their combined 
capabilities in order to serve their interests. The economic, military, and other 
capabilities of nations cannot be sectored and separately weighted. State are not 
placed in the top rank because they excel in one way or another. Their rank 
depends on how they  score on all of  the following items: size of  population and 
territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political 
stability and competence.341
Brian C. Schmidt rightly assails the one-dimensionality of Waltz’ reading, which 
tells us little about the social forces that work in and through the state-form. 
Instead, the capability-based model “represent[s] nothing more than the total sum 
of a number of loosely identified national attributes”342, while disregarding case-
specific patterns of interconnectedness, cooperation, and also conflict among 
these sub-units. Waltz clearly idealizes the state as a sort of supreme being that 
lucidly manages the supposedly passive capabilities at its disposal from an 
elevated position, and for the purpose of surviving in the competitive 
environment of international anarchy. The mythical figure of the state is 
implicitly portrayed as the prime arbiter of social forces, having the power over 
them at its fingertips, and commanding a plethora of complex yet obedient 
societal actors according to its will. 
 A scenario in which the proverbial tail wags with the dog, and where a 
seemingly passive capability exercises considerable influence over the state, 
appears as hardly thinkable from this theoretical angle. Yet it is perfectly 
imaginable from an empirical perspective. Consider the case of Pakistan, where 
the military is a decisive political force in itself, and provides a great deal of 
stability to the internal constitution of the state.343 Another example can be found 
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in the realm of economy and industry. Waltz implies that economic activity is 
mostly a national endeavor that takes place within the close confinements of 
national boundaries. This might have been the case in 19th-century Europe, but it 
hardly reflects the interconnectedness and interdependency of the world market 
in the 21st century. Previously nationally limited industries are increasingly 
internationalized and stand on occasion in stark opposition to the imperative of 
the state and its goals. Not only are businesses trying to elude the grip of the 
state. Some of them  even find themselves in a position that allows them to 
confront the authorities and threaten them with measures such as disinvestment 
and capital flight.344  From a state’s perspective it is certainly an unpleasant 
experience when a supposedly passive capability suddenly starts to revers the very 
logic of  domination and command. 
 The actorhood undoubtedly inherent to supposedly subordinated 
capabilities demonstrates that these agents themselves exalt a considerable 
amount of social force which allows them to produce decisive political outcomes, 
both, domestically as well as internationally. Waltz lump-concept of power has 
then proven to be empirically unwarranted. Proudhon’s theory of social force, in 
which natural groups agglomerate their forces, appears to be much more accurate 
in that regard. An interpretation of the previously discussed examples through 
the lens of the social force-approach looks quite different: the military and certain 
economic actors are themselves recognized as forces; they contribute to the act-
capacity of  the state but aren’t viewed as being subordinated to it. 
 The whole (i.e. the state as an agglomerated natural group) does not 
trump the singular, although it produces a greater force. What needs to be kept in 
mind is that the whole as such is incapable of operating in lieu of its constitutive 
singularities (i.e. the plethoras of natural groups that operate in and through the 
state):
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Imagine a society in which all relations between individuals had suddenly ceased, in 
which each would provide for his own subsistence in absolute isolation: whatever 
amity exists between these men, whatever their proximity, their multitude would no 
longer form an organism, it would lose all reality  and all force. Like a body whose 
molecules have lost the relations that determines their cohesion, at the lest shock, it 
would collapse into dust.345
A family, a battalion, a city, an empire, a political party, entire industries, and last 
but not least the state are neither capable of acquiring nor exerting power entirely 
by virtue of their own making. Despite their diverging sizes and capacities they all 
count as natural groups. As such they are ontologically dependent on the 
agglomerated forces of their constituting parts. Conceiving of the state as a 
black-box, and assuming that its power emerges as the result of a mere 
aggregation of heterogenous capabilities, appears unwarranted and highly 
superficial from the perspective of  agglomerated social force.
4.3 From cooperation to commutation
 Acknowledging power’s dependency on the agglomeration of intertwining 
ideational and material forces leads into a second critical distinction: between 
cooperation and commutation. Regarding the nature of commutation Proudhon 
remarks that the 
active groups which  make the city  differing  from one another in organization, as 
well as in their idea and object, the relation that  links them is no longer really a 
relation of  co-operation but a relation of commutation. The character of  the social 
force will thus be primarily commutative (...).346 
The commutative force is best described as a form of public reciprocity that 
differs qualitatively from mere acts of cooperation. Cooperation, for example in a 
market scheme, requires not necessarily an underlying socially or politically 
productive process and can be reduced to the mere functional activity of 
exchanging goods and services (c.f. institutional power). Cooperating actors 
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derive their act-capacity from a source external to the reciprocal process of 
exchange. This decidedly liberal narrative implies that a priori empowered subjects 
enter into a relationship of trade, but retain their quality as absolute subject-
positions with fixed and always already constituted identities and interests. 
Bottom  line, cooperation can be kept mechanical, instrumental, and socio-
politically unproductive. Hegel points towards this aseptic and self-sufficient 
character of cooperation is his description of liberal civil society and remarks that 
the 
concrete person who, as a particular person, as a totality of  needs and a mixture of 
natural necessity and arbitrariness, is his own end, is one principle of  civil society. 
[It] (...) gains satisfaction through the others, and thus at  the same time through 
the exclusive mediation of  the form of  universality, which is the second 
principle.347 
The international system - especially if viewed through the lens of Waltz’ billiard 
ball metaphor348  - is yet another reductionist construct that flattens the 
productive interplay of agents and diminishes their dealings to acts of mere 
cooperation. The result is a depiction of the political process as the unproductive 
relatedness of units that clash and collide under the sanction of a fixed system-
logic. In Waltz’ interpretation the international system can be very well compared 
to a market. Yet, while the market requires from its participants to maximize 
profit in order to prevail in an economically competitive environment, states 
operating within the international system  need to maximize their security if they 
wish to survive in a politically anarchic setting. What the market and the 
international system have in common is their a priori fixed operating logic: 
“Systems theories, whether political or economic, are theories that explain how 
the organization of a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the 
interacting units within in. Such theories tell us about the forces to which the 
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units are subjected”.349 Within the system interactions among units is dominated 
by mechanical compliance and follows the script of security competition. What 
changes is the balance of political power within the system, depending on the 
distribution of capabilities among units, yet never the underlying logic of 
uncertainty, self-help, and anarchy itself.
 Commutative force is productive by itself and cannot be reduced to the 
discrete interaction among pre-configured system-components. For the purpose 
of exemplifying the immanent productivity unleashed by the commutation 
between political subjects Proudhon refers to money and asks: “Is it the metal of 
which currency is made which has this extraordinary force?”. Followed by his 
answer: “No: it is in the public reciprocity of which currency is the sign and 
pledge”.350  From the perspective of commutative force money is not simply a 
transmission-belt for the process of exchange, nor is it a homogenizer that allows 
for the comparability of heterogenous goods and services: money is an ideational 
force in itself and constituted through the public reciprocity and the commutation 
between market participants. 
 The emergence and decline of general security provides another example 
for the immanent productiveness of commutation. Proudhon proclaims that 
throughout the Middle Ages various social and political actors, among them the 
Catholic church, attempted to rule the population by means of mobilizing 
physical force, and yet, a general sense of security was far from present: “The 
earth is covered with keeps and fortresses; everyone is armed and shut in; pillage 
and war are the order of the day”.351 The unruliness of the population and the 
difficulties to establish a sense of public reciprocity that might have pacified the 
demos from within did, however, not result from  the pitfalls of human nature, 
but was rather due to the fragmentedness of natural groups that prevented the 
commutative force from gaining traction: “But what is barbarism, or rather, what 
produces it? The incoherence of the industrial groups, their small numbers, and the 
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isolation in which they act, after the example of the agricultural groups”.352 Order 
originates from  power - but only if power is understood in productive and 
commutative terms as the amalgamation and agglomeration of collective forces and 
reasons. Money, or a notion of general security and stability, emerges and declines 
through the public reciprocity that underpins the very existence of these social 
institutions. If the commutative force that holds such institutions upright 
diminishes they cannot be sustained simply through the scaffolding of an 
exogenous, compulsory, or direct force: during periods of inflation central banks 
might print exorbitant amounts of money, but its actual value can only be found 
in the collective believe of its universal exchangeability, which then evaporates 
and is lost in its extremes. In the same vain public security might be sustained for 
a short period of time through excessive acts policing (coercive power), but if the 
trust into the legitimacy of a given order vanishes it is impossible to restore by 
mere command. The effectiveness of exogenous force in making and sustaining 
societies (Foucault’s Right of Death353) ought hence not to be overestimated. 
Exogenous and compulsory force is complementary and secondary to immanent 
commutation. The concept of juridical sovereignty is underpinned by a widely 
shared notion of public reciprocity and can’t be sustained infinitely if the fabric 
of  the social is irreparably ruptured and in a process of  disintegration.
5. Conclusion: anarchist ‘force’ and IR theory
 This chapter joined the prevalent debates on power in international 
politics by means of introducing the anarchist notion of force to the IR-field. 
Force offers, it was argued, a take on power that approaches the issue from a two-
dimensional angle and makes an attempt of synthesizing materialist and ideational 
readings of the concept. Social and political power are indeed characterized by a 
material facet, and operates through individual and aggregated agents which 
mobilize their respective forces in various areas of political concern, i.e. during 
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the processes of labor or by forming a multitude of political groups. Force 
consequently counts as an emerging property and reveals itself differently in 
heterogenous political settings, having both enabling and constraining effects on 
political agents, depending on the specific socio-historical alignment of force-
carrying actors. Yet, although being ontologically grounded in the phenomena of 
the material world, force can hardly be accumulated indefinitely. Far more decisive 
is the combined material and ideational situatedness and embeddedness of 
individual and collective actors, whose respective configuration gives rise to 
historically contingent clusters comprising of overlapping, intertwining, and 
hetero-scalar assemblages of actors. Manifestations of force are variegated and 
cannot be reduced to a few ontologically privileged actors, such as nations, the 
state-form, or prominent NGOs. Proudhon notes that force can be found in 
small-scale units such as families, workshops, battalions, or cities - yet, upon 
extending his logic it becomes apparent that the anarchist conception of force is 
not just limited to the local and domestic realm, but can also play a role in 
international affairs, for example by means of explaining inter-state relations, the 
formation of empires, or the emergence and perpetuation of the international 
system.
 What are then the conceptual ramifications of the preceding discussion 
and to what extent might the mobilization of Proudhon’s theory of power be of 
use for IR? How would such a mobilization look like in more concrete terms? By 
means of a conclusion this chapter charts four separate yet intertwined lines of 
action, each of which attempts to fathom  the possibility of an anarchist informed 
contribution to IR-theory that draws from the addressed concept of  force.
 (I) The preceding considerations on realist, poststructural, and soft power 
approaches to international affairs (section two) problematized the materialism-
idealism  divide alongside which IR’s power-discourse operates. The concept of 
force is certainly not in a position to bridge this split for good, mainly because force 
itself is broken up into respective materialist (collective force) and ideational (collective 
reason) facets. Yet, this deeply ingrained dualism exists by design rather than by 
accident, and it demonstrates a strong interdigitation between materialist and 
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ideational lines of reasoning. Force’s makeup is deliberately synthetic, and 
perfectly capable of accommodating the two logics under one conceptual roof, 
while avoiding to give primacy to either side. This dualism  is evident in 
Proudhon’s writings: early texts such as What  is Property? put an emphasis on 
materialist mechanisms and seek to demonstrate how processes of labor create 
surplus-value via the commutation and agglomeration of individual material 
forces.354  Whereas sections of Justice in the Revolution and the Church thematize the 
emergence of force as public and collective reason through the antagonistic 
interplay of individual reasons.355  It is in Justice were Proudhon puts collective force 
and collective reason side by side when arguing that both facets of power come into 
existence due to the productive interplay of individual forces.356  Only the social 
context in which power gets mobilized decides about their respective emphasis. 
In that respect Prichard remarks that “the larger a political unit, the more fragile it 
is and the more it depends on collective reason to hold together its collective 
force; the smaller it is, the more secure it is and the more it operates 
instinctively”.357 The implied interconnectedness flows naturally and serves as an 
integral part of social force - any definitive choice between its materialist and 
ideational components appears as a nonsensical and violent reduction of power’s 
complexity.
 (II) Force is also suited to work across the distribution-constitution divide 
thematized by Lipschutz (section three). The distribution of collective forces and 
collective reasons impacts heavily on the character and internal capacity of 
natural groups358, and the mechanisms of agglomeration (interplay between 
agents) and commutation (productiveness inherent to agglomeration) shed light 
on the constitutive elements of politics. Constituent power - Hardt’s “democratic 
forces of social transformation, the means by which humans make their own 
- 119 -
354 Proudhon, What is Property?
355 Proudhon, Die Gerechtigkeit in der Revolution und in der Kirche, 292 ff.
356 Ibid., 431.
357 Prichard, Justice, Order and Anarchy, 142.
358 Proudhon, “Little Political Catechism”, 656.
history”359  or Schmitt’s capacity “to make something from  that which is not 
something and thus is not subject to laid-down laws”360 - is strangely absent from 
contemporary IR and IPT discourses361, but it serves as an integral part of the 
theory of force. In Philosophy of Progress Proudhon analyses the tensions between 
‘the absolute’ (constituted power) and ‘progress’362  (constituent power) and 
develops an approach to politics that is decidedly geared towards a mobilization 
of the latter.363  By means of paying closer attention to constitutive elements of 
power in international affairs it becomes possible to re-conceptualize a wide array 
of IR’s key concepts (i.e. spatiality, sovereignty, agency) alongside the lines of a 
constituent, anarchist-informed approach to power.364
 (III) Agglomeration and commutation are particularly powerful devices 
when mobilized in the context of natural-group-formation due to their potential 
to destabilize IR’s pervasive domestic/international binary. The natural groups-
perspective undermines the attached inside/outside dichotomy and allows for a 
displacement of the state-centered framing of the international, in favor of polity-
focused concept of the global. This refined take on ontology rejects the 
assumption that the reality of international affairs is one of a statist world. The 
global’s ontology is instead portrayed as an assemblage of socio-political 
topographies and polities of varying scales - a landscape scattered with cliffs, 
archipelagos, planes, caves, and no-mans lands, that differs sharply from  the 
smooth homogeneity of a universal Westphalian republic. Cerny’s observation, 
according to which “international politics works as an increasingly complex 
institutional and behavioural superstructure crisscrossing with both domestic 
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politics, domestic and transnational society, and sub-units of states”365 is perfectly 
captured by the natural-groups-approach, whose sociologically underpinned 
narrative differs strongly from system-approaches to international affairs. These 
approaches operate alongside a domestic/international-divide, which emphasizes 
the ontological primacy of a limited number of privileged actors, usually states, 
NGOs, IGOs, and TNCs. Proudhon is decidedly unorthodox when defining the 
essence of a natural group and remarks that any social, economic, or political 
formation with a sense of unity can fall into this category.366  The label ‘natural 
group’ hence applies to small scale units, but equally befits larger arrangements 
like states and empires. From a natural-groups-perspective these units are 
characterized by a difference that is merely quantitative rather than qualitative. 
What matters is how force is mobilized by an actor for the purpose of producing a 
series of global political outcomes - its location (local, domestic, international, 
transnational) and socio-political function (an activist group, a union, a political 
party, or a multinational corporation) is only of  secondary concern to the analysis.
 (IV) Last, but not least, Proudhon’s political theory can also serve as an 
important bridgehead into IR, allowing anarchist writers to connect with an 
academic discipline formerly alien to them. The anarchist contribution to the IR-
field is scarce, and neither IR-scholars nor left wing libertarian activists 
themselves seem  to be aware of the fact that there is an anarchist tradition of 
studying international affairs (c.f. chapter I). If, at all, the consciousness of an 
anarchist take on international relations manifests itself in terms of transnational 
activism, anti-globalization-movements, and an orthodox and sometimes 
unreflected opposition to centralization and stratification. Anarchism, it is 
implied, is particularly skilled at mounting resistance against prevalent patterns of 
order, but it has little to contribute to the emergence and maintenance of order 
itself. Proudhon reminds both, IR-scholars and anarchist practitioners alike, that 
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anarchism  and IR are by no means incommensurable but have to be understood 
as complementing each other in various respects. Proudhon’s political theory has 
the potential to act as the much needed hub between anarchism and IR by means 
of providing an access-point for authors who have not published explicitly on 
international affairs. Notably in this respect are Stirner and Landauer - who 
thematize the potentially totalizing power of discourses as an instrument of 
governmentality -, Kropotkin - with his anarchist take on human nature and his 
theory of mutual aid -, and Bakunin - who stresses the politically productive 
power of collectivities. These authors would be able to join IR debates by proxy 
and through an engagement with some of Proudhon’s central themes, for 
example the theory of social force, the process of natural group formation, or 
the dynamics unfolded by constituent power. The openness and the versatility of 
Proudhon’s political theory speaks to various classical authors in the anarchist 
spectrum who couldn’t otherwise be mobilized for debates on global politics.
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CHAPTER SIX
VI | CAPILLARIES OF FORCE
1. Introduction: framing ‘the international’
 So far the argument has progressed in three consecutive steps: through a 
systematic reading of classical and neo-classical texts on geopolitics in chapter II 
the underrepresentation of productive/constituent power in international 
political theory was confirmed. A narrow fixation on coercive and institutional 
power (constituted power) leads to an interpretation of global political dynamics 
as a function of Westphalian inter-state politics. Chapters III and IV argued for 
the mobilization of anarchist political theory in an IR-context and to build a 
platform capable of mobilizing constituent power in international political theory. 
The argument was honed in further by an in-depth assessment of Proudhon’s 
theory of force. Chapter V came to a full circle by means of discussing the 
implications of  anarchist ‘force’ for IR-theory.
 At this point a conceptual basis has emerged, from which it is possible to 
branch out, and to discuss further implications for IR-research. This thesis 
addresses, as already highlighted in the introduction, the incomplete and partial 
mobilization of anarchist political philosophy in IR, and offers a more holistic 
and complete anarchist approach to the discipline’s grand themes. Towards that end 
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the thesis engages with dominant IR-key-concepts such as power, ontology, 
agency, sovereignty, and ethics, and aims at scrutinizing and destabilizing them. 
The purpose of such an exercise is the cultivation of a critical narrative, capable 
of creating room for accounts of transnational political agency beyond the 
confinements of Westphalian inter-state politics. The upcoming chapters VI, VII, 
and VIII will address these issues, and ask to what extend the co-mobilization of 
anarchist political theory and constituent power supports such a critical 
engagement with IR’s grand themes. In more concrete terms it is asked how 
anarchist takes on power in international affairs, the ontology of the global (both 
chapter VI), sovereignty, agency in international politics (both chapter VII), the 
spatial ordering of the global, and the ethics of world politics (both chapter VIII) 
looks like.
 Chapter VI will now address matters of ontology, and discusses the 
difference between structural and process-oriented approaches to IR. Section one 
highlights properties of anarchic ontologies and ontological anarchy. Section two 
develops an anarchist account of ‘the international’, while putting a special 
emphasis on the importance of natural-group-formation (a theme already 
touched upon in chapter V) and different types of power politics. The concluding 
section three discusses the topography of global politics and the normative 
implications of  micro-politics.
1.1 The international beyond the state
 Structural approaches to IR portray the ‘the international’ as a distinct 
political realm  about which independent theories can be fashioned.367  Waltz 
describes the function of structural IR as follows: “To be a success, such a theory 
has to show how international politics can be conceived of as a domain distinct 
from  the economic, social, and other international domains that one may 
conceive of ”.368  The international is, according to such theories, not only 
analytically distinct from other realms of human interaction, but operates, in 
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addition, under the premise of an exclusive set of rules: its anarchic configuration 
leads towards the ever present possibility of conflict and forces states to conduct 
their mutual affairs under the premise of a self-help logic. Liberal IR theories 
refrain from  buying into the realist narrative of fear, yet, they don’t necessarily shy 
away from  structural theorizing either. Deudney and Ikenberry perceive of the 
international as a distinctive structural realm, capable of imposing certain modes 
of actions on the behavior of states. Structural liberalism displaces the realist 
narrative of power politics and security competition, and highlights instead 
aspects of security co-binding, semi-sovereignty, economic openness, or civic 
identities as factors for the mitigation of anarchy’s potentially negative 
consequences.369 
 What structural approaches have in common are shared assumptions 
about the international’s somewhat distinct character as a discrete space, governed 
by rules qualitatively different from  other realms of inter-human affairs (i.e. the 
domestic sphere). Furthermore, the impression prevails that the international’s 
ontological fabric is made of a closely knit web of Westphalian polities. 
International organizations and powerful non-state actors are greeted with 
recognition, whilst their status as ontologically dependent agents is reaffirmed. 
Giving ontological primacy to the state certainly has viable reasons. States are still 
the most prominent, and perhaps even important, actors in international politics, 
despite prophecies of doom  about its nearing end.370 The state is live and well: it 
taxes, invests, fights, legislates, and is - historically speaking - the only major 
political project of universal and global reach. It is still very much attractive to be 
a Westphalian polity in the 21st century - a fact proven by countless secessionist 
movements attempting to obtain the status of ‘state’. Not even radical political 
movements such as the notorious Islamic State have (ironically) managed to escape 
the allure of Westphalia. One must bear the label ‘state’ in order to gain authority 
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and to be reckoned with – being a nation, a people, or perhaps a caliphate will not 
do the trick: the state remains the gold-standard of  political communities.
 However, framing the international through a predominantly statist lens 
presupposes the existence of a stasis, or perhaps coherence, that never really 
existed. Waltz acknowledges the international’s pluralistic makeup whilst insisting 
that the nature of a system  is, nevertheless, defined by its most dominant parts: 
“States are not and never have been the only international actors. But then 
structures are defined not by all of the actors that flourish within them but by the 
major ones”.371  Yet, even if one initially accepts the majority-thesis, a second 
incongruity emerges immediately, which involves the consistency of sovereignty. 
Treating the international as if  it were ontologically constituted by states also 
requires to treat states as if  they were always capable of acting in a genuinely 
sovereign fashion. After all, the systemic constraints of anarchy and security 
competition only exist because international society acts upon sovereign practices 
in the first place. Such an assumption implies the coherent existence and 
application of sovereignty-norms, but neglects a prevalent gab between auctoritas 
and potestas: the right to rule (a potentiality), versus the ability to do so (the 
actuality of statist power). Or, phrased differently, between the ideal type of 
sovereign control on the one side, and the border-penetrating forces of 
transnational interdependence on the other.372 Against this backdrop it seems to 
be empirically warranted to trace the forces behind the occurrence of global 
political dynamics back to sociological process of bifurcation, fragmentation, and 
parametric change, sustained by an overlapping and intertwining array of 
heterogenous actors.373  In order to do justice to the complexities of global 
political dynamics Linklater suggests to pay attention to the sociological question 
of  community, social learning, and the praxeological question of  reform.374 
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 Analogous to such relationalist IR theories and their emphasis on 
performative relationality in international affairs, this chapter contends that a 
heightened focus on relations, configurations, and projects, offers not only the 
chance to perceive the international as a ‘process’, but also creates room for a re-
imagination of the ontological standing of anarchy within IR. Rather than 
framing anarchy as an epiphenomenon of statism, processual relationalism  allows 
for a notion of deep anarchy which simultaneously precedes and facilitates global 
political conduct. For the purpose of conceptualizing this take on ontological 
anarchy the chapter mobilizes in particular the works of P.J. Proudhon on natural-
group-formation. A reevaluation of classical anarchist thought, it is argued, 
provides benefits for contemporary IR theory as it gives rise to a post-
Westphalian and process-based framing of the international. The chapter wishes 
to contribute to a notion of anarchy as a productive and generative force, 
supportive of the development of processual ontologies and non-foundational 
groundings of  ‘the international’ in a micro-political context.
1.2 The new normal: the international in transformation
 Vast portions of IR still mobilize Cartesian and problem-solving visions 
of science and perceive of the world as a given, pre-constituted realm  open for 
discovery.375  Such theories are often underpinned by a Cold-War narrative and 
develop a state-centric and materialistic image of the international as a relatively 
fixed and muted structural space.376  Substantialist assumptions back such 
theoretical endeavors, what makes it difficult to account for fast-paced change 
and ontological transformation in international affairs. In that regard Cox 
suggests to rather adopt an evolutionary perspective on international (or perhaps 
global) society’s history by means of paying attention to the question how 
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humans managed to organize themselves in groups such as states, confederations, 
or empires in the first place.377 What is required is a developmental perspective on 
the international’s ontological makeup, one capable of accounting for structural 
shifts and permanent transformation. Such a change in perspective addresses one 
of the major inconsistencies inherent to structuralist and state-centric theories, 
namely the conflation of the international with the inter-state system. It appears 
to be much more warranted to conceive of the international as a space 
comprising of imagined communities and polities of varying sizes and qualities in 
which loyalties often overlap, morph, and transform through processes of mutual 
interaction. Such an integrated and multifaceted approach stands in stark contrast 
to framings of an interstate-system which revolves around discrete, mutually 
exclusive territorial spaces.378
 Ideational factors and structural change: There is certainly no lack of 
transformative momentum in international affairs: institutions, discourses, and 
other ideational resources have the same capacity to change the structural 
configurations of global political arrangements like their materialist 
counterparts.379  Constructivism  has shown how actors preferences and self-
perceptions are neither pre-determined by exogenous forces, nor reducible to the 
pursuit of relatively fixed national interests, but are instead shaped and molded by 
intersubjectively constructed norms and values, which provide for flexible and 
indeterminate accounts of states preferences.380 Wendt demonstrates that anarchy 
- one of the staples of substantialist IR theory - is manifest in the form of 
different ‘cultures’381  and leads to the emergence of either competitive, 
individualistic, or cooperative security systems.382  State-centric soft-power 
approaches allude to the generative potential of ideological attraction, 
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internalization, and normalization, and provide for potential inroads of non-state 
actors into formalized policy circles.383 
 Institutional transformation: Structural change is anything but staggering from 
a relationalist point of view, which assumes that socio-political arrangements are 
only sustained through continuing efforts of inter-subjective reproduction. For 
that reason their disappearance and transformation must be accepted as an 
integral part of any social arrangement.384  The possibility of structural 
transformation is in fact quite familiar to certain branches of IR theory, i.e. the 
English School. Institutional arrangements change over time because 
international society permanently re-negotiates the rules upon which it acts. One 
example for institutional (and consequently structural) change is the abolishment 
of colonialism, a practice perfectly legal and legitimate up until the first half of 
the 20th century, but outlawed in the following decades.385  This instance 
demarcated a structural shift away from a mixed, hierarchical international society 
in which imperial and statist logics existed next to one another, towards a 
universally and ‘pure’ Westphalian system.
 Transformation as an event: Another concept alluding to accounts of 
structural transformation in world politics are events. Socio-political structures 
possess a relative openness for reformulation and change, which also exposes 
them to great amounts of instability due to the permanently present risk of 
disintegration.386  Yet, it also opens up transformative possibilities by means of 
positioning events as catalyzing factors for social transformation. Moore 
describes historical events as “a ramified sequence of occurrences that (...) is 
recognized as notable by contemporaries, and that (...) results in a durable 
transformation of structures”.387  Structures and events are thus antithetical: 
whilst the first one accounts for stability, the second one represents moments of 
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transformative rupture. Yet, despite their essential dissimilarity both are also 
mutually constitutive: “Events are possible because the cultural categories that 
govern a society are continuously put at risk during social action”.388  The effects 
of a successfully transformative event can hence only be felt because societies 
exist over vast stretches of time in a state of relatively uneventful continuity. An 
example for an event that significantly altered the reality of international politics 
can be found in the passing of Security Council resolution 1970 and 1973, 
authorizing for the first time in UN history an intervention against a sovereign 
member state for the purpose of preventing ongoing human rights violations.389 
The Libyan civil war and the following UN-sanctioned intervention finally 
established R2P as a viable intervention-standard, and paved the way for 
violations of state sovereignty for reasons other than concerns over international 
peace and security.
1.3 From substance to process
 Structural theories with their cartesian take on science and their problem-
solving outlook usually depart from a substantialist plateau  and depict actors 
identities and their preferences as relatively fixed and static.390  These approaches 
are capable of accounting for limited systemic adjustment, i.e. when a system 
converts from  bi-polarity into multi- or non-polarity - a process usually triggered 
by endogenous changes in the balance of power, resulting from the re-
distribution of capabilities among units.391  Yet, instances of adaption and re-
configuration occur on top of a relatively stabile and rather inflexible Westphalian 
basis. Against the backdrop of such an “ontological commitment to substance”392 
it is much harder to rationalize passages of substantial flux, for example the 
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transition from  Westphalian to neo-imperial or neo-medieval systems, or the 
sudden collapse of bi-polar orders without a prior change in the balance of 
power (i.e. the end of the Cold War). Substantialist and inter-action based IR 
theories lead, in terms of ontological imaginability, to an impoverished, parochial 
depiction of the international. Collective identities are thought of having 
assumed a crystallized, mainly territorial shape, whereas the limits of global 
political spatiality are defined by the state-form. Discursive constraints to 
knowledge-production are imposed in two different ways, since IR’s inquiries are 
supposed to limit themselves to processes and dynamics that occur outside and in 
between statist polities.393
 In order to make sense of instances of widespread institutional 
transformation, and for the purpose of identifying applicable catalysts that trigger 
such reconfigurations, it is much more plausible to move from a substantialist 
account of the international towards a processual framing: “The politics of 
location, or situated knowledges, rests on process ontology to posit the primacy 
of relations over substances”.394 A process-ontological account of global politics 
moves beyond the prevalent substantialist ‘billiard ball’ metaphor and emphasizes 
the importance of relations and activity over separateness and passivity when it 
comes to the production of global political outcomes. Process-based approaches 
do not limit their inquiries to the tangible, material, and relatively static aspects of 
international affairs, and can instead expose susceptibility towards messy, 
ideational, and non-linear practices such as nationalism, asymmetrical conflicts, or 
the effect of ideology or religion on global dynamics.395  In its most basic sense a 
process is an actual or possible occurrence, an integral series of connected 
developments, unfolding in a programmatic coordination, and initiating a group 
of changes.396 Processes are linked to one another, either causally or functionally. 
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And they are not necessarily linear, which makes it possible that several processes 
can indeed be constitutive of a series of relations between events while not being 
linked programmatically.397
 Conceiving of the international as a performative realm, constituted by 
process rather than substance, sweeps away the substantialist assumption that 
political spaces and systems can have clear cut borders, function within neatly 
delimitated boundaries, and operate in accordance to a single operational logic. A 
process-ontological account of international politics thinks instead in terms of 
super- and subordinate processes and their respective linkages.398  The 
international as a political entity exists only by virtue of a series of constitutive 
processes. Such subordinate processes are analytically distinguishable from the 
superordinate structure, but they are also intimately enmeshed with one another 
in a set of interlocking relations.399 Both layers of the overall configuration, the 
superordinate realm  of international politics and the attached subordinate 
processes - i.e. domestic politics, local/national/global non-state actors, 
transnational economic actors, etc. - can only be understood properly in their 
respective relational and positional configuration towards one another.400 
 In that regard Jackson and Nexon suggest to analytically dissect the 
constituting dynamics of the international, and to group them in accordance to 
the effects they produce in categories of processes, configurations, and projects. 
Processes are, as already pointed out earlier, “causally or functionally linked set[s] 
of occurrences or events, which produce a ‘change in the complexion of 
reality’”.401 They are, at first instance, nothing more than ties between actors, and 
can either be owned or un-owned (i.e intentional or accidental).402 An aggregation 
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random, one-time occurrences, configurations presuppose a certain regularity and 
directness. Configurations are robust patterns of continuous performative 
exchange between actors, such as revenue-extraction, class relations, or war-
making. The third category, projects, refers to the agentic quality to which 
configurations can amount to: “A project is a configuration with agent properties, 
a social entity with the ability to make choices and exercise causal power”.404 
Processes and configurations lack such agentic force, and are instead an 
outgrowth of agency. Projects, on the contrary, can act. States, corporations, 
international organizations, but also much more mundane ‘projects’ such as 
football clubs, an orchestra, or a family possess identities and interests on their 
own and cannot be reduced to the identities and interests of their constituent 
parts. Yet, such arrangements assume the status of a social reality only by virtue 
of their constitutive relations and configurations. A state is a state not because of 
its borders, its military, or its bureaucratic apparatus - these material realities attain 
meaning only within the formative context of an already existing ‘project’. A state 
is a state because of the ways in which a plethora of non-statist agents, i.e. ethnic 
groups, individuals (not citizens!), economic actors, religious authorities, and so 
forth, relate towards one another in a set of systematically thickened processual 
relations that culminate in the discursive formulation of  the statist ‘project’.
1.4 Anarchic ontologies and ontological anarchy
 Framing the international as a space constituted by processual 
arrangements displaces substantialist narratives of static and unproductive 
interaction in favor of a dynamic, relational ontology underpinned by “multiple 
overlapping and intersecting sociospatial networks of power”.405  Constituting, 
maintaining, and transforming such a realm is then subject to a variety of statist 
and non-statist operations, i.e. the mobilization of symbolic resources by 
imagined communities406, or acts of self-disciplining through practices of 
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governmentality.407  In addition, process ontologies also cast a different light on 
the meaning of anarchy in international affairs. Prevailing notions of anarchy are 
both shallow and pessimistic: shallow to the extent that anarchy is reduced to an 
epiphenomenon of statism, dwelling in the liminal zones between sovereign, 
territorial polities. And pessimistic  due to the negative connotation such an image 
conveys. Anarchy is depicted as a problem awaiting to be managed, a potential 
source for instability, and as one of the root-causes for conflict in international 
affairs. Non-substantialist processsual ontologies, on the other side, conceive of 
anarchy as a productive mode of existence, and assume that structure is not given 
from  above, i.e. through some kind of hylomorphic activity, which imposes 
formal order on a supposedly chaotic or passive matter.408  Instead, process 
ontologies convey the image of an anarchic ontology capable of producing order 
through relations, processes, and configurations via autopoiesis (self-making, self-
reproducing, self-defining).409 Furthermore, process ontologies also shed light on 
a condition of ontological anarchy  and allude to the arbitrariness, the 
foundationlessness, and the fragility upon which socio-political practices are 
based.410
2. Capillaries of  force: towards an anarchist account of  ‘the international’
 This section develops an anarchist approach to IR-ontology and mobilizes 
the works of P.J. Proudhon, in particular the Philosophy of  Progress and the Political 
Catechism. Proudhon never developed an explicit theory of international politics 
(or ontology for that matter), yet it is argued that a rearrangement of certain key 
approaches, most notably of natural group formation, can be used to build a 
process-oriented, non-foundational approach of  international politics. 
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2.1 Ontological anarchy in the ‘Philosophy of  Progress’
 Proudhon’s take on ontology works across the previously discussed divide 
between substantialist and relational approaches to politics. The key document in 
that regard, The Philosophy of  Progress, positions itself firmly on the processual-
relational side of the conceptual spectrum, and mounts a sharp critique against 
the claims of ontological substantialism. It remarks that substantialism represents 
“nature, society, religion, politics, morals, etc., (...) [as] the eternal, the immutable, 
the perfect, the definitive, the unconvertible, the undivided”411 and creates through 
such an imposing assumption about the static quality of ‘reality’ the object of its own 
analysis. Such contentions of objective truths are, however, deceptive and 
dishonest in the eyes of Proudhon, who remarks that “the false, the fictive, the 
impossible, the abstract, is everything that presents itself as fixed, entire, 
complete, unalterable, unfailing, not susceptible to modification, conversion, 
augmentation or diminution”.412  The Proudhonian take on ontology exposes a 
strong and explicit anti-essentialism and resists any commitment towards ‘the 
absolute’.413 It fashions an image of ontological anarchy which is underpinned by 
three consecutive key-assumptions: becoming, antinomy, and relationality.414
 The first  of these assumptions, which is more of a tenor, a Grundhaltung, 
than a hard-boiled conceptual category, can be found in the rather opaque 
assertion that politics as such has no actual, material existence outside of 
permanent flux and transformation: “everything changes, everything flows, 
everything becomes. (...) There is nothing, neither outside nor inside, apart from 
that eternal dance”.415  The weak post-structuralism  shimmering through the 
flowery language might not be sufficiently rich for the purpose of theory-
building. Yet, it still alludes to the bedrock assumptions that underpin Proudhon’s 
functional anarchism, which attempts to institutionalize the ‘eternal dance’ 
through a variety of economic and political arrangements (i.e. the reliance on 
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markets in combination with political federalism). A second, more solid claim, 
refers to an endogenous condition of antinomy which prevents social 
arrangements from  solidifying. Material or ideational categories might strive 
towards harmony and an attempted balance - a tendency from which substantialist 
theories infer their objectivist claims. Yet, due to the composite and synthetic 
nature of such arrangements - their syncrisis of heterogenous and potentially 
contradictory parts - an amalgamated unity, or even a synthesis, remains 
unachievable. The state serves as an example in that regard: as a political concept 
and a social group it must strive towards a certain degree of unity in order to be 
capable of acting as an entity in the first place, i.e. through the facilitation of 
intra-group cohesion (among its citizens) and inter-group recognition (when 
dealing with other states). However, due to the pluralistic internal fabric of the 
polity, and because of the presence of antagonistic interest-groups, which engage 
in distributive and hegemonic struggles over power, the statist project and the 
harmony it attempts to project is also, at any given time, exposed to the 
continuous strain of recomposing pressures. Thirdly, societies aren’t composed by 
an aggregation of pre-configured units, but instead by complex sets of intra- and 
inter-group relations. A political entity such as the state is no ontologically 
independent black box  that could assume the status of a reality outside of its 
constitutive relational matrix - on the contrary: the concept of the ‘state’ is the 
name given to the vast numbers of emerging material and ideational connections 
whose constitutive interplay forms such an agentic force in the first place. 
Proudhon notes that “every realization, in society and in nature, results from the 
combination of opposed elements and their movement”416, which implies that 
social agents and political concepts alike are expressions of transactions and 
productive exchange, rather than pre-configured essences.
 Becoming, antinomy, and relationally highlight the contradictory and 
dynamic nature of socio-political phenomena, but only a second set of terms, 
compositions and conceptions, can shed light on the emergence of such arrangements. 
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Philosophy of  Progress draws a nuanced picture of an anti-essentialist condition, 
characterized by deep ontological anarchy. Substantialist markers of essence and 
linearity are replaced with assumptions about uncertainty, movement, and 
transformation. Yet, the non-foundational ‘eternal dance’ is far from arbitrary or 
chaotic, despite its potential randomness. Rather than evaporating into thin air 
movement is regularized in a variety of relational patterns which facilitate the 
emergence of socio-political compositions. Compositions are the result of 
movement in the widest possible sense, and encompass any productive or 
reproductive social operation, such as generating value through acts of labour in 
the economic realm, or competitions over power in the political sphere. 
Compositions are inevitably relational and must be perceived as performative 
socio-political acts: “Thus, every intuition or sensible idea is the apperception of 
a composition, and is itself a composition: now, every composition, whether it 
exists in nature or results from an operation of the mind, is the product of a 
movement”.417 Towards that end compositions are strictly immanent products of 
relationality, and count - to appropriate the words of Hardt and Negri - as an 
“affirmation of the powers of this world”.418  The compositional surface upon 
which the ‘eternal dance’ is celebrated is then first and foremost an immanent 
plane, populated and occupied by a heterogeneous variety of actors, each of 
which contributing to the composition of the ‘common’ through their 
collaborative and relational acts of  socio-political labor.419 
 Compositions form  an ontological fabric and replace substantiality for 
relationality, but they depend, in order to be realized and recognized, on their 
framing through a set of conceptions. Society works and acts through such 
conceptions, which provide for an analysis of movement by reducing the 
compositional complexity of a deep, relational ontology to a set of conceivable, 
thinkable, recognizable intervals. While compositions are the products of 
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movement, conceptions analyze and represent movement.420  This 
representational function of conceptions makes them derivative to compositions, 
since they only represent and analyzes movement. Yet, conceptions also fulfill a 
constitutive and productive function by means of providing for a series of 
signifiers, through which infinitely complex compositions can be conceived and 
experienced. Towards that end conceptions function as pieces of social 
imagination by representing and depicting movement as if it were static: “But it is 
always a relation illegitimately transformed into reality: there is not, in the 
universe, a first and second, or last cause; there is only one single current 
existence”.421 The co-constitutive tension between productive compositions and 
representational conceptions serves not only as a core element of a deeply 
anarchic ontology, but exposes, in addition, one of the central conflicts in 
modern political thought. 
 Modern politics is characterized by pervasive modes of representations, 
attempting to mediated and capture the immanent forces of relational agency. In 
the domestic realm parliaments and governments act on behalf of ‘the people’ 
from  whom they receive their mandate. International affairs works through a 
variety of representational channels, and privileges inter-governmental and 
diplomatic exchange over alternative, non-representational courses of political 
action. And even transnational activism  relies on NGOs and high-profile 
individuals that must speak on behalf of an otherwise indeterminate global civil 
society. Such modes of representation are widely accepted traits and seem to 
naturally underpin modern politics. Yet, far from  being accidental or coincidental, 
they constitute an inherent feature of dialectical Enlightenment philosophy. 
Modernity is not only characterized by the discovery of an immanent, and 
potentially democratic momentum, but is also ridden by omnipresent and 
recurring attempts to capture these very forces by means of mobilizing 
transcendental and representational political mechanism.422
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2.2 Anarchic ontologies: groups, all the way down
 The contradictory and co-constitutive relation between compositions and 
conceptions plants ‘deep anarchy’ into the heart of the political process and 
establishes productive foundationlessness as a prerequisite for meaningful 
collective action. Compositions make social life in general, and politics in 
particular, tangible. Yet, the relations they form  are only latently productive and 
attain the status of a conceivable reality only if they work through conceptions - 
conceptions give meaning to compositions. These conceptions are, due to the 
condition of ontological anarchy, necessarily artificial, synthetic, and antinomic: 
“The antinomic dualism, reduced by the equation or fusion of the two terms into 
one, produces the synthetic and true idea, the synthesis (...)”423  - a position that 
leads Proudhon to the conclusion that all of social live is based upon 
representative conceptions which group productive compositions together. In the 
same way conceptions give meaning to composition on an ontological level, social 
or ‘natural groups’ (hereafter referred to as ‘groups’) give meaning to an 
otherwise indeterminate relationality in the political realm. And while ontological 
conceptions are opposed to substance, social groups stand in opposition to 
contentions of political absolutism: “From  the idea of being, conceived as group, 
I deduce, by one sole and single argument, this double proposition: that the 
simplistic, immutable, infinite, eternal and absolute god of the metaphysicians, 
not becoming is not and cannot be; while the social being, which is grouped, 
organized, perfectible, progressive, and which by its essence always becomes, 
is”.424  Compositions and conceptions, emerging from the productive void of 
deep anarchy, are similar to those social or natural groups that harvest the 
generative potential of immanent social labor. All politics is, in consequence, 
politics among natural groups - groups that need to be understood as proto-
polities and social embryos of  varying kinds and sizes. 
 From a groups-perspective politics cannot be reduced to macro-level 
representational processes, but denotes first and foremost a series of productive 
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and reproductive proceedings, which encompass all quarters of social existence, 
and transgress the boundaries of the social, the political, or the economic. Any 
human collective – a family, a workshop, a battalion, or a state425  - qualifies as a 
natural group as long as it is involved in generative or reproductive acts of social 
labor. The underpinning identities of such arrangements are heterogenous and 
variant, and fluctuate with the size and the quality of the collective. In its most 
basic sense a group forms the precondition for social and political action and 
conveys, due to its appearance as an essentially collective phenomenon, a sense of 
sameness and solidarity. Certain groups, like a subject-specific protest march may 
dissolve quickly after the end of the rally and instigate low levels of sameness and 
solidarity. Other, more universal and durable arrangements, possess the capacity 
to provide for thick accounts of collective self-understanding (i.e. through 
national or civic identities) and solidarity (i.e. the provision of public goods and 
services, or a sense of self-hood and responsibility). All groups are, regardless of 
the level of coherence they expose, and due to their status as conceptions, 
synthetic and antinomic, and as such in a permanent state of dissolution and 
becoming.426 States serve as examples in that regard: they are groups of a higher 
order, while comprising themselves of an assemblage of subordinate natural 
groups. A state-group is an actual, politically active phenomenon because of the 
constitutive and productive relations (compositions) it harbors, yet it is also 
fictitious and synthetic due to the fact that it acts upon an arbitrary interruption 
of social relationality (the state acts as a conception in that regard).427 In order to 
understand the operational logic of a state-group one needs to pay attention to 
the relations among its constitutive parts. A state is then first and foremost a set 
of relations, processes, and configurations that work, actively or passively, 
towards the realization of  a state-group.
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 Despite the republican bottom-up mechanism that underpins the 
formation of collective agencies, groups are not democratic or emancipatory by 
default. Drawing from  Spinoza’s concept of crowds Rogers-Cooper notes that 
multitudes often harbor the potential for latent violence, and are occasionally 
driven by accounts of infuriated passion – an assumption shared by Schmitt, for 
whom the statist monopoly of deciding on the friend-enemy-divide is a crucial 
mechanism of crowd-control via affective means (the sovereign absorbs and 
governs the otherwise erratic passions of the multitude by generating love for the 
state and hate for the enemy).428 In a similar vein Brubaker remarks that political 
entrepreneurs can mobilize certain categories (i.e. nationality, race, faith, or 
ethnicity) and use them as a backdrop for substantialist ethno- and identity-
politics.429 Simplified views on political and social group-formation lead towards a 
‘groupist’ social ontology and essentializes/naturalizes otherwise synthetic and 
relational identities. Groupism  denotes “the tendency to take discrete, sharply 
differentiated, internally homogenous and externally bounded groups as basic 
constituents of social life, chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental 
units of social analysis”.430  As such it neglects other forms of affinity, 
communality, connectedness, and collective action, and furthers a possessive, 
groupist individualism  by means of operating from the assumption (both 
analytically and normatively) that collectivities can assume the form of 
homogenous, unitary, and externally bounded entities.431 The anarchist approach 
to political agency undermines such substantialist and groupist takes on social 
action, and draws a picture of the collective as a “contextually fluctuating 
conceptual variable”, characterized by productive processuality and configurative 
practices. This more general account of ‘groupness’432, coupled with a specifically 
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anarchist framing of compositions, conceptions, and natural groups, puts a major 
emphasis on the underlying processes of being grouped and being  synthetic, while 
acting collaboratively and in concert with others. The relational character of 
natural groups as entities of becoming alludes, furthermore, to the performative 
aspect of group-making  as an ongoing project. Groupness affirms the performative 
character of socio-political arrangements and highlights their qualities as 
discursively constructed, summoned entities.433  The process of group-making 
involves, as already pointed out above, the transformation of compositions and 
relations into conceptions of a higher order.434  Hence it is applicable to think of 
groups as “practical categories, cultural idioms, cognitive schemas, discursive 
frames, organizational routines, institutional forms, political projects, and 
contingent events”435, capturing society’s immanent productiveness, and turning it 
into loci of political agency. This process also sheds light on the artificial nature 
of collaborative arrangements which are, despite their synthetic character, not less 
of a political reality than the individual political agents they comprise of.436 
Connectedness, communality, and groupness mount a convincing critique against 
a methodological individualism which overemphasizes the political impact of 
aggregative micro-level processes.437 Thatcher once famously proclaimed “There 
is no such thing as society”438 - what an odd thing to say for a political operative 
whose power derives solely from its recognition and situatedness within a system 
of processual relations that depends on the realization of a synthetic ‘society’-
concept. Thatcher commits to an anthropomorphic fallacy and treats society as if 
it were a person. Society is not a person, it is concept, a group of a higher order – 
and as such it is very real.
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2.3 Capillaries of  force: a different type of  power politics
 Political conduct in general, and international politics in particular, is first 
and foremost politics among natural groups. International affairs, as a distinct set 
of relations, are produced and reproduced predominantly through the interplay 
of heterogenous groups that vary in size, quality, and internal coherence. The 
international as a political space cannot claim  ontological independence, but is 
rather a conception in itself: the name given to bundles of compositions and 
processes involved in the production of a series of global political outcomes. It 
appears then, first and foremost, as an assemblage of immanent (proto-) polities, 
of whom only some assume the form of states. The upcoming section three will 
elaborate further on the implications and the broader trajectories of such a poly-
centric perspective for IR theory in general, and the ontological standing of the 
international in particular. It will be argued that paying greater attention to 
relationality and group-formation initiates a shift away from substantialist and 
statist narratives of international politics, towards a processual framing of a 
grouped, global political realm. Yet, before considering such potential 
consequences it is necessary to establish a firmer bond between the advanced 
anarchist perspective and the processual-relational approach discussed towards 
the end of section one. It will become evident that anarchist group ontologies do 
not only shed light on the emergence of ‘the global’ through processes and 
configurations, but are also capable of alluding to patterns of productive and 
constituent power-relations in international affairs.
 Substantialist IR theories with their static ontologies convey an exchange-
based image of power in international affairs and highlight the distributive effects 
of inter-state politics. Meaningful international political action is reduced to 
foreign policy initiatives and to an exchange of force between pre-constituted 
Westphalian polities. The writings of Morgenthau and Mearsheimer serve as 
examples in that regard. Morgenthau defines politics as a purposeful activity 
whose primary objective consists in the amassment of power. While other 
fractions of society might be interested in questions of profitability (economics), 
beauty (aesthetics), or the good life (philosophy), politics occupies itself first and 
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foremost with a quest for resources of domination: “The main signpost that 
helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international 
politics is the concept of interest  defined in terms of  power”.439 Power, in that regard, 
obtains a very specific function and serves as a tool aimed at controlling and 
manipulating “the minds and actions of other men [sic]”.440  Against this 
backdrop Morgenthau develops a model of ‘national power’ and defines the 
means for domination in more detail. States compete in a leaderless environment 
and must develop assets such as geopolitical location (geography, access to natural 
resources), material capabilities (industrial base, military preparedness, population 
and demographics), ideational and ideological factors (national character and 
national morale), and procedural arrangements (quality of diplomacy, quality of 
government)441  for their own good and in order to further their chances of 
survival within the confinements of a self-help system. Individual aspirations for 
regional domination, as well as system-wide strives over hegemony, are checked 
and balanced through the actions of competitors across the anarchic realm.442 
‘National powers’ balance against competing ‘national powers’, either by means of 
direct opposition or competition443, and employ different strategies and methods, 
i.e. divide and rule, compensations, armaments, or alliances444 towards that end. 
Realist power politics is portrayed as a predominantly distributive activity whose 
primary concern is the obtainment of ‘scoring points’ in an environment of pre-
configured, clashing, and competing Westphalian polities. 
 Mearsheimer’s offensive realism falls into the very same category of 
unproductive, merely distributive power politics. “Great powers” he argues “are 
always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with hegemony 
as their final goal”.445  The lack of a centralized ordering force in international 
affairs breeds uncertainty among units and encourages them to take things in 
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their own hands for the purpose of ensuring their survival (defined as maintaing 
territorial integrity and the autonomy of the domestic sphere).446  Maximizing 
relative power and investing in military capabilities is the most effective way of 
providing for ones security: “The stronger a state is relative to its potential rivals, 
the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it and threaten its 
survival”.447  States are primarily concerned with the distribution of power-
resources among them and focus chiefly on the maximization of relative gains. 
Rather than maintaining the system’s endogenous balance, great powers strive to 
unsettle this balance and aim  at tilting it in their favour. The mechanisms 
employed for the realization of such projects vary, but comprise typically of 
economic, diplomatic, and military means. Overall power politics has a strong 
material focus and is underpinned by a zero-sum-logic. 
 Substantialist IR theories further an exchange-based model of power 
politics in which meaningful foreign policy action appears first and foremost as a 
transaction, an exchange of force, between a priori established units, competing 
with one another over resources and domination in an essentially leaderless realm. 
Realist narratives of power politics emphasize the distribution of crucial 
resources within and across a relatively closed international system, and perceive 
of power as a commodity, a ‘thing’, that can be owned, deployed, or wielded for 
the purpose of furthering the state’s national interest. From  an anarchist groups-
perspective it is in fact agreeable to portray politics as an activity revolving around 
varying accounts of power. Yet, it is also necessary to make an important 
qualification in regards to the quality of power that underpins such politics. While 
substantialist and state-centric approaches are primarily concerned with the 
distribution of capabilities across units, anarchist group-perspectives pull away 
from  distributive questions and convey instead an image of constitutive power 
politics. Proudhon remarks that compositions and relations, and the deriving 
conceptions and groups, constitute power-relations of a specific kind, namely a 
collective force (c.f. chapter V). Natural groups do not simply wield power, but are 
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also products of power themselves, since their act-capacity as a collective force 
depends in turn on the individual and immanent forces of their constituting 
parts: 
To speak here only of  human collectivities, let  us suppose that  the individuals, in 
such numbers as one might wish, in whatever manner and to whatever end, group 
their forces: the resultant of these agglomerated forces, which must  not be confused 
with their sum, constitutes the force or power of  the group.448
And further:
(...)  all these collectivities, more or less skillfully  organised, contain power, a power 
which is synthetic and consequently specific to the group, superior in quality and 
energy to the sum of  the elementary forces which compose it.449
This mechanism of group-formation and the emergence of collective force has 
already been addressed earlier in the context of Jackson’s and Nexon’s take on 
processual relationalism (p/r). P/r portraits relations among actors as productive 
in themselves since they give rise to the emergence of configurations and projects 
which were defined as “(...) configuration[s] with agent properties” and “social 
entit[ies] with the ability to make choices and exercise causal power”.450  From 
such a perspective it is difficult to envisage the international as a smooth 
Westphalian surface on which statist ‘billiard  balls’ simply crash into one another. 
The international appears instead as a capillary web of collective forces and 
productive power politics. Group-ontologies direct IR’s analytical focus away 
from  an assessment of distributive politics (the simple exchange of force between 
pre-constituted units), towards an investigation into the capillaries of force at the 
heart of constitutive and productive practices in global affairs - i.e. how 
configurations and projects emerge in the first place, how they are sustained, and 
how they transform over time.
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3. Conclusion: from international to global
 What are the contributions of anarchist political thought and group-based 
ontologies to IR-theory? By means of a conclusion this chapter offers two 
answers to this question: one analytical, the other normative.
3.1 Multi-polity-perspectives and the topography of  world politics
 Group-based ontologies acknowledge the continuing importance of the 
territorial state (after all a group of a higher order) without giving priority to 
statist ontologies. The modern state’s perseverance and resilience has already been 
recognized in the introductory section, and it would be unwise and analytically 
unwarranted to deny or neglect the fundamental impact states have on the 
production of global political outcomes. Yet, it has also been highlighted that a 
reduction of international political dynamics to inter-state relations facilitates a 
distorted view about productive agency in global affairs. Group- and process 
based ontologies shift the analytical focus away from  questions of capability-
distribution among system units, towards a different kind of power-analysis, and 
investigates into the question of “who or what influences or controls what in 
global politics - and why”?451  Such processual polity-framings expose a 
heightened susceptibility towards ‘spheres of authority’: identities, patterns of 
institutionalization, and degrees of hierarchies among individuals and groups that 
co-exist, cooperate, merge, clash, or split in a climate of latently governing 
authorities.452  Attempts to grasp the internal dynamics of such arrangements 
must pay attention to the relatedness, connectedness, and distribution of loyalty 
in and among distinct groups. The distribution of capabilities among states 
results in various forms of polarities among them, whereas a group-centric post-
international perspective focuses instead on sets of heterogenous polities, 
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grouped around particular issues and interests, while being held together by 
varying degrees of  ideational and material connectedness.453 
 Such shifts in perspective are necessary in order to account for changes on 
the ground, induced by processes of economic globalization, transnational social 
change, and governmentalization. The post-Cold War ear has seen a staggering 
transformation away from the bi-polarity of the bloc confrontation towards an 
institutionally pluralized system  of overlapping, intertwining, and crosscutting 
politico-economic processes.454  “This system”, Cerny notes, “is being 
restructured into a complex, functionally differentiated, but increasingly 
integrated range of multilayered structures and multi-nodal processes, linking 
state and non-state actors across and within sectors and issue areas – above, 
below and cutting across state borders”.455  The resulting transformation, away 
from  the Westphalian raison d’etat towards a globalized raison du monde456 exposes 
the scalearity of world politics and the ‘durable disorder’ inherent to archipelago-
style forms of governance.457  The clear cut, discrete categories of substantialist 
IR, with their public/private, domestic/foreign, order/anarchy divisions, and the 
lump concept of agency that places states, corporations, and NGO’s on top of a 
sovereign framework, runs into immense difficulties when actors start to behave 
a-typically and outside their assigned role. Shadian exemplifies this point with her 
analysis of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (ICC). The ICC serves as an example 
for indigenous sovereignty and acts as such much like a traditional, territorial 
state. It occupies a space of dependence, while its ability to exercise political 
power and control depends significantly on its attachment to physical territory.458 
Yet, the ICC also acts and appears at times as an NGO, as a business, and it has 
its own collective history459  - hence it also occupies a space of engagement and 
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fulfills a cultural, economic, and social function.460 A-typical polities such as the 
ICC elude the grip of fixed categorizations, what makes it hard to account for 
their actions and explain the impact they have on global political dynamics. As a 
state-like entity the ICC would be primarily interested in maximizing its security, 
while its business-side might have an interest in the maximization of profit via 
the facilitation of trade agreements. The ICC’s NGO-side is possibly keen on 
acting as a lobby-organization and a norm-entrepreneur for indigenous concerns, 
with only secondary interests in matters of  either security or profit. 
 The puzzle appears, despite its complexity and alleged incoherence, less 
staggering if framed through an anarchist group narrative. Groups comprise, as 
already mentioned earlier, of subordinate conceptions themselves and form, by 
virtue of their collaborative efforts, conglomerates of a higher order. Such groups 
of a higher order must expose a certain degree of homogeniety for the purpose 
of acting collectively (from  a p/r standpoint they must form a project), yet, 
they’re also internally contradictory and inherently antinomic. Against this 
backdrop it makes little sense to conceive of the ICC as a substance, because it 
would have to fall in either of the pre-configured and pre-constituted categories 
of state, business, or non-state-actor. The situation becomes clearer, however, 
once one perceives of the ICC as a collective force which acquires its power from  the 
sets of constitutive relations of its constituent parts (individuals and groups 
alike). The ICC is as a conception a natural group itself, and as such a 
representation of indigenous life. Its artificiality makes it prone to internal 
inconsistencies (a project of becoming and permanent making), exemplified by its 
diverging identities as state, a business, and an interest group. Yet, it appears none 
the less as a relatively coherent political agent - a phenomenon of groupness - 
with the ability to generate, mobilize, and wield patterns of collective force. The 
strength of the anarchist approach lies in its ability to make sense of such 
seemingly incoherent agencies and explain their effectiveness in a scalar 
environment of  ‘durable disorder’.
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3.2 Natural groups, ‘the other’, and the virtues of  micro-politics
 Besides their incapacity to account for the effects of a-typical groupness, 
substantialist approaches to IR give rise to a second, more implicit, and mainly 
normative problem, as they convey a narrative of fear and construct an image of 
“dangerous ontologies” (for a detailed discussion see chapter VIII).461 The realist 
paradigm ultimately rests on the liberal assumption of the autonomy-seeking 
human being transplanted into the statist realm.462  Such individualist 
connotations, coupled with the substantialist claim  of a supposedly homogenous 
and sealed-off polity, fixes identities and interests prematurely, and reduces the 
motivation behind state action to either survival or conquest. The state is 
portrayed as if  it were a bound entity, fully equipped with a will and a purpose: 
namely to survive, to preserve, to fend-off external threats.463  The security 
dilemma, and the absence of guarantees and certainty in a leaderless inter-state 
realm, translates this methodological (and normative) individualism  into a fierce 
competition for power, and it reduces depictions of the international to maps 
portraying the distribution of capabilities among state-units.464  Apart from  the 
already addressed problems arising from  portraying the state as a sealed-off black 
box it is also questionable whether the primary motivation behind social action in 
general can be reduced to mere self-preservation (regardless of its location in the 
domestic and international sphere). Such narratives typically arise from 
particularly substantialist discourses on human nature: Morgenthau, Schmitt, and 
others point towards an alleged animus dominandi - an urge to dominate - which is 
supposedly hard-wired to human consciousness and necessitates the demarcation 
of the political plane along the lines of friend/enemy, inside/outside, us/them 
patterns. ‘The other’ as an existential threat is by no means a default position 
though, and it is up for contestation whether anxiety, not all-embracing fear, 
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serves as the main driver of social action.465 Natural-groups-perspectives help to 
diffuse the allure of ontological danger and offer an alternative image of ‘the 
other’ as a constitutive outside. Rather than departing from  the assumption of 
self-preservation, they highlight other behavioral traits, such as as the search for 
companionship which is designed to control and mitigate anxieties.466  Flares of 
violence, the possibility of ‘the other’ turning into an existential threat, are still 
acknowledge as powerful motivators behind social action - they get, however, 
stripped from their ontologically central status. Rather than starting from an 
assumptions about the omnipresence of physical threats, which necessitate the 
formation of strategic alliances for the purpose of survival467, group-perspectives 
emphasize the plethoras of motivations that underpin human political conduct - 
most of  which are not realized by violent means.
 The existence of durable and deeply ingrained demarcations between 
political communities and actors is central to realist approaches to IR-theory and 
ontology. Anarchism, on the other side, refuses to succumb to such substantialist 
and groupist reflexes by means of not only avoiding ‘the decision’ upon such 
demarcations, but by explicitly deciding against it. This “anti-decision decision”468 
departs from  the assumption that statist politics relies indeed on the development 
of firmly established patterns of political separateness.469 Such delineations are, 
however, not universally constitutive of politics, but represent instead a quite 
specific Westphalian approach to political conduct, and is designed to 
permanently entrench the relations among territorial units. ‘Anti-decision 
decisions’ serves as a pretext to anti- or micro-politics, due to its refusal of 
engaging in substantialist and representational forms of social action.470 Yet, far 
from  dissolving in a normative or ethical vacuum, the rejection of foundational 
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politicization: “This weakening of ground may lead to the increasing acceptance 
of the contingency and historicity of being, which potentially has a liberating 
effect”.471 Micro- and anti-politics in general, and anarchist politics in particular, 
emphasize the virtues of technical, political, and social self-determination, while 
simultaneously cultivating pragmatic conceptions of agency in inter-related 
systems of interdependencies.472  A normative commitment towards anarchist 
accounts of groupness serves as an effective vehicle for the trans-border 
provision of public goods in international affairs, most notably of democratic 
practices between ‘natural groups’.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
VII | RECLAIMING SOVEREIGNTY
1. Introduction: anarchic ontologies and the future of  sovereignty
 Chapter VI put the emergence of ‘the global’ in the context of a process-
oriented, anarchist approach to ontology, and payed particular attention to 
natural-group-formation and anarchist ‘power politics’. Furthermore the 
topographies of global politics were discussed, and assessed in combination with 
the normative implications of micro-politics. Chapter VII will now utilize the 
created conceptual space and build on the idea of a foundation-less, process-
driven ontology of  ‘the global’. 
 This chapter assesses the implications of process-driven ontologies for 
what is perhaps one of the most central concepts of modern political thought: 
the institution of sovereignty. The chapter aims to ‘reclaim’ sovereign practices 
from  the conceptually hegemonic state-form, and to re-assess the nature of 
sovereign agency in world politics. It departs from the assumption that the image 
of a foundationless ontology (chapter VI) requires a corresponding, equally 
dynamic agentic figure, capable of navigating an essentially fluid and contingent 
political terrain. Sections two and three hence present challenges to Westphalian 
governance and discuss the nature of state-based sovereignty. Section four 
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establishes a firm  link between sovereign practices and the already known theme 
of constituent power. The central parts of this chapter, sections five and six, 
develop the motif of anarchist sovereignty, and put so-called porous sovereignty  in 
the context of Westphalian practices, biopolitical agency, and republican political 
principles.
2. Challenges to Westphalian governance
 The institution of sovereignty - that is the assumption that legitimacy in 
international affairs is denoted by an assemblage of territorially defined authority-
structures, supreme internally and autonomous internationally - is regarded as one 
of the Grundnormen of international affairs, and as an institution upon which the 
society of states ultimately rests.473  Formally, sovereignty is accepted as a nearly 
universal ordering principle. A glance at a political world map suffices and one 
will understand immediately that the global political landscape is depicted in the 
shape of a universal Westphalian polity. Statist agents exalt a virtually hegemonic 
influence which is also mirrored by the grand political projects of the past 150 
years: 19th century efforts of European nation building, mid-20th century waves 
of decolonization, and late 20th century examples of state building in the 
Balkans, the Middle East, and Sub-Sahara Africa.474 Yet, upon taking a closer look 
at this supposedly smooth Westphalian surface, cracks and irregularities appear. 
State sovereignty as a mechanism  to regulate the circulation of violence475  in 
domestic and international realms works particularly well in certain political 
contexts, but leads to diametral effects in others. Regulating force through statist 
practices succeeds in Western and European societies - which negotiated the 
terms of sovereignty from the 16th century onwards and forged a specifically 
political notion of the concept that was inextricably tied to the rise of the 
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modern territorial state.476 A number of non-European societies, former empires 
- such as Japan, Turkey, China - and colonial dependencies - for example Brazil 
and India - adopted well and swiftly to the Westphalian ways of arranging inter-
polity relations. Yet, a third category of political communities, quasi-states 
according to Jackson,477 exposes great difficulties in coping with the requirements 
of Westphalian statism. An ever growing body of literature on fragile or failing 
states bolsters this notion.478 
 The promise of Westphalia - the effective regulation of violence through 
a division of the political plane into domestic and international political spaces - 
has failed to materialize. Instead of effectively managing force on a global scale, 
the Westphalian standard pacifies only certain societies, while insufficiently 
containing conflict in others. Adding insult to injury, these societies are routinely 
marked with the label ‘failed states’. Such discourses on state failure expose the 
conceptual inability of recognizing the existence of mechanisms for the 
regulation of violence that operate outside of the statist logic. Not societies who 
failed to adopt to the Westphalian model ought to be problematized, but rather 
an intrusive account of sovereignty that conceptualizes political authority-
structures through an exclusively statist lens. Certain societies might have ‘failed’ 
as states, but not as polities per se. Historically they have often developed 
alternative socio-political coping mechanisms and regulate political intercourse by 
non-statist means. Nomadic peoples, tribal- and village-structures, diasporas, 
urban communities, etc. are incompatible with the statist model, mainly due to 
their non-reliance on territorial accounts of rule and their ability to tolerate 
overlapping and intertwining authority-structures. Yet, they could still be 
mobilized effectively for the regulation of violence and the the management of 
political affairs by non-statist means. What is required for such a mobilization is a 
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new authority consensus capable of doing justice to the agentic heterogeneity 
inherent to world politics. The political reality of the 21st century is neither that 
of a homogenous Westphalian republic, nor is it accurately described by 
Friedman’s flat-world analogy which portraits the globe as a structurally unified 
realm.479 The global’s ontology must instead be comprehended as comprising of 
socio-political topographies and polities of varying scales - a landscape scattered 
with cliffs and archipelagos, planes, caves, and no-mans lands in which 
“international politics works as an increasingly complex institutional and 
behavioural superstructure crisscrossing with both domestic politics, domestic 
and transnational society, and sub-units of  states”.480
 This chapter suggests that such a new authority-consensus must emerge 
from  within prevalent debates about sovereignty. It problematizes Westphalian 
interpretations of sovereignty in global politics and works towards its analytical 
re-conceptualization alongside the lines of anarchist accounts of agency. 
Sovereign practices can indeed serve as an important platform for global political 
action by means of providing accounts of democratic accountability and 
oversight. Yet, it must be conceptually couched in a normative context that moves 
beyond Westphalian forms of rule. By means of deploying anarchist accounts of 
constituent power, the chapter proposes to conceive of a sovereign political 
momentum beyond the conceptually hegemonic horizon of the Westphalian 
agent. Amalgamating anarchism  with sovereignty on a global level disentangles 
the state-sovereignty-nexus and draws attention to the constituent qualities of 
non-foundational sovereign practices. The political space that emerges at this 
intersection of constituent anarchist power and post-Westphalian sovereignty 
facilitates the emergence of democratic agentic forces in international affairs. The 
aim of the Westphalian project of state sovereignty was to denote the conditions 
for legitimate political action in international affairs. The aim  of a post-Westphalian 
project of anarchist sovereignty is to denote the conditions for legitimate political 
action in global affairs. Such a project must recognize and work with the partially 
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statist reality of international politics, while acknowledging the political capacity 
of polities that exist above and below a statist threshold. A post-Westphalian take 
on sovereignty displaces and rephrases the authority-condition. In a Westphalian 
reading, a polity has political authority if it displays statist properties (a 
government, control over territory and citizens). In a post-Westphalian reading, a 
polity has political authority if it displays anarchic qualities (being organized in 
accordance to the principle of non-domination). A non-statist authority 
consensus is agonistic towards form and focuses instead on principles. This 
allows for an institutional pluralism and admits polities and political associations 
into the global political sphere that are disregarded under a statist regime.
3. Crisis and genesis: the rise of  state sovereignty
 The emergence of sovereignty as an institution can be traced back to a 
crisis of religious authority during the Renaissance. Up until then political 
authority in Europe was characterized by a hierarchical and vertically organized 
imperial structure, co-headed by emperor and pope, representing supreme 
political and supreme clerical authority respectively. In the medieval Respublica 
Christiana secular discourses of authority overlapped significantly with theological 
notions of redemption and salvation within a universal Christian 
commonwealth.481  From the 14th century onwards wealthy and powerful Italian 
city states, notably Florence, Venice, and Sienna, began dismantling the 
straightjacket of theological determinisms that captured the political by means of 
making it answerable to a sacred, extra-political, godly source of legitimacy.482 
Sovereignty was not part of the political vocabulary of the time yet, but the 
“autonomy of the political sphere”,483  as Morgenthau put it, has been eclipsed 
and the raison d’etat  began to assert itself against sacred rationalities and god’s will. 
Born out of the dialectic between sacred and secular assumptions of authority 
the institution of sovereignty continued to be shaped by crisis: the Peace of 
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Augsburg (1555 - affirming the king’s supreme authority in religious matters, the 
cujus region ejus religio), the Peace of Westphalia (1648 - introducing the removal of 
the papacy’s political authority from  the domestic realm), and the Peace of 
Utrecht (1713 - confirming the balance of power among European states), to 
name just a few, forged a specifically political notion of sovereignty that was 
inextricably tied to the rise of the modern territorial state.484 Fast forwarding into 
the 20th century one cannot but notice that even the emergence of what has 
grown into the European Union fits into the pattern of crisis that continues to 
mold the institution of sovereignty. Confronted with the devastating effects of 
two consecutive world wars the European society of states decided, once again, 
to renegotiate the terms of political authority upon which it is founded. The 
result is a partly intergovernmental, partly supranational political entity in which 
traditional multilateralism  coexists with emerging patterns of supranational 
sovereignty.485
3.1 Political sovereignty as hypothetical authority 
 In the contemporary study of international politics sovereignty is 
recognized as one of the Grundnormen of international affairs.486  The concept is, 
despite its centrality to international affairs, not free from ambiguity and changes 
its appearance and meaning, depending on the specific analytical context into 
which it is inserted: comparative politics defines sovereignty as a degree of 
absolute or nearly absolute control within a given territory; liberal perspectives 
highlight the sovereign’s ability to exercise control over trans-border movements; 
for international legal scholars it bestows agents, particularly states, with the 
ability to enter reciprocally binding agreements; IR theorists highlight its 
Westphalian interpretation and the attached right of states to territorial 
autonomy.487 
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 Its ambiguous appearance aside, the institution of sovereignty is 
inseparably tied to the existence of authority structures in international affairs. 
Political sovereignty in general, and state-based sovereignty in particular, are 
widely conceived of as a hypothetical form  of authority (ideational) vice versa actual 
capacities of power (material). Only the confluence of power and legitimacy 
characterizes this modern notion of sovereignty. Sovereignty as an institution 
always remains an assumption, “an assumption about authority”488 that denotes a 
“distinctive way of arranging the contacts and relations of political 
communities”.489 Understanding sovereignty as a hypothetical form of authority 
instead of an actual capacity to power reveals its sociological, constitutive, and 
most importantly legitimizing effect on international affairs: the practice of 
defining who does and doesn’t count as ‘sovereign’ explicitly confers legitimacy to 
some actors and polities, while deliberately and explicitly withholding it from 
others.490  It defines, furthermore, the conditions for membership: what 
requirements must be fulfilled by aspiring polities if they want to become 
‘sovereign’.491 Last but not least sovereignty also grants certain privileges to actors 
and polities that have already acquired this status, i.e. the exclusive right to wage 
war and to exercise other forms of physical violence; the right to send diplomatic 
envoys and set up missions at international organizations; the right to enter 
reciprocally binding international agreements, and so forth.492  In short: 
sovereignty as a form of hypothetical authority (or legitimate power) produces 
and establishes, in the widest sense, a very specific, state-based form of legal and 
contractual capability in international affairs that is, qua necessity and per 
definition, legal, absolute, and unitary in nature.493
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3.2 The right to death: state-based sovereignty, coercion, legalism
 Krasner remarks that the contemporary practice of sovereignty in 
international affairs can be parsed into four analytically distinct categories: 
domestic, interdependence or trans-border, international legal, and finally 
Westphalian accounts of sovereignty.494  This particular notion of political 
authority in world politics generates two specific problems for the study of global 
political dynamics: one empirical, the other conceptual. 
 From an empirical perspective one must acknowledge that the ‘sovereign’ 
has never been sovereign, at least not in an absolute sense. As remarked earlier, 
sovereignty should be understood as hypothetical and as an assumption of how 
legitimate international political conduct is supposed to look like. Sovereignty 
reflects first and foremost reality as practice, not reality as actual power. Yet even 
as a ‘practice’ sovereignty has always been subject to contestation, precariousness, 
and porosity. Westphalia was and is compromised repeatedly and routinely, i.e. by 
conventions and contracts, but also by means of coercion and imposition.495 
Rosenberg acknowledges the vulnerability of the sovereign and alludes to the 
structural relationship between the public political and the private political sphere. 
In this narrative sovereignty can never be absolute, but is conditionally depended 
on the synchronous co-constitution of state and market.496  Certain strands of 
classical realism, structural realism, and constructivism  treat sovereignty as if  it 
reflected a corresponding political reality. The empirical fallacy committed by this 
approaches is that they fail to grasp the essential difference between sovereignty 
as a hypothesis (‘practice’) and sovereignty as actual capacity (‘power’).
 Another much more severe problem is of a conceptual nature. Sovereignty 
has been monopolized by the state-from, which gives rise to a striking complicity 
between the two concepts: states are regarded as supreme and autonomous 
political arrangements, hence they are acting under the premise of being 
sovereign. Vice versa, the sovereign can only appear in the form  of the state. 
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Other political actors might wield considerable power, i.e. economic capacity or 
the ability to decisively influence public discourses497, but they cannot be 
bestowed upon with the title ‘sovereign’. The effect of this intimate relation 
between the state and the practice of sovereignty is twofold: Firstly, the state is 
regarded as virtually the only polity that possesses both, the power and the 
legitimacy to provide certain kinds of political goods, most notably democracy. 
Some commentators even go as far as to announce that sovereignty and the state 
are the precondition for any form of modern democratic life.498  Attempts of 
escaping the statist logic by means of transnationalizing democratic politics have 
proven to be unsuccessful in that regard. David Held’s model of cosmopolitan 
democracy, for example, rests heavily on the notion of the liberal legal state as the 
locus for democratic conduct. The envisaged cosmopolitan community projects 
this vision onto the global political plane and delineates a Rechtsstaat of global 
proportions499 – a change in size, not in quality. Secondly, under the auspices of the 
state-sovereignty-cartel meaningful global political activity is reduced to, and 
descents into, foreign policy. International politics is confined to movements on a 
spectrum  whose opposing poles are constituted by legality  (international legal and 
Westphalian sovereignty) and coercion  (trans-border and domestic sovereignty). 
Political action generates itself as an instrumental choice between the ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ and the ‘logic of consequences’, and turns into organized 
hypocrisy.500
4. Reclaiming sovereignty
4.1 Force and genesis: sovereignty as constituent power
 This diagnosis begs the question whether the concept of sovereignty is 
perhaps inevitably lost in these extreme quarters of coercion and legalism? Is it 
possible to conceive of a sovereign political momentum  beyond the conceptually 
- 161 -
497 Holzscheiter, “Discourse as Capability”, 738.
498 Oisin Tansey, “Does democracy need sovereignty?”, Review of International Studies 37, no. 4 (2011): 
1526.
499 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 222.
500 Krasner, Power, the State, and Sovereignty, 19 & 180 f.
hegemonic horizon of the modern territorial state? Can one circumvent the 
structural complicity of appropriateness and necessity? An answer to this 
question must inevitably take into account the transitory relation between 
framings of power in international affairs, the deriving assumptions of authority 
and sovereignty, and finally the existence of the state as the hegemonic polity. 
Rethinking sovereignty in world politics requires reassessing power in 
international affairs by means of traversing the coercion-legalism-axis. The 
conception of a principal polity constituted primarily by coercive and juridical 
efficacy derives from an image of sovereignty that is co-constituted by these very 
same attributes; furthermore, it rests fundamentally on the assumption that 
political capacity only emerges in the context of either power politics or 
international law. Exposing the structural relation between sovereignty and power, 
as well as offering a narrative that conceptualizes the latter devoid of coercion 
and prior to law, is paramount for recovering sovereignty as an active political 
property.
 The state-sovereignty-nexus as discussed so far resembles a form  of 
constituted power, which represents a juridical and punitive notion of force, 
administering and limiting, yet incapable of acting politically beyond this point: 
“Constituted power (…) defines the fixed order of the constitution and the 
stability  of its social structure”. And further: “History is closed by constituent 
power or, rather, the history it determines is restricted to a continual repetition of 
the same social divisions and hierarchies”.501  Incarcerating democracy in the 
domestic realm  and reducing meaningful international political action to state-led 
foreign policy are but two phenomena that are exemplary for the closure of 
history and the mechanical repetitiveness Hardt is alluding to in this definition. 
When paired with the paradigm of sovereignty constituent power leads inevitably 
into a hierarchical narrative of command and obedience in which a centralized 
source of supreme authority exercises its supposedly inherent ‘right’ of 
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demanding allegiance from  a set of politically inferior, subordinated subjects.502 
Constituted power is hence closely associated with notions of  coercive sovereignty.
 A perspective beyond the unproductive stasis of constituted power and 
coercive sovereignty is provided by the complementary principle of constituent 
power, which represents the “democratic forces of social transformation, the means 
by which humans make their own history”. Hardt points out that constituent 
power bestows the demos with agency in the form  of politically productive 
forces: “Machiavelli’s peoples in arms (…) animated by the power not only to 
rebel against and overthrow the current order but also to create from  below new 
democratic forms of  social organization”.503  By way of paying closer attention to the 
working of constituent power in global politics a series of novel perspectives 
emerges that allows for the salvaging of sovereignty from  the state-form and for 
its conceptualization alongside democratic lines. Amalgamating constituent power 
and sovereignty draws attention to the productive and generative qualities of the 
modern democratic sovereign. The hitherto dominant model of coercive 
sovereignty gets supplemented by an alternative reading that exposes founding, 
positing, and constituting forces504: productive or constitutive sovereignty. 
 As soon as the question of sovereignty is examined through a productive 
lens a lacuna emerges: transnational forms of constituent power that reach 
beyond the conceptual hegemony of the state have not been systematically 
assessed in International Relations Theory and International Political Theory yet 
(c.f. discussion in chapter II).505  Furthermore, a broad articulation of the 
structural co-constitution of constituent  power and productive sovereignty is largely 
missing in current debates that unfold around questions of transnational 
democratic practices. This vast absence of the begründende Gewalt, the ‘founding 
power’,506  from  discourses of sovereignty and democracy alike is somewhat 
surprising, mainly because early modern concepts of popular rule drew 
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extensively from constitutive forms of power and connected them to practices of 
popular sovereignty. Negri’s studies of the Italian, the French, the American, and 
the Russian revolutions serve as striking examples in that that regard.507  In the 
same vein Kalyvas argues that the modern doctrine of popular sovereignty 
“coincides with the conceptual advent of constituent power”.508  Any 
contemporary study of sovereign practices should then pay attention to this 
alternative reading and the attached, somewhat submerged constitutive 
connotation. 
 Comprehending the decidedly productive elements as complementary to, 
instead of overlain by, the much more prominent and prevalent facet of coercion 
serves as the key paradigmatic insight in that regard. Vice versa, any theoretical 
attempt to delineate a model for transnational democratic practices must be 
susceptible to the momentum  exalted by constituent forces and the productive 
facet of sovereignty. Sovereignty – a practice supposedly and superficially 
assumed to be state-centered and coercion-based – must not be evaded and 
circumnavigated but rather reinstated in its original productive guise. The image 
of a democratic multitude is important in that regard because it inserts 
constituent power into the context of productive sovereignty. Whereas the state-
form operates on a political plane that is enclosed by force and law, multitudes as 
democratic agentic forces dislocate the distinct logic that guides these modern 
coercive sovereigns. It is particularly the attached shift from  transcendence to 
immanence that opens up possibilities for the emergence of new authority-
structures which generate themselves in a productive way. Classical European 
notions of sovereignty remove act-capacity from their democratic locus and lock 
it away in a transcendental realm, leading towards a situation in which the locus 
and the actuality of power no longer coincide.509 Hobbes Leviathan or Rousseau’s 
volonte general serve as prominent examples in that regard. Immanence remedies 
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this shortcoming and ensures a “democratic interaction of powers linked together 
in networks”.510  Outsourcing act-capacity and hiding it away behind the veil of 
transcendental legitimacy is no longer applicable, because any separation of the 
actuality of power from its locus becomes conceptually and politically unfeasible. 
The political space that emerges at the intersection of constituent power, 
productive sovereignty, and immanence displaces the conceptual hegemony of 
Westphalian inter-state politics and creates room for democratic sovereign action in 
international affairs.511 Any serious attempt to reclaim the practice of sovereignty 
from  the state must pay attention to this transformative potential of constituent 
power. Sovereignty can be imagined beyond the dominant Westphalian moment 
and by means of paying attention to the question of how global political 
outcomes are produced through processes underlain by constituent forces. 
Constituent power allows for an articulation of sovereignty alongside productive 
lines and devoid of coercion, transcendence, inter-state politics, foreign policy, 
and the logics of command and hierarchy. Paying closer attention to the working 
of constituent power in world politics, as well as delineating the conditions for 
transnational democratic action that operates alongside immanent and productive 
lines, should be the logical consequence for any future study of global democracy 
and sovereign practices alike.
4.2 The generative momentum of  immanence
 The literature working at this particular intersection of sovereignty and 
power in international affairs is still in a developing stage, but the writings of 
Hardt and Negri - specifically the ones in Empire and Multitude - serve as well-
suited exemplifications for the dynamics unfolded by constituted power, 
constituent power, coercive sovereignty, and productive sovereignty in world 
politics. Empire represents first and foremost a technique of post-modern 





concerned with the immanent and disciplinary aspects of rule. Empire is, at least 
partly, an innovative political force that disturbs the conceptual and political 
hegemony of the state. Westphalia has been constructed around binary 
oppositions, territoriality, and a pluralistic assemblage of formally equal 
polities.513  For the new imperial sovereignty political space has lost this 
delineating meaning: territory descents into hyperspace; ideological (liberal) and 
material (money and the division of labor) universalism  grinds down binaries; 
pluralism is replaced by the various hierarchies of imperial command.514  Yet, 
despite its ostensibly seminal and original appearance even empire cannot but 
reproduce the Westphalian logic of control, command, and subordination. Due 
to its corrosive effect on the practice of statism  empire tends to emerge as 
progressive phenomenon. However, its eventual reliance on control through ‘the 
bomb’, money, and ether515  unmask it as an agent of the reaction. Empire as a 
practice of governance rests primarily on constituted forms of power and inserts 
itself  in the uniform and unbroken tradition of  coercive sovereignty.
 Multitude, on the contrary, represents the forces that constitute the 
actuality of productive sovereignty: “The multitude is the real productive force of 
our social world, whereas empire is a mere apparatus of capture that lives only off 
the vitality of the multitude”.516  Its strength lies in its ability to bundle a 
multiplicity of constituent powers and transform their various diverging momenta 
into forces that produce ‘the common’.517 Biopolitical production in the form  of 
immaterial labor, the exchange of information and knowledge, and performative 
communication shape the common as a socio-political space that opposes the 
culture of command and control.518  While the state and empire depend on a 
certain degree of homogeneity in order to act as sovereign political bodies, 
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remains “composed of innumerable internal differences that can never be 
reduced to a unity or a single identity” and ensures that “social differences remain 
different”.519  By that means the multitude manages to square a circle: it acts 
genuinely politically since it represents the forces of productive and generative 
sovereignty, yet it bypasses at the very same time the logic of coercion and 
hierarchy, this intersection of modernity and postmodernity that is shared by the 
Westphalian and the imperial sovereignties alike. The multitude hence counts as a 
productive sovereignty and exists by virtue of  constituent power.
 The transcendence of the Westphalia agent, this mere “assumption about 
authority”520, is supplemented by the actuality of power and materializes itself in 
the democratic production of common, shared political spaces. The plane of 
politics deepens and widens as global affairs turns into a dualistic structure that 
harbors different types of sovereign processes at the very same time, with 
transcendence and immanence as dialectical poles. Eventually the changes in 
‘propulsions’ - from transcendence to immanence - and ‘planes’ - from  inter-
state- to biopolitics – transforms ‘procedure’ as well: coercive sovereignty’s logic 
of control, command, and hierarchy gets supplemented by the ethico-political principle 
of production. Meaningful political action in international affairs is no longer 
reduced to the apparitional repetitiveness of foreign policy, but resonates in the 
creation of novel political goods: ideas, the exchange of knowledge, 
communication, etc. mobilize the immanent potential of society and facilitate the 
emergence of social relationships and collaborative forms of labor beyond the 
reach of  the state and empire.521
 Yet, despite its evident innovativeness in terms of formulating the 
conditions for post-structural types of sovereignty one must also acknowledge a 
series of problems caused by the practice of immaterial labour in particular, and 
the agentic figures of multitude and empire in general. Empire and multitude 
mobilize two different forms of immaterial production: the first one, immaterial 
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labour, is defined by a narrow economic rationale and highlights the generative 
potential of knowledge-based activities, and all kinds of affective and analytical 
work. The second concept, biopolitical activity, alludes to the fabrication of 
communal life, and situates immaterial endeavors within the wider sphere of 
social (re-)productiveness. 
 The first  problematic issue that arises out of the mobilization of 
immaterial labour in the context of post-structural sovereignty develops due to 
the simultaneous broadness and specificity of the concept itself. Immaterial 
labour, if read through a biopolitical lens, seems to entail all types of social 
activities without properly distinguishing between mere acts of (often 
unconscious) social reproduction, and deliberate acts of socio-political 
production. This sweeping notion of biopolitical labour, which functions as a 
catch-all-phrase for various, often heterogenous types of operations and 
exchanges within specific social settings, waters down notions of genuinely 
political action and strips the process from its directed, deliberate, and constituent 
elements. Biopolitical sovereignty dissolves into indeterminacy if framed through 
processes of biopolitical labour due to the assertion that the simple reproduction 
of the common counts already as a revolutionary act. Yet, while multitude 
highlights - in a rather egalitarian fashion - the revolutionary potential inherent to 
mundane and trivial activities, it gives also - in a quite elitist way - rise to a novel 
class of revolutionary vanguards, which emerges due to the already mentioned 
narrow definition of immaterial labour. While multitude as the relevant political 
entity confronts empire and circumnavigates capital through the production of 
the common, the crucial revolutionary class are those immaterial workers whose 
products are placed outside capitals reach. The portrayed mode of revolutionary 
agency is clearly an elitist one and privileges one specific type of economic and 
productive activity over other types of labor, i.e. industrial or agricultural ones. 
Hardt and Negri explicitly highlight the inclusive nature of multitude and joyfully 
proclaim that through biopolitical labour even the unemployed will have a chance 
to engage in socially and politically productive activities. This promise of inclusive 
and egalitarian political action is, however, undermined by a parochial and narrow 
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definition of immaterial labour which focuses solely on one type of productive 
activity. The unemployed might indeed play an instrumental role in producing the 
common, but the attack on empire (or rather the process of eluding its grip) is 
lead by a vanguard class of  immaterial laborers.
 Secondly, it needs to be remarked that the revolutionary machinery of the 
multitude, and the attached processes of fabricating the common through the 
effects of immaterial labour, glosses over class conflicts between biopolitical 
workers themselves. Hardt and Negri imagine the multitude as a non-
homogenizing assemblage, whose fabric is constituted by a set of infinitely 
fragmented subjectivities. Yet they also assert a necessary degree of homogeneity 
within multitude, especially in its relation towards empire. In an attempt to 
assemble a coherent political agent with the capacity to confront and challenge 
empire’s hegemonic position Hardt and Negri lump together teachers, food 
servers, salespeople, prostitutes, and computer engineers because their ‘products’ 
are immaterial in nature. What is casually neglected are the antinomic 
relationships within multitude itself.522  Overemphasizing the results (the 
products) of work clouds the relational configurations of the labour process, i.e. 
the social relations, hierarchies, and class antagonisms which are conditioned by 
the activity of production itself.523 A similar problem emerges in the depiction of 
empire, which is also portrayed as a supposedly homogenous bloc whose internal 
political struggles are negligible in the wake of its seemingly far more important 
battles with multitude. Yet, centers of capitalist power do not always act in sync 
and often expose internal rivalries and antagonisms, which proves to be 
incompatible with empire’s alleged homogeneity.524
 Lastly  it also proves difficult to sustain assertions about immaterial labor’s 
rapid ascent and its alleged dramatic impact on the reconfiguration of labour 
activities. Historically there has never really existed a truly hegemonic type of 
labour, but only a complex interplay between agricultural, industrial, and 
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immaterial modes of production: “no single socio-technical configuration of 
wage-labour (...) [has ever been] globally dominant”525  as Camfield notes - an 
insight positioned in sharp opposition to Hardt and Negri’s assertions about 
newly emerging, hegemonic types of immaterial production. In addition they also 
seem to neglect capital’s continuously successful attempts of capturing the 
activities and the products of immaterial work. Immaterial labour, which serves as 
the backbone of multitude’s revolutionary endeavors, is subject to 
commodification in the same way other types of production have been in the 
past.526  The deterritorialization of production wont’t serve as an indisputable 
prove for the alleged new age of immaterial, network-like labour since 
“production may be decentralized, while power finance, distribution, and control 
remain concentrated among big firms”.527 Certain groups of immaterial laborers 
might be in the privileged position of creating products such as music, computer 
programs, or literature outside of capital’s reach, but it remains difficult to locate 
those vast and autonomous spaces of common, post-capitalist production upon 
which the existence of  multitude is supposed to rest.
5. Elements of  porous sovereignty
 The ensuing situation is far from satisfying, mainly because the agentic 
figure of the multitude, and the attached forces of immaterial labour, point 
towards a model of non-Westphalian sovereignty, while leaving too many 
questions open and unresolved. Multitude mobilizes constituent power in 
international affairs, it pushes towards a model of agency beyond the state form, 
and it makes an attempt of delineating the conditions of a global authority-
consensus beyond the confinements of territorial politics. What makes the model 
unconvincing is the vagueness of concepts such as biopolitical labour, a narrow 
focus on immaterial production, elitist notions of revolutionary action, and, last 
but not least, an implausible degree of internal harmony upon which a 
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heterogenous revolutionary machinery like the multitude must rest in order to be 
capable of  acting politically in the first place. 
 In the light of such defects the final part of this chapter will hence 
investigate further into the required configurations for an immanent, constituent 
agency in global politics beyond the indeterminacy of biopolitical labour. Such an 
agency must leave room for potentially antinomic class relationships, while 
resisting the temptation of lumping together heterogenous sets of actors in 
indefensibly broad political blocs. Lastly, notions of labour need to broaden their 
scope of politically constitutive work and refrain from  limiting themselves 
exclusively to immaterial forms of production. Towards that end the section ties 
together several trains of thought already developed in earlier chapters, and 
suggests to approach the matter of non-Westphalian sovereignty from  an 
anarchist angle. In more concrete terms it is proposed to position natural groups 
at the center of non-Westphalian sovereign agency, and to take the requirement 
for the existence of constituent force at the heart of genuinely sovereign action 
more seriously. The final section pushes beyond the Westphalian criterion of 
legal, absolute, and unitary sovereignty, and suggest to conceive of sovereign 
political dynamics as porous, process-based, and constituent events.
5.1 Constituent power and the centrality of  anarchist thought
 Section 3.1 has already alluded the transitory relation between diverging 
notions of power and prevalent framings of sovereign practices in international 
affairs. It has also been established that a thorough revision of sovereignty needs 
to pay close attention to, and engage comprehensively with, the effects of 
constituent practices in global political conduct. If a reformulation of such 
sovereign practices requires the mobilized of constituent power, it would be 
prudent to pay the outmost attention to the anarchist tradition of political 
thought, which has an evident track-record of engaging with questions that 
concern the institutionalization of constituent agencies in various social contexts. 
Departing from  these observations, and in reaction to the exposed deficits 
inherent to biopolitical sovereignty, it is now suggested that the Proudhonian take 
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on constituent power is in a specific and unique position to support the 
emergence of  non-statist and post-Westphalian sovereign agency. 
 The different appearances of constituent power have been addressed in 
greater detail in chapter IV, for which reason this subsection will only provide a 
brief synopsis of a much more complex issue. The broader trajectories upon 
which the appearance of anarchist constituent power rests can be found - as 
already suggested - in Justice in the Revolution and the Church. Justice concerns itself 
with the ethical question of self-actualization and self-realization, and investigates 
into the proper political conduct which ought to support this particular end. 
Against this backdrop two types of political practices are pitted against one 
another: absolutist/authoritarian forms of social organization on the one side, 
and revolutionary/anarchist principles on the other. The unequivocal tenor of the 
developed argument goes as follows: a truly revolutionary moment requires the 
presence of mutualism and immanence, which can only be achieved by means of 
arranging the contact-points between the members of a social group through 
direct encounters, open-ended negotiation, and processes of constant 
deliberation. The portrayed divide between ‘the absolute’ and ‘the revolution’ 
mirrors the difference between constituted and constituent types of power, and 
points to the partition’s ethical relevancy. In Proudhon’s duct revolutionary 
practices are supposed to be immanent and constituent in nature - ordering 
societies through the employment of transcendental and constituted means bears 
an unethical edge to it, and prevents highly important, formative encounters 
between individual political agents from taking place.
 While Justice covers questions about the ethicality of mutualist social 
orders, constituent power’s deep-structure is investigated by Philosophy of  Progress 
(PhP), which positions ‘revolution’ not only as an ethical condition but as an 
ontological one as well. The non-foundational process ontology developed in PhP 
brushes against the grain of substantialist and monadic political theories, and 
offers a picture of society as an indeterminate environment, characterized by 
widespread patterns ontological dynamism. All of social life is inevitably synthetic 
and grouped, yet it is exactly this ensuing void, the contingency, that creates the 
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pretext for genuinely constituent socio-political activities. In this light Proudhon’s 
aversion against ‘the absolute’ (as it is termed in Justice), and the preference for 
‘revolution’ becomes clear, mainly because the latter creates the ontological 
climate in which constituent power is able to flourish.
 The mobilization of constituent power is possible in a variety of different 
fashions, some of them material, other ideational in nature. Concepts such as 
collective force and collective reason provide for the practical toolkit required to deploy 
constituent agency into political practice. Political Capacity of  the Working  Class 
(PCWC) focuses primarily on matters attached to the mobilization collective 
reason and the transformation of political communities towards mutualistic 
network societies via collective and immanent acts of self-alteration. PCWC 
emphasizes the necessity of developing joint patterns of self-awareness in the 
form of collective reason, for the purpose of initiating public events of self-
governance and self-transformation. The presence of collective reason counts as 
the ideational condition necessary for the realization of emancipatory change, 
and it explains how groups, and even entire populations, are capable of putting 
themselves into a constituent positions, which allows for the realization of their 
immanent, transformative potential. Constituent power appears, in that regard, as 
a necessarily public and immanent event, and it works through the transformative 
momentum of  collective identities. 
 Another way of making constituent power count is through the 
deployment of collective force and the performative effects of labour. A connection 
to the previously discussed writings of Hardt and Negri becomes apparent 
immediately: both hail, similar to Proudhon in the 19th century, the generative 
and transformative potential of work. Yet, Proudhon refrained, unlike his 21st 
century successors, from distinguishing between different qualitative types of 
labour. For him all forms of productive activity - i.e. industrial, agricultural, or 
skilled labour - exalt collective force, as long as production takes place in 
common and in concert with others. Collective force does not need to be 
summoned, but is, unlike its counterpart collective reason, always already and 
latently present through multiple acts of joint labour. Against this backdrop What 
- 173 -
is Property? (WiP) raises the question how a demos’ constituent capacity resonates 
in collective acts of labor, and how certain social institution, in particular 
property, lead to an appropriation of collective and constituent force through a 
class of proprietors. Notions of capitalist property represent a type of 
constituted power, as well as a form of royal or sovereign principles similar to 
absolutist forms of government. Contra to such static and ‘unproductive’ notions 
of ownership WiP develops a dynamic (and democratic) concept of possession 
which combines the economic right of resources usage with the political ability to 
control these resources in the first place. The central issue raised is concerned 
with the question how the products of collective force and constituent power can 
be re-appropriated by their locus of  initial production.
5.2 Porous sovereignty: empirical, partial, synthetic
 While previous sections referred repeatedly to the mechanisms and 
practices which support the resonance of constituent power in various political 
and social fields, it has still not been made explicit how a non-Westphalian 
sovereign agency in global politics might look like in terms of its institutional 
qualities. To reiterate: it was proposed to evaluate the content and the quality of 
sovereignty by means of reframing the practice through the lens of constituent 
power. Ethical, ontological, and practical elements of constituent power were 
then traced trough the anarchist tradition of political thought. For the purpose of 
initiating a displacement of the dominant Westphalian narrative it is now 
suggested to position the agentic figure of the natural group as an appropriate 
vessel for constituent sovereign agency in global politics. 
 The observations made in chapter VI are crucial in that regard, due to the 
development of an anarchist take on IR-ontology via the deployment of said 
natural-groups-perspective. Departing from  a non-foundational perspective 
chapter VI proposes a model of ontological anarchy, characterized by processes 
of becoming, antinomy, and relationality. The portrayal of a deep, foundationless 
anarchic ontology has not only led to an image of grouped and synthetic social 
life, but highlights in addition the centrality of such a void in creating the required 
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conditions for the flourishing of constituent power. Two of the central concepts 
introduced in this particular chapter were compositions and conceptions. Compositions 
stand for the productive yet indeterminate ontological fabric of commonly 
produced political spaces. Conceptions serve as analytical representations of 
movement which help making interwoven and overlain acts of political labour 
cognitively graspable. Especially the latter term was deemed to be of importance 
in the context of natural group formation. The chapter establishes a firm 
connection between natural groups in the area of politics, and conceptions in the 
field of ontology, and argues that in the same way conceptions give meaning to 
composition on an ontological level, ‘social’ or ‘natural groups’ give meaning to 
an otherwise indeterminate relationality in the political realm. Furthermore it was 
suggested to trace back political events to the interplay between natural groups of 
varying sizes and qualities: compositions and conceptions emerging from  the 
productive void of deep anarchy are similar to those social or natural groups that 
harvest the generative potential of immanent social labor. All politics is, in 
consequence, politics among natural groups - groups that need to be understood 
as proto-polities and social embryos of  varying kinds and sizes.
 However, natural groups are not only involved in the cognitive ordering of 
the political landscape, but serve in addition as evidence for society’s immanent 
productiveness: any human collective - a family, a workshop, a battalion, or a state 
- qualifies as a group as long as it is involved in generative or reproductive acts of 
social labor. Some, if not most, natural groups do certainly limit themselves to 
the exercise of mundane and unspectacular acts of simple social reproduction. 
Yet, a minority utilizes their immanent capacity for genuinely productive purposes 
and turns into a locus for constituent power. When these grouped and synthetic 
(hence porous) agencies perform political founding acts through their collective 
labour, and by means of exploiting the liberties offered to them by a 
foundationless anarchic ontology, they generate themselves as relevant sovereign 
agencies, and turn into porous sovereigns, due to their ability of mobilizing a 
begründende Gewalt - a founding power. A natural group then exercises porous 
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sovereignty if it finds itself in a position which allows for the mobilization of 
constituent power: the sovereign is who successfully marshals constituent force. 
 Natural groups must hence be viewed as the proper vessel for non-
Westphalian sovereign agency, mainly because constituent power resonates in and 
works through them. This sovereign agency differs fundamentally from the 
standard-type of the Westphalian agent, whose defining attributes are routinely 
characterized by the substantialist markers of  legality, absoluteness, and unitarity. 
 Constituent natural groups defy the logic of fixed and relatively inflexible 
authority-structures in world politics, and present instead an image of sovereignty 
as a process: legality is not of primary concern for a porous sovereign. What 
matters instead is the empirical presence of constituent force - auctoritas, the 
actuality of power matters, not potestas, its potentiality.528 Absoluteness, the second 
staple of Westphalia, and the requirement for a sovereign to act as the supreme 
source of authority within a given territory, is also put into question and 
undermined by a natural-groups-perspective. What matters instead is the partial 
exercise of constituent force within certain, often limited sectors of society. The 
requirement of absoluteness is an illusion to begin with, which is exemplified by 
the fact that even extremely powerful states must tolerate pockets of lawlessness 
and competing sources of authority within their own territory. Comprehending 
sovereignty as the partial and sectoral mobilization of constituent power delivers 
an empirically much more warranted picture in that regard. Unitarity, the last 
Westphalian core-principle, gets replaced by accounts of syntheticism and 
antinomy. The unitarity of the sovereign, territorial agent presupposed the 
existence of a coherent political space, characterized by a clearly identifiable 
inside-outside distinction, and patterns of control and command responsive to a 
centralized source of authority. Such discreteness proves indefensible if 
approached from a porous-sovereignty-angle, since the exercise of constituent 
agency depends strongly on a political space’s antinomic and synthetic  makeup. 
Antinomy prevents social arrangements from solidifying and forces their constant 
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adaption to a permanently changing political landscape. Syntheticism alludes to 
the grouped nature of social arrangement and the dubiosity of essentialist claims. 
While the Westphalian agent is then characterized as a legal, absolute, and unitary 
political player, the porous sovereign exalts empirical, partial, and synthetic 
properties.
6. Conclusion: porous sovereignty in global politics
6.1 Porous sovereignty in relation to Westphalia
 Inter-state relations are characterized by, and also suffer from, the vast 
absence of constituent momenta (c.f. chapter II). Global politics of the 
Westphalian type is instead defined by the omnipresence of constituted power 
and the deriving attributes of legalism, absoluteness, and unitarity. This triad 
forces international political conduct into the stale repetitiveness of foreign policy 
operations, which are located on a spectrum with ‘force’ and ‘legalism’ at its 
respective ends. The Westphalian political cosmology is certainly not negligent of 
constituent forces in politics per se, yet it confines them towards the inside of 
territorially defined political communities. 
 Natural groups on the contrary, especially in their function as porous 
sovereignties, are not bound to such inherently statist operations and certainly do 
not rely on territorially defined political spaces for the projection of constituent 
power. They are also not chiefly concerned with legislation or legal recognition, 
and instead satisfied with the partial exercise of constituent force. Furthermore 
they are capable to accommodate dissent due to their necessarily synthetic and 
inherently non-homogenous internal makeup. Natural groups in general, and 
porous sovereignties in particular, practice a different kind of power politics (ch. 
VI) and enrich international politics’ spatial imaginability by means of presenting 
an image of non-discrete and non-territorial, yet still sovereign, political zones. In 
this framing the projection and the exercise of sovereignty hinges chiefly on 
patterns of constituent relationality, i.e. collective force, collective reason, socio-
political labour, commutation and agglomeration, and mutualistic principles.
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 A narrow reading of sovereignty as a purely Westphalian attribute leads 
quickly and directly into an unjustified conflation of the inter-state system and 
the international (or rather the global). Natural groups and porous sovereignties 
break with the prevalent narrative of a political plane whose most important 
operatives are supposedly states. Demonstrating an enhanced susceptibility 
towards sovereignty’s varieties and guises helps to conceptualize the inter-state 
system as a distinct assemblage of a highly specialized set of natural groups 
whose mutual and exclusive intercourse is regulated by various negotiated, 
historically grown institutions. State-groups themselves are, however, only part 
and parcel of a much more complex and comprehensive global political realm in 
which heterogenous sets of actors engage in the mobilization of constituted and 
constituent political force.
6.2 Porous sovereignty and the multitude
 Porous sovereignties deliver a broader notion of agency, not only in 
relation to Westphalian inter-state politics, but also in regards to revolutionary 
approaches, such as the previously scrutinized multitude-concept by Hardt and 
Negri. The earlier discussion on this particular agentic figure criticized biopolitical 
labour’s tendency of giving rise to a vanguard definition of revolutionism. Hardt 
and Negri consciously employ immaterial labour as a transformative mechanism, 
due to its ability of escaping capital’s grip through the construction of the common 
in common, outside of empire’s reach. Yet, this revolution which employes 
biopolitical labour, is also heavily reliant on, and centered around, the actions of a 
vanguard-group of immaterial laborers. The existence of multitude then comes at 
a heavy price, since it must privilege specific types of labour and laborers in order 
to retain its ability to marshal political power. 
 From the perspective of porous sovereignty the idea of a vanguard-
revolution appears as nonsensical and has little buy. There are certainly overlaps 
between porous sovereignties and the multitude, i.e. a framing of revolutionary 
events as prolonged and constitutive processes. Yet, from a porous sovereignty 
perspective these events are initiated by collective forces and collective reasons. 
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What matters in that regard is not the deployment of one particular type of 
revolutionary activity (i.e. the mobilization of immaterial labour), but the 
mobilization of collective forces/reasons and the existence of an immanent and 
productive process in the first place. Not the product of political labour matters, 
but the relations which made production possible. Any labour-operation can 
attain the status of a proto-revolutionary act, as long as it manages to project 
constituent force. The existence of revolutionary vanguards is not central in that 
regard.
 Porous sovereignty offers a broader conception of political/revolutionary 
agency and remedies another shortcoming of multitude, namely its vagueness in 
regards to the transformative potential of biopolitical labour. Not every act of 
labour is also revolutionary in nature. Labour can be dull and entirely 
unproductive (in a transformative sense) if it only engages in the mere 
reproduction of shared political spaces. And this also applies to immaterial and 
biopolitical work: affective laborers such as waiters, call center agents, or teachers 
repeating the same syllabus over years/decades fall into the category of 
immaterial workers, yet their activities are reproductive at best and can hardly 
count as revolutionary or constitutive. The natural-groups-perspective recognizes 
the existence of simple, dull, and reproductive acts of labour, but refrains from 
forcefully and artificially elevating them to supposedly revolutionary actions. Yet 
it still creates the room for potentially productive activities: natural groups (and 
waiters, call center agents, and teachers certainly belong into this category as well) 
can act in a genuinely sovereign way, but only if they project constituent power. 
Revolution is not forced that way, but the required outlets for the deployment of 
transformative powers are still created.
 Lastly it is of importance to highlight porous sovereignty’s non-reliance 
on alleged harmony. Multitude and empire must appear as relatively homogenous 
and harmonious groups vis a vis one another, and despite prevalent intra-class 
conflicts or clashes between capitalist groups and core-states. Such a lump-
approach to agency fuses potentially antagonistic agencies together, and groups 
them in the crude and undifferentiated realms of multitude and empire. Porous 
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sovereignty on the contrary receives its momentum  from antinomic relations, and 
can function properly without markers of fictitious harmony. Natural groups in 
general, and porous sovereigns in particular are, due to their synthetic makeup, 
perfectly capable of accommodating latent tension, contestation, and even 
dissent. Consequently it is possible to adequately grasp the struggles between 
competing groups without forcing them into pre-defined political categories.
6.3 Porous sovereignty and the exercise of  structural control
 While porous sovereignty as an analytical category explains the interplay 
between sovereign agents of various guises, it also serves as a normative and 
emancipatory principle. Westphalian sovereignty had (and has) the purpose to 
manage the circulation of violence within domestic realms and across international 
political spaces - a reactive principle. Porous sovereignty is, on the contrary, 
concerned with processes involving the exercise of structural control - an active 
principle. Towards that end porous sovereignty bears certain republican elements 
and institutionalizes republican politics on a global scale. Most notable in that 
regard is the notion of freedom as non-domination - a hallmark of anarchist 
political theory. And, more concretely, a constant strive towards structural 
control, via the exercise of political agency, through collaborative acts of socio-
political labour, within the context of  a natural-groups-setting. 
 Emerging notions of freedom as acts of structural control point towards 
the construction of political liberty in the form of non-domination and 
independence from arbitrary power.529 Pettit notes in relation to republicanism  that 
- unlike in the liberal tradition - domination is not just defined by actual 
interference, but rather by the mere potential of being subjugated. The sheer 
possibility of illegitimate control, not its actual exercise, is already enough to 
infringe upon a person’s or a group’s liberty. Questions of ‘who is ultimately in 
control’ and ‘who is the agent in charge’ advance to yardsticks for measuring 
- 180 -
529 Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy, Republicanism, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
republicanism/#LibNonDom, 1 (accessed 07.09.2014).
political freedom.530  Operating outside of someone’s command “consists in not 
being subject to anyone else’s will in the exercise of deliberation and choice”.531 
In the republican narrative an agent is then free as long as no-one has the 
structural and institutional disposition (the capacity) to make him  or her decide 
otherwise.532  Anarchism  picks up on this positive and republican account of 
liberty as a practice in which potential sources of interference are properly kept at 
bay, and offers a set of three distinct mechanisms allowing for the deliberate, 
democratic control of  political spaces:
 (I) A first pillar of said strategy entails the mobilization of constituent 
power in the form of collective force and reason. Members of a natural group 
make an explicitly directed attempt to control and actively shape the political 
environment they are embedded in through acts of socio-political labour. In 
regards to matters of structural control over potential sources of interference this 
first principle is in fact paramount, since it highlights the importance of joint 
socio-political labour as an emancipatory tool. Labour counts not only as a mere 
economic activity for the production of commodities to be traded on the market-
place. Political activity in general, and sovereign action in particular, necessitates 
the forging of such constituent relationships and joint patterns of 
industriousness, since “no human life, not even the life of the hermit in natures 
wilderness, is possible without a world which directly or indirectly testifies to the 
presence of other human beings”.533  Political life, sovereign life, is then 
preconditioned by the existence of living labour, potentia534, and a vita activa.535 
Work and action ascend to tools of an activist citizenship, centered around the 
performance of  structural control.
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 The danger looming behind the latter notion of freedom as structural 
control can be found in the necessary presence of a collectivist element, which 
breeds the possibility of undifferentiated groupism and potentially totalizing 
strives for perfectionism. Crushing collectivism is imminent in cases where the 
self ’s substance gets projected onto a collective body, and if this agent is then 
charged with the promise to lift the demos as a whole to higher levels of freedom 
- i.e. a tribe, a cult, a church, the state, and basically any form of social 
organization that manages to transcend its constituent individual parts. Berlin 
describes negative liberty as the right to be left alone, to realize ones preferences, 
and the process of being “principally concerned with the area of control, not 
with its source”.536 It separates the question of “Who governs me” from “How 
far does government interfere with me”.537  Positive freedom  on the contrary 
defines liberty as a function of self-mastery: “I wish to be the instrument of my 
own, not of other men’s acts of will”, and further “I wish to be somebody, not 
nobody; a doer - (...) self-directed and not acted upon”.538  Berlin rejects and 
abandons the ideal of positive freedom and retreats into an account of negative 
liberty, since freedom in the ‘positive’ sense can easily destroy ‘negative’ liberties 
when the sovereignty of the people encroaches on the individual’s one, with the 
tyranny of  the majority as its eventual result.539
 
 (II) & (III) While natural groups and porous sovereignties provide for 
outlets of positive liberty towards other collective agencies, the anarchist 
conception of freedom rests on two additional pillars and allows for the 
synchronous realization of negative liberties as well. The second cornerstone of 
the anarchist agenda (the relation between the collective agent and its constituent 
parts) is represented by the antinomic makeup of natural groups and their 
permissiveness towards dissent. Antinomy as a pluralistic political principle 
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prevents such settings from solidification and homogenization, and provides 
protection for voices of dissent and difference. The principle of mutualism  builds 
the foundation for the third and last pillar of the anarchist agenda, and reinforces 
the commitment towards non-domination in the ‘private’ realm (between the 
members of a natural group). Mutualism is geared towards safeguarding the 
integrity of individual freedoms through its representation of reciprocity as a 
form of  political justice.
 Combining the organizational and normative principles of collective 
force/reason, antinomy, and mutualism addresses Berlin’s fear of a crushing 
collectivism, and it diffuses concerns about the resulting diminishment of 
personal freedom. A firm commitment towards ‘groupness’ (as opposed to 
‘grouism’ - c.f. chapter VI), the acceptance of porous sovereignties as functional 
arrangements (as means to an emancipatory end, never as ends in themselves), 
and the universal affirmation of non-domination as a central political principle, 
enables the co-exercise of positive and negative accounts of liberty. Providing for 
such seemingly heterogenous, and at first glance even contradictory political 
goods, does not put anarchism outside of the republican canon though. Instead it 
goes along with the instigations of one of the republican tradition’s chief 
visionaries: Machiavelli, and his theory of  the humours. 
 The humours anticipate modern pluralism  by refraining from a vilification 
of dissent and internal discord. Machiavelli’s humours portray, similar to 
Proudhon’s antinomy, tension and struggle as the lifeblood of the demos and as a 
guarantee for its continued vitality. Political communities comprise by default of 
multiple social groups, each of which equipped with mutually conflicting 
aspirations.540  The homogenous political body is a fiction - the strive for an 
allegedly harmonizing synthesis a danger. A well ordered political body - the 
perfect commonwealth in Machiavelli’s duct - manages instead to balance among 
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prevalent humours and embraces the momentum provided by frictional, 
antinomic relations.541 
 Machiavelli’s republicanism and Proudhon’s anarchism  alike seek to 
remedy the dangers of transcendentalism, and propagate instead a presentist 
politics of the here-and-now, incredulous of all utopian promises, and petrified 
by the terrors of perfectibility.542  The ensuing built-in pluralism  is emancipatory 
to the extent that it allows for the exercise of structural control. Its focus on 
processes and means (hardly ever ends) creates a platform  for immanent, non-
normative, and non-substantialist political action.543
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CHAPTER EIGHT
VIII | ANARCHIST ETHICS: SCRUTINIZING 
AGONISTIC SPATIALITY
1. Introduction: agonistic spatiality
 At this point the study has already worked through a number of IR’s grand 
themes and built alternative narratives alongside anarchist lines. In regards to power 
in international affairs the importance of paying a heightened attention to 
constituent power was stressed, mainly in order to gain a more sophisticated 
understanding about the production of global political outcomes. Furthermore it 
was proposed to conceive of the global’s ontology as a foundationless, 
contingent, and process-driven political space, and to initiated a shift away from 
state-centric framings of ‘the international’. Sovereignty was re-formulated as a 
partial, empirical, and synthetic phenomenon, one that stands in stark contrast to 
the absolute, juridical, and unitary Westphalian type. Lastly it was proposed to re-
think constituent agency in international affairs and to recognize the political 
productiveness of porous sovereignties and natural groups of varying sizes and 
qualities.
 The final chapter will link these findings to questions of ethics in global 
affairs, and, more concretely, to accounts of political responsibility in world 
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politics. One of the chapter’s main objectives is to intervene into Chantal 
Mouffe’s agonistic international political project by means of deconstructing the 
normative vision of the pluriverse and the ethics of distance it conveys. Such an in-
depth engagement with agonistic political theory is highly applicable due to vast 
overlaps between agonism and anarchism. The agonistic pluriverse comes in fact 
closest to what is currently available in terms of a quasi-anarchist global regime 
structure.
 Yet, Mouffe’s pluriverse also exposes some problematic traits which need 
to be addressed and remedied. Agonism, it is argued, lacks the ability of 
formulating conditions for political responsibility that would reach beyond the 
hermetic constraints of the pluriverse. Responsibility towards ‘the other’ exists in 
the form  of a commitment towards a conflictual consensus. However, due to the 
division of the political plane into large, culturally distinct hegemonic blocs, 
accounts of responsibility can only develop within the confinements of these 
polities, not across them. The chapter scrutinizes this very notion of agonistic 
hegemony from an anarchist angle and suggests to envisage a radically democratic 
perspective of order, ethics, and responsibility beyond the spatial constraints of 
the pluriverse.
 The supposed necessity of organizing international affairs around large 
regional centers of cultural and political hegemony derives from the Schmittian 
view on ‘the political’, which is trapped in a coercive vision of sovereignty (this 
matter was already problematize in chapter VII). Schmitt is reluctant, yet far from 
incapable, of acknowledging the existence of constituent power prior and past to 
the moment of the decision. Through a mobilization of porous sovereignty the 
chapter takes up on the suggestion that sovereignty and power overlap 
fundamentally, and that diverging notions of sovereignty must be conceived of as 
functions of power. Analogous to the preceding chapters it is argued that 
sovereignty’s essence is dualistic and either characterized by porosity or 
coerciveness, depending on the context of power (constituent or constituted) into 
which it is inserted. Hence, hegemony must not exclusively be conceived of as 
the product of a sovereign decision (coercive sovereignty, constituted power), but 
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can also be the result of intertwining collective forces and reasons (porous 
sovereignty, constituent power). 
 The chapter contributes to the formulation of anarchist-informed 
international ethics and moves beyond agonism’s account of political 
responsibility as a conflictual consensus in a static pluriverse. This framing fails to 
grasp the omnipresent ontology of anarchy within global politics. Anarchism  and 
agonism are, as already suggested, by not means incompatible, and there exist vast 
overlaps between the two projects. While the second section discusses the ethics of 
space as an institution, the third section of the chapter will thus pay closer 
attention to the similarities of, and the potential cross-pollination between, 
anarchist and agonist political thought. The argument subsequently problematizes 
agonism’s spatial project and the attached ethical implications (section four). The 
final section (five) introduces an anarchist account of global ethics in which 
political responsibility resonates within and across porous sovereignties in a spatial 
setting termed ‘omniverse’.
2. Locating responsibility: institutional architecture and the ethics of  space
 The opening section of the chapter investigates the impact of structural 
arrangements, institutional design, and spatial architecture on notions of ethical 
conduct in global affairs. As an underlying question it is asked how institutional 
modes of arranging the contact points between collective agents facilitates the 
emergence of specific notions of responsibility, while impacting at the very same 
time on the ability of an agent to discharge an assigned set of duties. The review 
opens with an assessment of responsibility as structural transformation and pays 
particular attention to Thomas Pogge’s moral cosmopolitanism. The second 
section touches upon institutional moral agency  and lines out Chris Brown’s and Toni 
Erskine’s respective takes on international society and international organizations. 
The third and final part explores issues of spatial arrangements as ‘ethos’ through the 
work of Louiza Odysseos and R.B.J. Walker - this sub-section will also develop 
the analytical framework for the ensuing analysis of agonistic spatiality and the 
anarchist ethics of  space.
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 Responsibility  as structural transformation: Pogge’s account of moral 
cosmopolitanism is particularly concerned with the performance of an 
institutional moral analysis and institutional re-design as a means of addressing 
injustice.544 When determining the conditions for ethical conduct in global affairs 
the assessment of duties, obligations, and responsibilities needs to be susceptible 
to the causal effects exalted by structural and institutional arrangements. Whereas 
interactional approaches focus narrowly on the actions of individuals and 
collective agents, institutional approaches broaden the scope of moral enquiry by 
means of assessing the equally enabling and constraining effects of conventions 
and practices on ethical conduct545: “The emergence of global justice talk is 
closely related to the increasing explanatory importance of social institutions”.546 
Structural arrangements are of ethical relevancy to the extent that they impact 
potentially on an agent’s ability to claim  and access human rights - conversely, if 
human rights can’t be claimed their underfulfillment can often be traced back to 
certain features entrenched in the global institutional order.547 
 The effect of institutions on an agent’s ability to claim specific rights is 
certainly a mediated one, which implies that structures do not cause harm  actively, 
i.e. they do not displace, torture, or suppress people. Yet, institutional 
arrangements can have an enabling effect on the commitment, or at least the 
possible occurrence, of human rights violations. Certain institutionally 
entrenched privileges and modalities, created and maintained through practices 
such as sovereignty or global capitalism, have the potential to impoverish people 
indadvertedly or deprive them, by proxy, of their ability to realize human rights.548 
In that regard Pogge refers specifically to resource and borrowing privileges that 
are regularly misused by corrupt and/or incompetent elites for the purpose of 
furthering personal gains, while simultaneously inflicting harm on entire national 
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economies, which need to absorb the fallout of excessive borrowing and 
spending.549  These privileges - created and positively sanctioned by international 
law and bodies such as the IMF or the World Bank550 - cause preventable harm  to 
otherwise vulnerable populations, and need to move into the center of ethical 
assessment. 
 Pogge’s institutional moral approach establishes a firm connection 
between institutional architecture and patterns of moral responsibility: “An 
institutional order is human-rights violating when it foreseeably gives rise to 
greater insecurity in access to the objects of human rights [...] than would be 
reasonably avoidable through an alternative feasible institutional design”.551 Those in the 
capacity to avoid human rights violations by means of amending the institutional 
order upon which international affairs rests are reminded of their duty (or rather 
responsibility) to react upon institutionally induced underfulfillments of human 
rights. The particular addressees of this call for action are the “reasonably 
privileged citizens of the rich democracies”552 who are morally obliged to do no 
harm 553  and responsible for holding their governments accountable for the 
avoidable human rights violations that could be prevented by means of inducing 
reasonable institutional reforms.
 Institutional moral agency: Pogge’s approach rests on the assumption that 
institutions can only be held causally, yet not morally, responsible for human 
rights violations. Institutions play an instrumental role in the systematic 
underfulfillment of human rights, but they are none the less passive in nature, and 
bare of any immediate act-capacity. Hence it would be implausible to assign 
duties to them in the first place. Institutions enable, but they do not act, and they 
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certainly are not in the position to assume the role of a ‘responsible’ international 
actor. 
 This reading of the role of institutions is, however, not share 
unequivocally. Brown argues that international society does indeed possess agency 
which enables it to act morally. As an agent constituted by institutions, i.e. 
sovereignty, international law, and diplomacy, the society of states needs to be 
understood as a type of association or club. As such it is capable of developing 
centralized decision-making capacities that allow for deliberate actions and the 
conscious reflection upon the im-/morality of its activities.554  Similar to legal 
persons international society cannot perform actions literally but must work 
through a body of representatives that act on its behalf.555 As historical case for 
the act- and the moral capacity of international society serves - among other 
examples556 - the 19th century Congress system. In regard to the Congress system 
and the adjacent Concert of Europe it is striking that the great continental 
powers felt a sense of collective responsibility towards the maintenance of a 
conservative cosmopolitan governance across the european continent. Out of 
this self-assigned and power-backed mandate arose the identity of the european 
Congress, with its independent institutional identity, that existed separately from 
the individual interests of its constituent parts. The Congress system  thus counts 
as an early example for the mobilization of a collective moral agent in the context 
of  a Westphalian setting.557
 Erskine pushes this logic of institutional moral agency even further and 
suggests that collective bodies can have absolute ontological independence, which 
qualifies them as moral agents of the first order. Prevalent discussions revolving 
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around questions of responsibility suffer from an anthropomorphic bias558 which 
gears the debate towards the assumption that only individual actors - i.e. humans 
or states - can possess (moral) agency, while institutional arrangements are 
reduced to ontologically dependent structures, mobilized by states as vehicles for 
simple goal attainment.559  Institutional moral agents abilities to understand and 
respond to moral requirements is routinely underestimated560, and the ethical 
relevancy of collective agency is rarely recognized.561  It is certainly not the case 
that all types of collectivities qualify equally for the label ‘collective moral agent’: 
crowds, mobs, checkout-lines and other aggregated collectivities would not pass 
the test of agency due to their randomness and erratic behavior.562  Yet, in 
building on the work of Peter French, Erskine argues that corporations and 
conglomerate collectivities can indeed qualify as moral agents if the conglomerate 
possesses an independent identity; if it can resort to a set of internal decision 
making procedures; if it is able to maintain an identity over time; and if it 
possesses a concept of itself as a unit. In cases where these criteria are fulfilled a 
conglomerate passes as a purposive actor capable of claiming sets of rights, 
duties, and responsibilities.563
 Spatial arrangements as ‘ethos’: For the remainder of the chapter the study 
entertains two separate yet somewhat intertwined ideas: the first  claim suggests to 
perceive of spatial arrangements as a specific type of institution that needs to be 
subject to in-depth moral scrutiny. The spatial ordering of the political landscape 
must be perceived of as a practice or an institution, irregardless of the type of 
space it creates, be it territorial (i.e. statist) or structural (i.e. economic) in nature. 
It needs to be acknowledged that spatializing practices and the emerging spatio-
- 191 -
558  Toni Erskine, “‘Blood on the UN’s hands’? Assigning Duties and Apportioning Blame to an 
Intergovernmental Organisation”, Global Society 18, no. 1 (2004): 23.
559 Toni Erskine, “Locating Responsibility: The Problem of Moral Agency in International Relations”, 
in The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, ed. Christian Reus-Smit & Duncan Snidal (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 703 f.
560 Toni Erskine, “Assigning responsibilities to institutional moral agents: The case of states and quasi 
states”, Ethics & International Affairs 15, no. 2 (2001): 68.
561 Erskine, “Locating responsibility”, 705.
562 Erskine, “Assigning responsibilities to institutional moral agents”, 70.
563 Ibid., 71 f.; and Erskine, “‘Blood on the UN’s hands’?”, 25 f.
temporal patterns of order are of ethical relevancy due to their impact on the 
contextual narratives that frame the conditions for responsible action towards the 
‘other’. Political communities are routinely characterized by their (alleged) spatially 
consolidated appearance. Most notable in that regard is certainly the state, which 
is, by definition, a territorial polity. Yet even more ambiguous terms such as ‘the 
West’, ‘the Global South’, or ‘the Middle East’ are discursively underpinned by a 
certain degree of spatial or territorial coherence. The spatializing narrative 
resonates often implicitly in a number of prevalent debates that touch upon 
questions of responsibility in global affairs, i.e. climate change, the practice of aid 
giving, migration, and so forth. Here ‘perpetrators’ and ‘victims’ often assume a 
form of coherent, spatially defined political communities. The West as a space 
does not act, yet, treating a heterogenous assemblage of sovereign state as if  if 
possesses some sort of spatial unity helps assigning duties and responsibilities to 
an otherwise amorphous set of  individual actors. 
 This is not to suggest though that spatial arrangements qualify per se as 
institutional moral agents, like Brown and Erskine have argued in their respective 
discussions of international society and conglomerate collectivities. When it is 
suggested to perceive of spatio-temporal pattern of order as institutions the 
argument leans more towards Pogge’s take on causal responsibility which assumes 
that structural arrangements are mediately responsible for the facilitation of 
political outcomes, despite their apparent lack of agency. Congruously one can 
not assign duties or responsibilities towards them, which is a privilege reserved 
only for actors with a decisive impact on the institutional architecture of the 
structure itself. Yet, spaces - if interpreted as the outcome of political practices - 
can still be subject to an ethical assessment, mainly due to their enabling and 
facilitating effect on an agent’s ability to discharge an assigned set of duties or 
responsibilities. Reverting to Pogge’s line of reasoning allows us to put 
spatializing practices and spatio-temporal institutions in the focus of a moral 
assessment, while synchronously deferring the question of institutional agency 
for the meantime.
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 A second claim  that underpins the subsequent analysis assumes that an 
intimate connection between spatiality and ethos exist. It is argued that normative 
claims about the spatial architecture of the international are not of a purely 
technical nature, but contribute in addition to the development of epistemic 
schemes whose referent points define the way in which individual agents relate to 
one another. It can hence be said that spatio-temporal narratives - i.e. in the form 
of an agonistic pluriverse - define the conditions of a global ethos. In her work 
on dangerous ontologies Odysseos interprets ethos as a form of ethics that describes 
“an attitude and mode of relating to others”.564  Odysseos derives this 
understanding from  Heidegger for whom ethos amounts to “the open region in 
which the human being dwells”.565 For both, Heidegger and Odysseos, ethea are 
then expressions of the attitudinal aspects of communal life - they are “a manner 
of  being”566 as Foucault has put it.
 The ethics that underpin IR’s contemporary vision of Westphalian 
spatiality are built around an ethos of survival and reinforced by a narrative of 
uncertainty, anarchy, and self-help, structurally designed to revolve around 
binaries of self/enemy, inside/outside, and order/anarchy.567 Odysseos traces the 
prevalent ethos back to the Hobbesian state of nature, which resonates strongly 
in IR’s takes on international anarchy: here the ‘other’ is a source of incalculable 
risk and permanent competition - not out of malice, but due to human beings 
inherent similarity in regards to their faculties and powers.568  Individuals might 
have overlapping and competing interests, but the absence of a natural hierarchy 
prohibits the a priori settlement of emerging conflicts. Consequently, humans find 
themselves in a hypothetical war of all against all, in which unmediated conflict is 
an ever present possibility. Only the transference of some of mans natural rights 
onto the Leviathan will allow for the transcendence of the state of nature. The 
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ethos of survival conveyed by this narrative hinges strongly at a perception of 
enmity: the ‘other’ is reduced to a threat which does not count as a subject of 
ethical concerns, let alone as an agent with legitimate claims and demands. This is 
accompanied by a notion of responsibility as a purely self-referential impulse, 
limited to the self ’s survival.569 The dilemma that surrounds the state of nature is 
only partly resolved by the emergence of the Leviathan: within its realm 
survivalist connotations are indeed tamed, and order in the form of legitimate 
authority and hierarchy permeates, what puts an end to the ever present 
possibility of conflict. Outside of the Leviathan’s spatial confinement uncertainty 
prevails and the war of all against all continues indefinitely. The ‘other’ as an 
enemy does not vanish but is simply relegated to the outside. An outside which is, 
in contemporary IR’s ductus, the realm of anarchy.570 In the Hobbesian narrative 
the construction of differential spaces is thus a clear response to an ontology of 
danger. Specific spatial arrangements and sovereign practices are ways of coping 
with this threat. Space in that regard is then not simply a realm  of control, but 
represents, in addition, a clearly defined layer of predictability and security whose 
integrity is guaranteed by the Leviathan. 
 Whereas Odysseos traces the emergence of exclusionary spatializing 
practices back to an ethos of survival, Walker puts the phenomenon in an even 
wider context and argues that ensuing patterns of inside/outside and order/
anarchy are peculiar ways of addressing the dilemma of modernity: the 
combination of “enlightenment and despair” that oscillates permanently 
“between a universalising progress and a relativistic nihilism”.571 Walker contends 
that “modernity framed as a universalising history of (instrumental) 
rationalisation is simultaneously an account of modernity as a realm  of non-
rational or criterionless choices about ultimate values”.572  Sovereignty and 
Westphalian spatiality respond not only to danger, but also to an uniquely modern 
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dialectic. The prevalent spatio-temporal order of the political plane, which is 
dominated by discrete polities, is heavily underpinned by a vision of the modern 
subject that attempts to re-negotiate the terms of relationally in a world that is 
based on the mutually contradictory terms of nihilism  and disenchantment, 
universality and rationality. While the modern subject attempts to cope with the 
prospects of nihilism and disenchantment that gave rise to the endlessly 
empowering accounts of constituent power and productive sovereignty, its search 
for universal markers of rationality and ethicality endures. The binary ontology of 
the international provides a temporary relief for this enlightenment-despair, and 
resolves the clash between universality and particularity in a spatial way573: the 
inside/domestic realm does justice to the universalizing claims of modernity, the 
outside/the international caters towards radical skepticism  under the auspices of 
power politics.574
3. Agonism and anarchism: fundamental overlaps
 The ethical implications of spatializing practices are now highly visible, 
and it has become apparent that ‘space’ as an institution must be responsive to a 
critical moral assessment, due to its impact on how political agents relate to one 
another. Before commencing with an analysis of agonistic spatiality along the 
previously discussed lines the study will briefly discuss the fundamental overlaps 
between anarchist philosophy and agonistic political theory.
3.1 The freedom of  the ancient and the freedom of  the modern
 It is one of agonism’s fundamental concerns to strike a balance between 
what Mouffe calls the freedom  of the ancients and the freedom of the 
moderns;575 that is, between the positive republican conception of liberty as ones 
capacity to participate in the public life of the community, as opposed to the 
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with.576  A contemporary variation of this ethico-political struggle still resonates 
in the debates between cosmopolitans and communitarians, with fault lines 
running between universal notions of right on the one side, and ethical 
conceptions of the good on the other.577  Agonism demonstrates a critical 
awareness that both facets of freedom need to be articulated and practiced 
simultaneously by a modern interpretation of radical democracy: “One task of a 
modern democratic political philosophy, as I see it, is to provide us with a 
language to articulate individual liberty with political liberty so as to construe new 
subject positions and create different citizens’ identities”.578  The challenge to 
cope with is really the re-invention of the political agent and the common good 
alike. As of the latter Mouffe suggests that this “good which defines a political 
association as such”579   should derived from equality  and freedom as the central 
normative assertions of modern revolutionary politics.580 The postmodern agent, 
on the other side, needs to be conceived of as a de-centered and de-totalized 
agent whose subject-position is constituted by a multiplicity of hegemonic 
struggles.581  The universitas-societas-nexus serves as the eventual point of 
convergence between both principles, and provides an outlet in which 
heterogenous notions of freedom, namely liberal individualism  on the one side 
and radical democratic citizenship on the other, can be exercised co-
constitutively.582
 It is not my intention to suggest that classical anarchism  is equally capable 
of performing a sophisticated co-articulation of liberal and republican freedoms 
in the same way the much more recent agonistic branch of political thought is 
able to. In fact, certain branches of anarchist thought, i.e. Kropotkin’s biological 
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opposition to the agonistic project. Yet it is indisputable that a congeniality 
between agonism  and anarchism exists, and that a fair amount of prominent 19th 
century anarchists did indeed embarked on a quest identical to the agonistic one. 
Proudhon and Bakunin addressed similar problems by means of raising questions 
in regards to socio-political assemblages that would permit for the parallel 
articulation of individuality and communality in a mutually constitutive, non-
hierarchical way.
 For Proudhon it is an inherent social individualism  that constitutes the basic 
ontological framework of a mutualist society. This account puts a strong 
emphasis on the autonomy of socio-political agents and identifies the individual 
as originator and ward of society.584  Proudhon’s agonistic side is most certainly 
no fully developed, and on occasion he even demonstrates strong liberal 
tendencies. The General Idea of Revolution in the Nineteenth  Century, for example, 
advocates for a society that is governed by a market-logic, and in which 
governance, government, and public law ought to be replaced with contracts, 
negotiated individually between subjects.585  Despite the admittedly strong focus 
on the realization of subjective freedoms Proudhon is by no means a 
methodological individualist. Quite on the contrary he demonstrates a critical 
awareness that both, liberal and republican liberties must coincide, rather than 
combat each other. The fact that his social-individualist ontology unfolds in 
concentric circles demonstrates his attempt to reconcile republican virtue with 
liberal autonomy: justice does not derive from a distant and abstract principle 
such as god or reason, but is rather constituted by the conflation of subjective 
notions of morality. Individuals do not exist in isolation or solitude but are deeply 
rooted in various social context such as families, workshops, economic classes, 
nations, states, etc. - the second circle. The third layer comprises of the norms 
and institutions which have been developed within a specific social setting. These 
practices feed back towards the individual and shape the moral instinct of the 
person - a process that can be beneficial, but equally derogatory to the 
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development of  moral instincts.586
 Bakunin, significantly more collectivist that Proudhon, focuses 
predominantly on the emancipatory potential of communities and associations.587 
In Marxism, Freedom, and the State he remarks that even strong and intelligent 
individuals cannot escape the attractions of solidarity588 and that collectives must 
realize “the liberty which consists in the full development of all the material, 
intellectual and moral powers which are to be found as faculties latent in 
everybody, the liberty which recognized no other restrictions that those which are 
traced for us by the laws of our own nature”.589  In a complementary way the 
Revolutionary  Catechism defines ‘justice as equality’590  and freedom as the “absolute 
rejection of every authority including that which scarifies freedom  for the 
convenience of the state”.591 The tension that emerges between the necessity of 
communal life on the one side, and the invoked notion of freedom and justice on 
the other, demonstrates the latent agonism inherent in Bakunin’s philosophy: 
despite the fact that groupism  is a constitutive element of political life it cannot 
be mobilized as an excuse to subordinate the individual to an abstract notion of 
the common good. Vice versa individual agents have every right to claim 
extensive individual liberties, but only if certain ethico-political principles (c.f. 
justice and equality) are maintained. This critical awareness that humans are not 
only “the most individualistic being[s] on earth”592 but also “the most social”593 
ones does not automatically turn Bakunin into a proto-agonist, yet again, it 
demonstrates a resemblance between agonism and certain strands of  anarchism.
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3.2 The critique of  rationalism and liberal neutrality
 A second fundamental concern of the agonistic project is the 
reconceptualization of democracy beyond the prevalent accumulative and 
deliberative models. Mouffe’s primary concern in that regard is the striking 
absence of a genuine political moment, and a low susceptibility towards 
antagonistic group-relations in both models of democracy. While accumulative 
models collapse too easily into narratives of a universal economic rationality, 
deliberative democracy clings to a notion of a supposedly equally rational and 
universal ethicality.594  Despite this rejection of mainstream liberal democracy 
Mouffe cannot be labeled an anti-liberal. What motivates her criticism  is an 
attempt to refine the liberal project’s susceptibility towards the importance of 
group-based identities, and to push the tradition beyond narrow notions of 
modern rationalism and presumed universality.595
 Similar traits of skepticism against liberal claims of rationality and 
presumed universality are echoed in certain quarters of the anarchist tradition. 
What unites Bakunin and Proudhon is a shared hesitance to buy into clichés of 
rationality and universality. Bakunin’s collectivist approach highlights the context-
specificity of political, social, and ethical knowledge: agents are embedded in a 
community of practice which fosters the development of their latent faculties 
and enables individuals to access the material world that surrounds them  through 
various signifiers and layers of meaning. This imperative of community-centrism 
is made explicit in The Paris Commune and the Idea of  the State, where Bakunin 
postulates that humans positioning themselves outside society cannot be 
considered free, since humanization and emancipation will only take place within 
the specific setting of a societal context.596  In that regard Bakunin opts for a 
rather Hegelian interpretation of reason  in which transcendence and far-reaching 
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claims of universality have very little buy. The answer to the question of what 
constitutes the good life or the ideal community is given by means of referring to 
the “actuality of the ethical ideals”597 and not to supposedly rational and universal 
claims of  what is either good or right.
 Politics, for Proudhon, is fundamentally unconcerned with questions of 
rationality and universality, or, in that regard, with any attempt of navigating 
towards an original position or an argument that nobody could reasonably object. 
Proudhon’s anarchism emphasizes in a very agonistic fashion the ever-present 
possibility of conflict and tension that is immanent to human affairs. Politics is 
the realm of ongoing struggles between a vast number of antinomic positions of 
which the tension between authority and liberty is the most fundamental one.598 
This tension, which prescribes the essence of political life and defines the 
ontology of society’s vast antipodal fabric, can be managed and balanced, yet it 
evades its ultimate resolution in the form  of a synthesis or a liberal original 
position.599 Practical reason does then not consist of the encirclement of neutral 
realms, rational discourse, or universal truths but can rather be found in the 
attempt to maintain a certain balance between opposing, antagonistic, or even 
hostile principles and poles: “For Proudhon the exercise of practical reason 
involves finding a temporary balance of the two terms in ideas and practice, a 
balance that will be relative to time and place. Thus right and duty are correlative, 
commutative terms and their temporary balance is an immanent justice”.600 In an 
almost agonistic sense Proudhon approximates the principle of hegemony. 
Political enterprises are not characterized by their attempt to realize presumably 
universal claims about absolute truths, since perceptions of ‘truth’ and 
‘rationality’ are in themselves discursive products that change their appearance, 
depending on the hegemonic configuration from which they ultimately spring. 
The struggle over hegemony, and the temporary establishment of hegemonic 
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practices which preclude any final word on the notion of the good life, is a 
defining criterion for agonism and anarchism alike.
3.3 The constitutive function of  power
 Deriving from  the Schmittian notion that politics is essentially based on 
us-them-divisions and patterns of exclusions, a nexus between power, hegemony, 
and legitimacy emerges. While deliberative democrats often perceive of power-
relations as a threat to democratic authenticity, agonism  defines them as being 
constitutive of social relations.601  Struggles over hegemony between clashing 
centers of power create an ever changing political environment in which stability, 
or a permanent balancing of forces remains unattainable.602  A condition labeled 
as the “coming to terms with the lack of final ground and the undecidability that 
pervades every order”.603  Hegemonic struggles serve as structuring mechanisms 
for the establishment of temporary orders in an essentially foundationless social 
setting: “Every order is the temporary and precarious articulation of contingent 
practices. Things could always have been otherwise and every order is predicated 
on the exclusion of other possibilities. It is always the expression of a particular 
configuration of power relations”.604  At this point the connection between 
objectivity, legitimacy, and relations of power becomes apparent: identities and 
interests are neither formed in a vacuum, nor are they defined in an a priori like 
fashion prior to an agent’s appearance on the political scene. Instead they are 
configured, molded, and conditioned by criss-crossing, overlapping, and 
competing power-relations.605  Legitimacy on the other hand can simply be 
defined as successful, and socially accepted power.606 Due to power’s constitutive 
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role it needs to be understood as central, not alien, to political and democratic 
processes.607
 Mouffe’s emphasis on the centrifugal, potentially excluding, and 
decisionist components of power fits squarely into the anarchist tradition, yet her 
insistence on its ontological significance reveals once again certain overlaps with 
Proudhon’s political theory. In the Little Political Catechism Proudhon formulates a 
theory of relational power and explains how force is constitutive of, and 
immanent to, the socio-political realm. His answer to the question “what 
constitutes the reality of social power?” is short and rather straight forward: “The 
collective force”.608 He proceeds further and gives a more detailed definition of 
the quality of collective force: ”Any  being, and by  that I mean only what exists, what is 
reality, not a phantom, a pure idea, possesses in itself, to whatever degree, the 
faculty or property, as soon as it  finds itself  in the presence of  other beings, of beings able 
to attract and be attracted, to repulse and be repulsed, to move, to act, to think, to 
PRODUCE [sic!], at the very least to resist, by its inertia, influences from  the 
outside. The faculty of property, one calls force”.609 This short paragraph makes 
two important statements about the ontological significance of power in relation 
to politics: first and foremost, force cannot be found in the realm  of 
transcendence. Proudhon stresses power’s actuality, which is closely tied to the 
physical presence of a force-wielding agent. The material existence of “what is 
reality”, and the possibility to generate power/force, are hence inseparable 
intertwined. The second insight concerns the strict relationality of force: the 
force produced by social agents manifests itself ‘as soon as it finds itself in the 
presence of other beings’. Social, political, and economic activities make it then 
possible to comprehend and experience power - power does not speak for itself, 
but has to be made up through human interactions. Consequently it can only be 
understood adequately in the context and by virtue of the presence of other 
forces. A political world devoid of power-relations would then be impossible to 
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comprehend. The existence of power-relations, its strict relationality, and its 
inherently constituent capacity define the nature of politics. The presence of 
force has nothing to do with the absence of democratic authenticity, but is rather 
the precondition for possessing agentic capacities.
4. Agonistic international politics
 After having outlined the fundamental overlaps between anarchism and 
agonism the chapter will commence with an institutional moral assessment of 
agnostic spatiality. Analogous to the discussion of institutions and responsibility 
in section two it is asked what specific type of ethos is conveyed by agonism’s 
ordering principle (and normative vision) of  the pluriverse.
4.1 Transnational order in the pluriverse
 In response to the task of institutionalizing an agonistic regime of global 
reach Mouffe mobilizes again a Schmittian concept: the so called pluriverse.610 The 
pluriverse is a reaction to the increasingly forceful dynamics of neoliberal 
globalization and their potentially homogenizing, mainly market-driven 
approaches to politics. Such neoliberal one-size-fits-all solutions serve as potential 
incubators for essentialist forms of identification (i.e. nationalism or religious 
extremism), whereas regime-pluralism  is supposed to prevent the emergence of 
such fundamentalisms: in order to “create channels for the legitimate expression 
of dissent, we need to envisage a pluralistic  world order constructed around a 
certain number of  great spaces and genuine cultural poles”.611 
 As as problem-solving mechanism the pluriverse has the purpose to 
institutionalize dissent, and to make sure that ‘globalization from above’ remains 
both challengeable and negotiable.612  Within this framework political power is 
distributed among large, regional units, that are grouped around diverging cultural 
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practices.613 Settling for a more universal ordering principle, i.e. that of a global 
cosmopolitan regime, is rejected by Mouffe since it would assert liberalism’s 
superiority over competing modes of  social organization.614
 While a centralized ordering force is absent from  the pluriverse, a 
normative consensus based on the ethico-political principles of democracy  and 
human rights is supposed to govern the relationship between cultural blocs. These 
principles serve as the smallest common denominator between political 
communities, and can be interpreted in a variety of ways.615  Democracy, for 
example, may be practiced in either representative or direct-democratic ways.616 
Human rights could either lay their focus on individual autonomy or collective 
self-determination respectively.617 Questions concerning the nature of the ‘good 
life’ can then be addressed in multiple ways - yet: a set of minimal, non-negotiable 
ethico-political principles remains, and serves as the yardstick for measuring the 
amount of freedom a political community is capable of providing. Only a 
community able to secure a person’s dignity can count as ‘free’: “a political form 
of society would need to be informed by a set of values whose role in that regime 
corresponds to that played in liberal democracy by the notion of human 
rights”.618  What the pluriverse seeks to offer is the co-existence of functional 
equivalents, namely culturally specific answers to the question how democracy and 
human rights are supposed to be practiced.619
4.2 Scrutinizing agonistic spatiality: reproducing the ‘territorial trap’
 What Mouffe proposes for the international realm is a form  of 
civilizational or cultural multipolarity that advances a model of hegemony and 
power organized around cultural attributes. This type of multipolarity is grouped 
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“around a certain number of great spaces and genuine cultural poles”620  and 
strives for a pluralist order in which large regional units, which are characterized 
by their internal struggles over hegemony, coexist.621  Organizing the dealings 
between hegemonically defined political communities in this particular way is 
supposed to prevent what Schmitt has labeled an “international civil war”.622 The 
“universalist approach exacerbates (...) antagonism”, while the “multipolar world 
order will not eliminate conflict, but the conflict in question will be less likely to 
take antagonistic forms”.623 Arriving at a fragile equilibrium, preferably managed 
and policed by a super-power-like agent, is the clear aim  of this particular 
configuration.
 The order imagined is, however, far from novel or innovative and mimics 
instead the current Westphalian principle. What changes is the applied 
geopolitical perspective and the mode of spatiality: in Mouffe’s reading 
international political space would no longer be defined alongside the lines of 
Westphalian sovereignty, but rather according to cultural signifiers and hegemonic 
practices. One of the novelties one will encounter is that the environment is not a 
purely statist one anymore. Instead of disappearing completely states get 
absorbed into hegemonic blocs, whose character is in turn defined by cultural 
commonalties and a shared center of successful power. The spatial vision for the 
global political plane that is articulated under the heading of agonistic pluralism is 
very similar to the project exposed by the classical realist school of thought. Even 
the justifications for the respective pluralistic geopolitical visions overlap 
significantly. To reiterate: Mouffe argues that universal visions of liberal morality 
have no place in global political affairs. Any attempt to overwrite plurality with 
uniformity is dangerous and destined to fail “since the unification of the world 
under a single system can only suscitate violent reactions”.624  As demonstrated 
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extensively in the previous section the reason for this potentially violent reactions 
is “the lack of ‘agonistic channels’ for the expression of grievances”, which 
“tends to create the conditions for the emergence of antagonisms” that can take 
“extreme forms and have disastrous consequences”.625 
 A similar line of reasoning can be encountered in Morgenthau’s Six 
Principles of  Political Realism. The angle through which international affairs is 
approached is admittedly a very different one: Morgenthau is more concerned 
with foreign policy than with transnational democratic practices. Yet, the logic 
that justifies the primacy of politics over ethics mirrors Mouffe’s argument. 
Morgenthau claims that “universal moral principles cannot be applied to the 
actions of states in their abstract universal formulation but that they must be 
filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place.”626 Other than the 
individual the state “has not right to let its moral disapprobation of the 
infringement of liberty get in the way of successful political action”.627  This 
implied primacy of situational politics over universal moral considerations has 
two purposes, of which the first one comprises of the maintenance of the 
national interest, which is defined as securing the state’s survival by means of 
amassing power. The second, and in the context of this chapter more important 
one, is the stabilization of the multilateral system and the prevention of an 
imperialist crusader-mentality, driven by convictions of moral superiority: “All 
nations are tempted (...) to clothe their own particular aspirations and actions in 
the moral purpose of the universe”.628  A prudent foreign policy refrains from 
deriving its directives from the realm  of morality: ethics and the pursuit of 
supposedly universal moral objectives are misplaced when inserted into an 
international political context. Political action in the international realm is defined 
by its pursuit for power. A limitation to this very specific objective is not only the 
precondition for the security of the individual state, but also serves as a 
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safeguard-mechanism that prevents the international from being thrown off its 
inherent balance: “On the other hand it is exactly the concept of interest defined 
in terms of power that saves us from  the moral excess and that political folly”. And 
further: “For if we look at all nations, our own included, as political entities 
pursuing their respective interests defined in terms of power, we are able to do 
justice to all of  them”.629 
 Despite the fact that Mouffe and Morgenthau are concerned with the 
construction of very different political projects they justify their respective spatial 
visions by rather similar lines of reasoning and arrive at comparable ends. 
Plurality is a form of justice, and the spatiality of the global political sphere needs 
to be a fragmented one, since only this configuration is able to channel the 
inherently conflict-laden nature of politics and helps to prevent the emergence of 
large scale international conflicts. Claims of universality that are made on 
supposedly moral grounds are counterproductive to this endeavor. Morgenthau’s 
multilateral system is then populated by power-maximizing states that try to 
realize their respective national interest. Morality is not supposed to creep into the 
foreign policy register of states, since this might lead to imperial aspirations and a 
severe disturbance of the system’s balance. In Mouffe’s pluriverse states are 
superseded by large regional blocs, defined by cultural affiliations and similarities. 
This specific form  of multipolarity is supposed to constitute “an alternative to 
American unilateralism”630 which poses the danger of cultural imperialism in the 
guise of a forceful universalization of liberal values. In order to create room for 
counter-hegemonic projects frontiers need to be multiplied so that potentially 
antagonistic encounters are turned into agonistic ones.631
 A specific problem that emerges in this context is not the construction of 
counter hegemonic projects per se, but rather their spatial appearance. Agonism 
claims to radicalize democracy by means of pluralizing hegemonic struggles.632 
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Yet, in order to realize this plurality of agonistic encounters on the domestic level 
an inherently conservative international political spatiality is proposed. Mouffe, 
driven by her justified rejection of cosmopolitan universalism, drifts towards the 
other extreme of the political spectrum and advocates a communitarian-style 
international system that is organized around cultural signifiers and locks 
democratic practices away behind large, regional hegemonic centers. This project 
appears rather familiar and resembles Huntington’s vision for the post-Cold-War 
era in which political cleavages run alongside cultural lines.
 The inherent conservativeness of the pluriverse reproduces what Agnew 
has termed the territorial trap. Agnew points out that this trap comprises of three 
elements, that is first  the complete overlap between territorial space and sovereign 
space, second the emergence of strong binary divisions in the form of a domestic/
foreign or national/international polarities, and third a hegemonic image of the 
state which serves as a container for society.633  Agonism  does of course not 
reproduce the ‘territorial trap’ literary since it is not primarily concerned with 
territorial notions of space. Yet is still favors a certain spatial image of 
international politics which represents non-territorial or structural space.634  This 
structural space exists by virtue of power-relations, struggles over hegemony, and 
shared cultural principles within the large regional units that constitute the 
pluriverse.635  A trap in the form of spatial fixity and exclusivity is indeed 
reproduced, although the adjective territorial is certainly misplaced - spatial trap 
might be more suitable in that regard.
 How does the territorial/spatial trap then resonate in agonism’s international 
political project? In terms of the first claim - the identity of sovereignty and 
spatiality - Agnew diagnoses a number of effects on the formation of agency in 
the international realm: (1) identities are viewed exclusively in state-territorial 
terms;636 (2) this separation leads to a universality/inferiority polarity that matches 
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other binaries such domestic/foreign, inside/outside, or politics/force;637 (3) the 
historically contingent practice of statism  is naturalized and viewed as being the 
only viable form of political organization.638  Despite the fact that agonism 
exposes a non-territorial and post-statist outlook on international affairs it 
reproduces all of these effects. An agent’s identity within the pluriverse is 
characterized by a high degree of exclusivity due to the fact that it is produced 
and confined within hegemonic blocs. Struggles over hegemonic interpretations 
carry on within these respective blocs, yet, in opposition to other large regional 
units identity is always narrated in the form of one type of successful power. The 
pluriverse hence leads to a form of representational hegemony in which individual 
agents are perceived of as if  they belong to a relatively closed political community. 
Although the fault-lines do not necessarily run between notions of universality vs. 
inferiority politics can be practiced only within  given hegemonic spaces not  across 
them. An inside/outside polarity emerges and Mouffe herself is tempted to 
proclaim “the conditions are very different in the domestic and the international 
domains”.639 Agonism is ill-equipped to theorize the emergence of transnational 
political practices capable of transcending these hermetic notions of space. This 
is due to the (alleged) fact that the “kind of ‘conflictual consensus’ based on 
divergent interpretations of shared ethico-political principles that is necessary for 
the implementation of an agonistic model of liberal democracy cannot be 
expected at the global level”.640  Politics across autonomous regional blocs can 
only be practiced on the basis of an equilibrium of forces which institutionalize 
in a new system of international law.641  Yet it can never be materialized as an 
agonistic encounter between individual agents and or groups that don’t define the 
hegemonic identity of the bloc at a given moment. In the same way the state is 
exaggerated by classical/territorial geopolitics the agonistic pluriverse fetishizes 
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alternative since it is the only body capable of providing security for its 
inhabitants. Similarly the pluriverse is the only form  of organization capable of 
performing a Hegung  des Krieges (containment of war)642, since it prevents the 
uncontrolled multiplication of hegemonic struggles, and confines them within 
“several big regional units with their different cultures and values”.643 Historically 
contingent cultural practices are naturalized, and the pluriverse, which fosters a 
coexistence of political blocs, is the only viable regime for organizing the contact 
points between them: the pluriverse is “unavoidable”644 in the same way the state 
is. The conceptual authority of ‘the struggle over hegemony’ is blind to the fact 
that plenty of socio-political association are not necessarily interested in attaining 
hegemony in the first place. This fixation impoverishes politics, since it reduces its 
essence to one very specific type of strive. A politics of ‘the everyday’, which has 
important structural and productive effects on the production of geopolitical 
outcomes is neglected, since agonism aims loses sight of processes situated on 
lower, i.e. local levels.
 In terms of his second claim, that is the emergence of strong binary 
divisions such as domestic/foreign or national/international, Agnew stresses that 
this divisions are purely conceptual and do not necessarily match corresponding 
empirical realities. The ‘domestic’ has never been completely separated from  the 
‘foreign’, and the ‘national’ has always interacted with the ‘international’. 
Mobilizing binaries in order to allude to the distinctiveness of socio-political 
realms is misleading since is suggests the existence of a closure that has never 
really existed. Agnew suggests instead that the “domestic/foreign opposition 
constitutes a shifting interaction rather than a fixed polarity”.645  Moving back to 
agonism’s international political project it becomes apparent that the pluriverse is 
incapable of articulating these shifting interactions. International politics is not 
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perceived of as taking place on a spectrum whose respective ends are constituted 
by relative closure and relative openness. Mouffe rather opts for a fixed polarity 
that emerges by virtue of the existence of multiple cultural spaces. In following 
Derrida agonism  perceives political identities as negative identities. Negative, in 
this context, refers to the fact that they can only come into existence after the 
demarcation from a constitutive outside. According to Derrida the creation of an 
identity implies the establishment of difference, which is often done on the basis 
of a hierarchy. Every identity is then relational and based upon an affirmation of 
difference as the precondition for its existence.646  The language invoked by 
Mouffe - the vocabulary of hegemonic poles, great regional spaces, genuine 
cultural blocs647 - bolsters this claim and reinforces the narrative of closure and 
distinctiveness. The various shades and hues of social life, the chasms of politics, 
are only visible within the confinements of the a cultural bloc. Only there subject-
positions can be formed through nodal points that represent the various 
hegemonic clashes within the demos. These practices do not transpire into the 
pluriverse, the realm  of necessity, which is concerned with a Hegung des Krieges, not 
with the formation of identities. In the pluriverse identities are always already 
established. The pluriverse arranges contact points, but it does not define their 
appearance. Consequently the ‘domestic’ is very distinct from  the ‘foreign’, and 
the ‘national’ hardly communicates with the ‘international’ other than through 
hegemonic cultural representations.
 Agnew’s last point refers to the subordination of society to the state, or, in 
the case of agonism, to emerging centers of cultural hegemony which 
homogenize internal diversity. Mouffe remarks that a hegemonic bloc is 
characterized by its ability to successfully legitimize a specific form of social 
power. The power-legitimacy nexus is not problematic per se and is also invoked 
by a number of anarchists, most notably P.J. Proudhon. Problems start to surface 
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when successful power is projected as a unitary representation of cultural identity 
by one hegemonic sphere onto another. The representation of hegemony towards 
other regional blocs fails to reflect the plurality of agonistic struggles within the 
‘domestic’ sphere. Within this sphere “adversaries fight each other because the 
want their interpretation to become hegemonic”648, yet, this struggle within the 
bloc is not necessarily visible for outsiders. The representation towards other 
actors in the pluriverse, the outside, does not reflect the plurality of agonistic 
encounters on the inside. A regional bloc is a hegemonic force and can hence 
only represent a single type of successful social power. The pluriverse exposes 
traits of methodological nationalism, since it traps society within the structural 
confinements of cultural space. Mouffe claims to delineate the conditions for a 
radical democratic project in which identities are formed through nodal points 
and a multiplicity of subject-positions shaped by a democratic matrix.649  She 
argues explicitly against the Enlightenment ideal of an undifferentiated human 
nature650, and yet sanctions at the very same time the potentially homogenizing 
framework of the pluriverse, which represents the content of a regional bloc as if 
it were unitary and homogenous. In the same way the state has been perceived of 
as an enabler of society and as the creator of individual rights,651  hegemonic 
cultural centers generate agency in the pluriverse and allow domestic agonism to 
flow smoothly. Agnew notes that “prior to modern times society was rarely state 
defined. But in the 20th century ‘states are central to understanding of what a 
society is’”.652 This statement applies to agonism as well, since hegemonic blocs 
are instrumental for its understanding of a society’s identity. To paraphrase 
Agnew: hegemonic blocs serve as the ‘containers of  society’.653
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 Analyzing agonistic spatiality through the narrative of the territorial trap 
has shown that Mouffe reproduces a decidedly modern pattern of political 
spatiality. The discussion has already problematize the prevalence of inside/
outside and order/anarchy patterns, which give rise to an ethics of distance, or, as 
Odysseos has put it, an ethos of survival. Walker notes that “within the horizons 
constructed through this resolution, the search for a middle ground, for an ethical 
foundation for the society of states, must be perpetual wandering on a road that 
is closed at both ends”.654  Despite the fact that the agonistic project is not 
particularly interested in the relations between Westphalian spaces it still emulates 
this modern restlessness that is caught between particularity and universality. 
Mouffe’s agonism departs from a critique against the homogenizing forces of 
globalization, and responds to the liberal-universalist challenge with a pluralistic 
counter-project, which attempts to institutionally entrench the irreconcilability of 
diverging forms of life. Yet, instead of embracing the ensuing pluralism, it is 
swiftly curtailed and forced back into the spatial confinements of the agonistic 
pluriverse - a pluriverse which reproduces modern inside/outside patterns as it 
attempts to harmonize universality with particularity. Despite its supposedly 
radical underpinning the pluriverse simply mirrors contemporary international 
relations655  and suggests that what is going on within a hegemonic bloc (various 
struggles over hegemony) is fundamentally different from the relations between 
these blocs (a conflictual consensus). An ontology of danger and an ethos of 
survival prevail, while the ‘other’ continues to be perceived as a danger the needs 
to be kept at bay, mainly by means of mobilizing the spatial demarcations of the 
pluriverse. Responsibility exists only towards agents that reside on the ‘inside’ of a 
hegemonic bloc - towards the ‘outside’ responsibility is reduced to the obligation 
of  maintaining distance, and to accept the incompatibility of  diverging lifestyles.
 Does this analysis then suggest that agonism is inevitably lost in an ethos 
of survival which denies responsibility towards the ‘other’ across hegemonic 
blocs? Or is it possible to retain certain agonistic core tenants while 
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circumnavigating some of the aforementioned dilemmas? In order to tackle this 
question it is necessary to have a brief look into the origins of the agonistic 
pluriverse.
4.3 Forget Schmitt: the dilemma of  sovereignty
 Mouffe’s pluriverse is actually a Schmittian concept and can only be 
understood properly if read in the context of ‘the political’. Schmitt was mainly 
focused on the vertical dimensions of the political process and emphasized 
properties such as necessity, rule, and authority.656 While the republican tradition 
of political thought highlights the potentially integrative function of antagonism, 
realists tent to conceive of conflict as a centrifugal force that leads towards 
exclusionary and hierarchical relations between agents.657  Politics is concerned 
with collective forms of identification, and the inevitable emergence of us/them 
patterns or friend/enemy dichotomies: “The political, as he [ed.: Schmitt] puts it, 
can be understood only in the context of the friend/enemy grouping, regardless 
of the aspects which this possibility implies for morality, aesthetics and 
economics”.658 Politics is then the realm of decisions: of picking sides, concepts, 
enemies, and ideologies - every consensus that is achieved within a specific in-
group (‘us’) is necessarily based on the exclusion of an out-group (‘them’). If viewed 
in this narrative exclusion does not count as inherently undesirable but represents 
an entirely normal outcome of  the political process. 
 Schmitt presents himself as a severe critic of liberal bourgeois attempts 
to make politics safe and to administer and regulate agency by means of 
bureaucratizing vast portions of social life.659  In its most essential terms his 
take on sovereignty and politics needs to be perceived of as an affirmation of 
constituent power which reveals itself, according to Schmitt, in the possibility 
of combat, the prospect and the finality of death660, the maintenance of a 
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certain way of life661, and, last but not least, the demarcation of the collective 
us from the collective them. Schmitt’s main concern is to salvage the 
meaningfulness of life through the preservation of collective forms of 
identification and the ever-presence of conflict and antagonism. A world that 
lacks these essential binaries, i.e. the friend-enemy distinction, is a world 
without politics and one that has lost any meaningful antithesis.662  The 
mechanism invoked to produce this antithesis, which is always polemical and 
acts as the most essential type of demarcation, is ‘the political’. Social life is 
essentially underpinned by sets of various binaries, for example profitability 
(economics), beauty (aesthetics), and goodness (ethics).663  Politics, however, 
which encompasses the political, is special to the extent that it produces the 
most basic and essential antipode in the form of collective enmity: “The 
specific distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is 
that between friend and enemy”.664  Schmitt’s take on decisionism  has strong 
normative implications, and is not only a mere formality that separates a 
random in-group from  another random out-group. The decision is a form  of 
sovereignty and defines its own ethical fundament. It does so by means of 
articulating - with great clarity - how the good life, our good life, is supposed to 
appear in opposition to competing models of community, of their good life. 
The political emphasizes responsibility in the guise of demarcating and 
defending one’s own lifeworld against its possible negation by intruders. It 
hence positions itself clearly against bourgeois ambiguity, liberal individualism, 
and their inherent skepticism towards collective forms of  identification.
 One of the core elements of the decision is its inherently independent 
and legitimately sovereign character. The decision’s substance, the condition 
that defines the friend-enemy-criterion in the first place, “can neither be 






disinterested and therefore neutral third party”.665 The decision on the political 
is non-generic and genuinely unbound by prior notions of legality, goodness, 
or profitability.666  Sovereignty is a creative void that creates context and 
withdraws from it at the very same time. 
 It is exactly this conflation of sovereignty and decisionism  that needs 
to be problematized if one wishes to delineate an image of the international 
beyond the hegemonic constraints of the pluriverse. Schmitt’s attempt to 
salvage sovereign creativity (constituent power) from  the crippling 
repetitiveness of law (constituted power) is indeed convincing. Possessing the 
ability to act in opposition to constituted power counts as a genuinely 
sovereign move and demonstrates the superiority of constituent power over 
constituted power. Yet, Schmitt’s conclusion, according to which the 
generative forces of constituent power are best affirmed through the sovereign 
act of the decision - enshrined in the figure of the state -, does not follow. 
Sovereignty understood as the realization of constituent power can be 
conceived devoid of a decisionist moment. Consequently the international can 
appear as a post-statist space which abandons the spatial notion of the 
pluriverse.
 The moment of the decision is indeed the solution to a very specific 
dilemma that emerges for Schmitt in the context of sovereignty. The ability to 
act in an unbound, hence sovereign way trumps the dull repetitiveness of law 
and bureaucracy and affirms the generative potential of constituent power. 
Despite the fact that Schmitt champions certain unruly and archaic elements 
of life he is not willing to let them unfold freely and uncontrolled. Sovereignty 
and constituent power must define the essence of politics, and, at the same 
time, they need to be domesticated. Neither by law or bureaucracy of course, 
but by other means: the decision. The decision tames exactly the forces Schmitt 
freed in the first place, and it is his way out of a pit he dug himself into. The 
decision is dualistic in the way that it affirms and monopolizes constituent power 
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synchronously. Schmitt’s emphasize on the fact that the decision cannot be 
multiplied, and that only the sovereign has the right to decide, is really an 
artifice, a maneuver, a diversion that allows him  to play out legalists against 
democrats. Against the legalists Schmitt fields constituent power. This is 
dangerous, however, since constituent power could also be wielded by a 
multitude. Invoking the political, and declaring at the same time that the 
decision cannot be multiplied but must reside with a centralized agent667, is his 
eventual turn against the democrats. Schmitt is indeed very conscious in terms 
of not letting constituent power, the force exalted by genuine sovereignty, 
remain unattended. Instead he attempts to shape and sculpt it, and then 
assigns it to the state: the sovereign decision, the ability to invoke constituent 
power for the purpose of deciding on the friend-enemy distinction, is the 
prerogative of  the state.668
 The dilemma of  sovereignty  (accentuating and hedging constituent power 
at the very same time) reveals that sovereignty (as a creative act) and authority 
(as the decision on the friend-enemy-divide) are really two separate elements 
and exist parallel in the sphere of politics - both elements can be combined, 
but do not have to. 
 Schmitt’s take on the political arena is that of authority in which 
decisions are singular, absolute, final.669 However, as demonstrated previously 
the infusion of politics and sovereignty with authority is optional, and not 
predetermined. The general conflation of politics with centralized decision-
making is indeed a deliberate and purely instrumental choice, and it attempts 
to strategically position the state as the only legitimate wielder of sovereign 
capacity. If Schmitt really wanted to preserve constituent power he could have 
done so by means of emphasizing the productive potential of a democratic 
multitude. But this would be entirely diametral to his anti-democratic and pro-
statist agenda, which is inherently-problem solving, and deals first and 
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foremost with the question of legitimacy: how to legitimize the state’s supposed 
(not actual!) status as the sovereign. As shown above sovereignty as the 
affirmation of constituent power (“Sovereign is he who decides on the 
exception”670) can perfectly well exist outside of a decisionist context (see also 
ch. VII on anarchist sovereignty). When Schmitt invokes authority and 
decisionism, and pitches both as being identical with sovereignty, he is not 
stating a fact but comes instead forward with a proposition: sovereignty ought 
to the perceived as if  its essence is limited to the moment of deciding on the 
political. Emphasizing authority and decisionism as the bedrock of politics is 
instrumental in the struggle over sovereignty, mainly because the state is primarily 
defined by its ability to demarcate. As Schmitt notes himself: the high points of 
politics are “those moments in which the enemy is, in concrete clarity, 
recognized as the enemy”.671  This statement is exceptionally well phrased 
because it presents the state as if  it were the sovereign by default, which is 
clearly not the case. The dilemma of  sovereignty  (again: accentuating and hedging 
constituent power synchronously) can be solved in at least two ways: one is 
statist, the other democratic. The specifically statist response is the 
mobilization of authority and decisionsim, which serve as tools for 
performing the given task. What the statement then really celebrates is the 
state’s ability to solve the dilemma of sovereignty by means of demarcating 
friend and enemy. 
 Schmitt’s strong emphasis on demarcation is not a voluntary choice, 
but imposes itself as a necessity deriving from his fixation on the state. A state 
can only act as sovereign if it demarcates - it’s essence is indeed singularly 
defined by this very ability to tell the domestic from the foreign. The insistence 
on the fact that the decision cannot be pluralized672  is then completely 
accurate, since it is one specifically statist way of embracing constituent power. 
Decisionism  and demarcation does then not define the essence of sovereignty, 
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but rather the nature of the state. In this context the claim that “the state 
presupposes the concept of the political”673  is again unveiled as a deception, 
since it suggests the existence of ‘the political’ prior to the state’s eclipse, and 
in the form of a meta-determinism defined by the nature of the political 
sphere. The political does indeed not precede the state, but is rather its co-
constitutive feature. Both, the political and the state, are binaries: the decision 
divides into friends and enemies, the state separates the inside and the outside. 
As already demonstrated, decisions are specifically statists affirmations of 
sovereignty and constituent power. The state does not  presuppose the concept 
of the political, the state is the political which exists as a specifically statist 
response to the dilemma of sovereignty. Schmitt’s initial claim, according to 
which a world that lacks the friend-enemy-distinction is a world without a 
meaningful antithesis674, suddenly appears in a different light. The supposedly 
substantial divide is neither integral to the articulation of a constituent 
moment, nor relevant for the exercise of sovereign force. If the 
meaningfulness of life would really be the criterion it could assert itself in 
various other, i.e. democratic, ways. Only the state would indeed suffer from 
this loss of a meaningful antithesis, since its very existence relies on the 
construction of  hermetic binaries.
5. Conclusion: the pluriverse and the omniverse
 In the wake of problematizing agonistic  spatiality  the assessment has 
revealed three important insights in regard to the pluriverse: 
 Firstly, it is questionable whether the pluriverse does indeed serve as 
Mouffe’s sought after, counter-hegemonic project that would be capable of 
containing the homogenizing influences of a single superpower by means of 
diffusing antagonism into agonism. As demonstrated, the pluriverse has 
initially been designed in order to organize the contact points between states. 




necessary for states to exist in the first place. The pluriverse does not diffuse 
antagonisms, it institutionalizes them.
 Secondly, and in reference to the ethical consequences, the foregoing 
analysis has also demonstrated that the agonistic account of spatiality gives rise 
to an ethics of distance and an ethos of survival. Agonism’s decidedly modern 
attempt to reconcile universality and particularity significantly limits the notion 
of responsibility towards the other, due to its division of the political plane 
alongside inside-outside-patterns. Deep ethical commitments are required only 
towards the inside. Towards the outside, and across hegemonic blocs, 
responsibility is reduced to the requirement of keeping ones distance, in an 
attempt to respect diverging forms of life (the aforementioned conflictual 
consensus).
 Thirdly, the supposed necessity to conceive of constituent politics and 
sovereign action as necessarily hegemonic strives has been questioned through 
an engagement with the Schmittian roots of the pluriverse. The sovereign is 
indeed he who decides upon the exception. Sovereignty is the life-affirming 
power “to make something from that which is not something” and can thus 
not be subject to laid-down laws or liberal claims of a supposed universality.675 
Yet, this momentum is not identical with the decision on ‘the political’, which 
is a predominantly statist reflex. If sovereignty is primarily characterized as an 
affirmation of constituent power, and if the friend-enemy-divide is only one 
highly specific way of performing this affirmation, the hermetic pluriverse is 
only one, highly state-specific, way of organizing the contact points between 
political communities. Being able to conceive of a sovereign and constituent 
movement outside the coercive corsets of either states or agonistic cultural 
blocs sheds light on political formations still capable of distinguishing between 
and inside and an outside, while refraining from  pushing this logic to the 
extreme end of the friend/enemy divide. The separation of sovereign/
constituent power from ‘the political’ (and the attached functions of 
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exceptionalism, decisionism and friend-enemy-dichotomies) reveals new 
perspectives in terms of imagining groupness outside of hegemonic practices 
as the singularly demarcating mechanisms.
 These three issues are of particular importance when reconsidering the 
spatial ordering of the political plane, and the ensuing implications for ethical 
commitments in global affairs (in particular responsibility towards fellow 
political agents). Agonism does not offer a spatial project for the international 
capable of moving beyond the ethically problematic pluriverse as its chief 
ordering principle. Anarchist philosophy, on the other side, has already 
demonstrated its ability of being conductive to certain agonistic core tenants 
(c.f. VIII-3) and possesses the additional capacity of circumnavigating the 
pluriverse’s shortcomings. What kind of geopolitical spaces (and eventually 
modes of responsibility towards the other) could a radical project of anarchist 
democracy envisage if it moved beyond a mode of agonistic spatiality whose 
ontological constitution rests fundamentally on the maintenance of friend/
enemy binaries?
 The point of departure for such a reformulation of political spatiality 
needs to start with the image of the pluriverse, this Schmittian invention later 
adopted by Mouffe for the purpose of keeping competing centers of hegemony 
(cultural blocs) apart. It has already been established earlier that the pluriverse is 
not only a mechanism  destined to control the circulation and the quality of 
conflict. The pluriverse also results from  the dilemma of  sovereignty, which entails 
the necessity to accentuate and hedge constituent power synchronously. Schmitt 
pitches the state as the preferred political entity to perform this task, which leads, 
in terms of institutional and spatial configurations, to an assemblage of 
Westphalian polities on an international political level: the statist pluriverse as the 
principal mode of organization is born. Mouffe’s motivation is quite similar and 
driven by comparable intentions, namely to protect political communities from 
liberalism’s homogenizing tendencies. The centrality of groupism and the 
inevitability of conflict between political subjects is taken as an ontological given, 
which leads to the a priori foreclosure of a rational or universal (read: liberal) 
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consensus. The pluriverse functions as a mechanism  to control the quality of 
conflicts and to prevent them from turning toxic. And it has, furthermore, the 
purpose of accentuating and hedging constituent power through the figure of the 
hegemonic bloc (Schmitt’s corresponding entity is the state). Constituent power 
can only be mobilized properly within these blocs - outside of them constituted 
power prevails. Agonism’s spatial project is hence designed as a divisive 
mechanism, destined to institutionalized a fragile truce among competing 
hegemonic centers. What becomes apparent immediately is the direct connection 
between attempts of salvaging constituent power, and the positioning of the 
ethically problematic pluriverse as a central ordering principle. There exists an 
evidently close relation between the ways in which constituent power is managed, 
and the emergence of differential political spaces - an insight already formulated 
in chapter II.
 While the state and the hegemonic bloc count as the respective Schmittian 
and agonistic responses to the dilemma of  sovereignty, it is the anarchist tradition of 
political thought which can offer an alternative answer to the question of how to 
accentuated and hedge constituent power synchronously: namely through the 
mobilization of natural groups and, more concretely, the deployment of porous 
sovereignties. The agentic figure of the porous sovereign affirms constituent power via 
acts of socio-political labour, while using natural groups as a temporary hedging 
vessel. Porous sovereignty hence affirms and contains constituent power, and it 
offers a specifically anarchist response to Schmitt’s dilemma. This response has 
also spatial implications, and provides an alternative to the pluriverse. 
 The pluriverse is, by definition, a space or a gathering of ‘many’ political 
communities. In contrast to a political universe, which revolves around a singular 
center, the pluriverse knows multiple centers, either in the form  of Westphalian 
polities or hegemonic blocs. Yet, the pluriverse of the agonistic guise also exposes 
some limiting qualities due to its narrow fixation on cultural spaces. This focus 
creates a strong and durable, allegedly necessary division of the political plane. 
And it institutionalizes us-them-divides along the lines of supposedly fixed, 
unalterable cultural practices. An anarchist approach to spatiality is instead 
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characterized by porosity. The principal collective agency is not the hermitically 
sealed cultural bloc, but rather an infinite set of permeable natural groups and 
porous sovereignties. The resulting spatial configuration is consequently that of 
an omniverse, which cannot be reduced to an assemblage of a few hegemonic 
centers. Such an omniverse acknowledges instead the diverging and non-
homogenous ways of mobilizing constituent power, and it exposes susceptibility 
towards the production of global political outcomes by heterogenous sets of 
actors that operate within, across, and between states or cultural blocs.
 1st  ethical implication: ‘groupism’ and ‘groupness’. An omniverse as the chief 
ordering principle for global politics supports the circumnavigation of groupism, 
which is inherent to Schmitt’s statism and Mouffe’s agonism. Both portray 
groupism not only as a necessity, but also as a virtue: by means of forming in- 
and out-groups political agents are actively involved in the construction of their 
collective identities, and in the affirmation of responsibility towards their 
communities. Binary identities create a “meaningful antithesis”676  without which 
communal life as such would lack any substance. Schmitt’s and Mouffe’s 
insistence on the virtues of grouped identities is in fact understandable, since it 
also affirms an agent’s desire for structural control: through the symbolic division 
of vast political spaces into ‘us’ and ‘them’ - i.e. by means of defining how ‘our’ 
way of life is supposed to look like, and how it is qualitatively different from 
‘their’ way of life - political subjects manage to generate themselves as mature 
agents, capable to make decisions and to endure their consequences. Groupism 
also circles back to the dilemma of sovereignty, since the demos constitutes itself 
by means of defining its own boundaries. Groupism is hence one possible form 
of accentuating and hedging constituent power. Problems emerge since groupism 
is also an essentialist approach to politics, one that portrays political communities 
as if  they were relatively closed, homogenous entities. A groupist social ontology 
denotes “the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally 
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homogenous and externally bounded groups as basic constituents of social life, 
chief protagonists of social conflicts, and fundamental units of social 
analysis”.677  While the pluriverse relies fundamentally on such groupist forms of 
spatialization, an omniverse provides a foil for the projection of collective identities 
in the form of groupness. Through the invocation of natural groups and porous 
sovereignties the image of a contextually fluctuating space emerges. This space’s 
basic parameters are defined by productive processuality and configurative 
practices.678 The pluriverse curtails movement and aims at its incarceration behind 
the walls of groupist cultural blocs. The omniverse, on the other side, provides 
for political spaces were the performative aspects of group-making and 
syntheticity are central.
 2nd ethical implication: the centrality of  conflict. The omniverse provides proper 
outlets for the enactment of inevitably occurring tensions between social groups - 
quite similar to the pluriverse. As an institution it is chiefly concerned with 
arranging the contact points between structural spaces (i.e. natural groups and 
porous sovereignties) and the regulation of conflict between them. Chapter VII 
alluded to the centrality of antinomy in anarchist political thought: instead of 
evading or suppressing tensions, they are instead viewed as a vital part of 
communal life, and as a desired mechanism  which prevents political structures 
from  solidification. Every commitment towards constituent power requires an 
acknowledgement of  the productive nature inherent to antinomic social relations. 
 Where the omniverse differs from the pluriverse is in regards to the 
desired spatial ordering of the political landscape. The omniverse is configured 
around institutionalized antinomy, the pluriverse opts instead for a set of 
agonistic principles. Agonism  affirms the inevitability of competition and tension, 
while still engaging in attempts to make politics ‘safe’. This happens through the 
dedication of zones in which conflict can take place without damaging 
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consequences. By means of containing issues worth fighting for, i.e. control over 
a cultural bloc, potentially conflictual behavior is locked away in the hermetically 
sealed container of hegemonic spaces. Struggles over hegemony are only possible 
within these discrete spaces - across them a conflictual consensus must prevail. 
For agonism  the dangers of essentialism hence requires a pluriverse in order to 
keep struggling parties separated. Through the creation of distinct zones the 
mayor catalyst for struggle (the projection of hegemonic rule) has either been 
contained or removed.
 The pluriverse and the omniverse give two different answers to the 
question of how to regulate the quality and the enactment of conflict. 
Furthermore, an anarchist approach to global politics must also be susceptible to 
the essentialist tendencies exalted by the pluriverse itself. The organizational 
principle of the cultural bloc is just another substantialist figure, charged with 
groupist assumptions on political agency, and hence unfit to manage the dangers 
of fundamentalist identities. What is required instead is a dynamic management 
of conflict - one that uses antinomy (not agonism) as a principle for governing 
the interplay between competing natural groups and porous sovereigns through 
mutualist practices. Anarchism also engages in efforts of removing potential 
reasons for essentialist struggles, since natural groups and porous sovereignties 
are not interested in hegemonic rule, but only in the sectoral projection of 
constituent power. The situation in the anarchist omniverse is quite different 
from  the pluriverse since the principal agents, namely natural groups and porous 
sovereignties, do not compete over hegemonic control. Hegemony is a 
Westphalian principle, and affirms the universal domination of political spaces by 
a unitary agent. Instead of making attempts to manage such realms in their 
entirety, porous sovereignties project constituent power in a partial and synthetic 
fashion (see VII-4,  “Elements of porous sovereignties”). This projection is still a 
competitive endeavor, and struggles must definitely be expected. Yet, as long as 
conflict follows mutualist principles the dangers of emerging essentialist forms of 
political identification are quite limited.
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 3rd ethical implication: beyond an ontology of  danger. Lastly it is also of 
importance to acknowledge the agonistic pluriverse’s tendency of cultivating an 
ontology of danger due to the reproduction of conservative patterns of realist 
spatiality. Earlier it has been noted that the ethics which underpin IR’s 
contemporary normative vision of Westphalian spatiality are geared towards an 
ethos of survival, and revolve structurally around binaries such as inside/outside, 
order/anarchy, or self/enemy.679  The pluriverse, with its carefully separated 
cultural spaces, institutionalizes a narrative where politics can only be practiced 
within cultural blocs. On the ‘inside’ political subjects meet at eye-level and 
engage in the unhindered exercise of constituent social practices. ‘Outside’ of the 
cultural block one will find a qualitatively inferior realm  whose prevailing 
practices can hardly be called political. The space ‘in between’ cultural blocs is a 
stale and stagnant environment, a place of constituted power and a forced 
consensus, one that derives its legitimacy from sheer necessity. The pluriverse pits 
politics against necessity, and it creates two types of political subjects: the equal, 
who resides inside ones own cultural bloc, and the stranger, whose mere existence 
is underpinned by the potentiality of substantial uncertainty and the prospects of 
violence and danger. This limiting (but supposedly necessary) division of political 
spaces prevents the full ethical realization of subjects by means of intercepting 
universal moral commitments towards the other.
 Chapter IV explained the centrality of mutual recognition to mutualist 
anarchist thought, and it demonstrated why political subjects can only fully 
develop their potential through this particular politico-psychological mechanism. 
Accordingly, emancipatory justice is only realizable when individual agents are 
offered the opportunity to sense and experience their own personhood in and 
through the reflection by others: “Justice, I must repeat, is to sense our ownness 
through the other”.680  Such a dual and reciprocal account of justice requires an 
active strive towards institutional and spatial arrangements in which individuals 
can retain their distinctness, while simultaneously encountering themselves 
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through their vis-a-vis’s dignity. Only through unmediated and immanently 
productive processes is it possible to experience one’s own dignity and 
personhood through the dignity and personhood of the other. Cultural blocs, 
however, initiate a durable and lasting closure of the political sphere. When the 
pluriverse solidifies it belongs to the system of the ‘absolute’ (c.f. ch. IV), which is 
severely reduced in its function to act as a recognition-facilitating platform. The 
result is a parochial pluralism and an ethical entrenchment in which novel, 
recognition-facilitating encounters become impossible. Political agents are 
trapped within their own cultural blocs, while the prospect of establishing 
politically productive ties with subjects residing in other, parallel structures is 
dramatically diminished.
 The omniverse strives towards the realization of immanent justice, and 
attempts to overcome the system of the absolute, of transcendence, and 
representation. Its building-blocks - most notably porous sovereignties, as well as 
the principles of mutualism and antinomy - create outlets for the projection of 
constituent power between and across natural groups, and they provide for spatial 
configurations conductive to recognition-facilitating encounters. A conscious 
political agent will always prefer such immanent accounts of justice over 
transcendental ones. If one can experience his or her own dignity through 
unmediated encounters with others, and if systems of representation (i.e. the 
pluriverse) are not conductive towards this endeavor, it is highly applicable to 
cultivate immanent systems of justice that remove transcendental barriers and 
foster  potentially limitless, socio-political encounters.681
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CHAPTER NINE
IX | CONCLUSION: THE VIRTUES OF ANARCHISM
1. Anarchism in the context of  International Relations Theory
 The final chapter of the study provides a perspective on how IR-theory 
benefits from  the mobilization of anarchist political thought. One question 
looming over the research-project since the very start was perhaps: why 
anarchism? Isn’t anarchism contradictory to the study of international politics? 
Shouldn’t anarchism focus on local actions and outcomes, micro-politics, and 
anti-politics? The answer to this question is certainly affirmative if one follows a 
narrow and orthodox understanding of IR, and frames it as a discipline 
exclusively concerned with phenomena produced by statist practices and coercive 
sovereignty. The anarchist tradition of political thought is indeed not particularly 
well equipped to offer a comprehensive theory of the interstate system which 
could move very far beyond a critique.
 It is, however, much more useful to think of international politics in 
general, and the international in particular, not as a realm  exclusively populated by 
the state-form  - one of the core-issues the study seeks to promote. The 
international produces first and foremost a series of global political outcomes.682 
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While some of these outcomes can be traced back to the actions of states, others 
can be credited to the activities of actors dwelling above and beyond the 
Westphalian threshold. Confusion about the role of anarchism in IR emerges 
only if one conflates ‘the global’ with the interstate system.683 The latter is indeed 
populated by discrete, territorially defined spaces. The former, however, is 
constituted by a multiplicity of material and ideational forces, and rarely fits into a 
statist scheme.684 The ontological constitution of the global does hence not rely 
solely on the interstate system, which is only one among several elements of a 
complex, transnational, socio-political machinery. Neumann’s and Sending’s 
suggestion to conceive of international politics as a set of relations between 
polities, driven by governmentality instead of sovereignty, is indicative in that 
regard. The international then turns into a structure defined by power-relations, 
and it “generates different and changing practices of political rule (...) and 
agencies”.685 
 Anarchism might not be particularly well equipped to theorize upon the 
interactions between states. It is, however, almost predestined for understanding 
and explaining the emergence of global political spaces that are constituted by 
non-coercive forces. A widely shared commitment to non-domination obliges the 
anarchist tradition to conceive of the emergence of polities and political 
groupings under the absence of coercive mechanisms. This commitment to non-
domination does, however, not entail a renunciation of power per se. Among 
classical authors it was Proudhon who embraced the idea of fundamentally 
constitutive power-relations (see ch. IV and V for a detailed discussion): “what 
constitutes the reality of social power?” he asks, and answers “the collective 
force”!686 This insight, in combination with a deeply rooted skepticism towards 
state-based politics and superimpositions, enables anarchism to construct political 
spaces outside the territory-coercion-nexus. The act-capacity of political 
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groupings depends then on the condition to manage and mobilize any sort of 
power other than coercion. The potential effect on IR is clear: political space is 
framed outside the constraints of coercive sovereignty, and instead perceived of as 
structural, productive, and porous (ch. VII).
 Against this background the study has posed three initial questions: first, 
can it be confirmed that constituent power is indeed inconsistently applied in IR-
theory? Second, to what extend is the anarchist tradition of political thought 
capable of addressing a lack of constituent power in IR-theory? Third, to what 
extend might the co-mobilization of anarchist political theory and constituent 
power support the destabilization and reframing of IR’s grand themes? The 
research-project has addressed and answered all of these questions and will now, 
by means of a conclusion, provide a synopsis of the findings through an 
emphasis of anarchism’s substantial contributions to IR-theory. Analogous to 
Waltz’ five ‘virtues of anarchy’ (ch. I) the conclusion presents the five ‘virtues of 
anarchism’.
2. The virtues of  anarchism in IR: five proposals
2.1 Towards a theory of  constituent power in global politics
 In regards to the first  and second research-question the study has shown 
that over the past decades IR has developed an impressive conceptual toolkit 
which enables the discipline to study varying types of power, as well as their 
dispersion through the international system. Dahl’s relational power approach 
argues that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something 
that B would not otherwise do”.687 To this first layer of power - direct influence - 
Lukes has added a second and a third dimension: setting/structuring agendas, as 
well as shaping preferences.688  Barnett and Duvall parse the latter one into two 
more facets, namely structural and productive power.689 Last but not least one will 
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find a vast amount of post-structural takes on power which locate it in the realm 
of  discourses, biopolitics, and the likes (ch. II and V).690
 What is strangely absent from IR is an account of constituent  power (ch. II). 
The effects of the “democratic forces of social transformation, the means by 
which humans make their own history”691, and the attached capacity to act in a 
genuinely sovereign and autonomous way by making “something from  that which 
is not something and thus is not subject to laid-down laws”692  have not been 
systematically addressed by the discipline.693  IR treats constituent power as a 
prerogative of ‘the domestic’, the realm  of genuine politics. ‘The international’, 
the realm of anarchy and necessity, must however bow to the structural 
constraints of uncertainty, which forces politics into a sterile set of pre-
constituted foreign-policy operations.
 As a way out of this dilemma the study suggested to pay heightened 
attention to Proudhon’s theory of natural groups and the attached concept of social 
force (ch. IV and V). It was argued that political processes are generated by proto-
polities which impose a certain degree of coherency upon themselves. Natural 
groups can be found in almost any socio-political domain, i.e. families, 
workshops, battalions, unions, whole industries, and even states and empires. The 
most important aspect in that regard is every group’s potential ability to wield a 
certain degree of constituent power through the projection of social force. Social 
force was further divided into material and ideational properties, which exist by 
virtue of agglomeration and commutation (ch. V). The difference between ‘the 
absolute’ (constituted power) and ‘progress’ (constituent power) has been 
extensively addressed by Proudhon in Philosophy of  Progress (ch. IV).694  In 
combination with the theory of natural groups it becomes a powerful device 
which traverses the domestic/international binary, and helps to assess the 
diverging effects of  constituent power in international politics.
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2.2 Complex ontologies: the deep anarchy of  the global
 In regards to the third research question the study suggest to direct IR’s 
focus of investigation towards certain anarchist core-themes, i.e. the role of 
constituent power and natural groups in world politics. This will not only alter the 
disciplines view in regard to key concepts such as sovereignty and anarchy (ch. 
VII), but raises additional questions about ontological core assumptions (ch. VI). 
Jackson and Nexon demonstrated IR’s deeply rooted commitment towards 
ontological substantialism, which presumes “that entities precede interaction, or 
that entities are already entities before they enter into social relations with other 
entities”.695 This already quite one-dimensional view is narrowed down further by 
the broad acceptance of a statist ontology. The complex dynamics of global 
politics are often reduced to one particular element: international relations - 
which derives from  the latin phrase inter nationes and translates literarily into 
relations between nations. 
 Reducing global affairs to inter-state politics gives rise to a flat, state-
centric ontology and perpetuates the image of a universal Westphalian republic 
with sovereignty as its governing principle. Actors different from  states are not 
completely ignored, but their importance is often diminished, due to the 
assumption that a structure’s operating logic (i.e. the one of the international) is 
defined by its major actors, not by all the actors in it.696  The study demonstrated 
the innovativeness of anarchist narratives in that regard, since they draw attention 
away from an allegedly absolute substance, and direct it towards ontological 
intangibility. Patterns such as emergent properties, non-reductionist processes, 
nested units, network structures, autopoiesis (self-making and self-reproducing), 
and random shifts between linearity and non-linearity (ch. VI) become suddenly 
visible.697  Rather than emphasizing certainty and stability, anarchism in IR 
highlights ontological anarchy and substantial uncertainty as the major wagers of 
global politics.
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 The very notion that all politics is politics among natural groups leads 
towards a dynamic ontology of the global: the global is populated and constituted 
by natural groups and porous sovereignties, and not exclusively by the state-form 
(coercive sovereigns). In that regard Prichard notes: “there is no distinction 
between ‘international’ and ‘domestic’ politics. States dominate and conquer 
populations and the relations between states are of the same kind as the relations 
between any other groups, only that the former are better armed”.698  This 
conceptual opening breaks - in the vein of Laski’s pluralism  - with monistic 
conceptions of the state.699  And it progresses even further by means of 
preventing the conceptual hegemony of the state to spill over into the realm of 
global politics: the international is not a universal Westphalian republic, but an 
association of associations, of whom  the state is only one among many. The 
concept of ontologically productive natural groups also differs radically from  any 
liberal notion of international politics, were subject positions are often portrayed 
as always already constituted units. Porous sovereignties are agents in the making, and 
thus inherently precarious (c.f. antinomy, ch. VII). They do not exist under, but 
rather by virtue of anarchy. Anarchy is then not a challenge to be mastered, but 
the precondition for political life as such: the international is an anarchic frontier 
of permanent socio-political reproduction, kept in motion by the restless 
movement of constitutive powers, and built around an assemblage of porous 
sovereignties.
2.3 Beyond Westphalia: sovereignty and constituent power
 The study also highlighted the structural relationship between notions of 
power and diverging types of sovereignty. It argued that prevalent accounts of 
Westphalian inter-state sovereignty are heavily influenced by a reading of power 
as a function of coercion and violence.700 The reasons for this fixation on force 
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and compulsion have been addressed in great detail in chapter II, and also during 
a close engagement with Waltz’ take on anarchy in chapter I. For Waltz 
Westphalian polities count as purpose-build arrangements, dedicated to regulate 
the circulation of violence within and across domestic and international political 
spaces. Sovereignty, the institution deployed to authoritatively govern certain 
political spaces through a rationalization of violence, must then be necessarily 
coercive. A non-coercive, i.e. a productive account of sovereignty is neither 
required to exist, nor intended to flourish within the logics of inter-state politics. 
Coercive sovereignty leads into a constraining account of anarchy. Anarchy, the 
void between Westphalian war-machines breeds struggle and anguish, not by 
design, but due to its structural intertwinement with violence and coercive 
sovereignty.
 Under the auspices of coercive sovereignty anarchy is perceived as a dead 
end, a problematic state of being, and emergent from the context of a nexus 
between power and sovereignty. Constituent power - i.e. Proudhonian social force - 
displaces this unidirectional logic of Westphalian politics. It offers instead a re-
conceptualization of sovereignty alongside constituent lines, and provides for a 
cyclical account of anarchy (ch. VII). The power-sovereignty-anarchy nexus 
remains intact, yet its connotation changes. Other than the restrictive and punitive 
power that backs Westphalian sovereignty, constituent power highlights the 
founding and positing forces immanent to politics.701  It circumnavigates the 
monopolizing gravity of the state and can be found in multiple locations. The 
rhizomatic appearance of constituent power, and its capillary dispersion 
throughout various global political spaces, is again perfectly captured by the figure 
of the natural group, where constituent power translates into productive, i.e. 
democratic and republican, accounts of sovereignty: “Machiavelli’s people in 
arms (…) animated by the power not only to rebel against and overthrow the 
current order but also to create from below new democratic forms of social 
organization”.702 The anarchy growing from  a productive account of sovereignty 
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is still underpinned by antinomy, competition, struggle, and strives over 
hegemony. Yet it allows for a much broader array of interests. While statist 
polities engage by default in a fierce security competition, natural groups are not 
exclusively driven by a survivalist rationale. Against this backdrop anarchy is not 
the death of politics but its alpha as well as its omega. Global politics among 
natural groups is possible because – not despite – the high degree of ontological 
anarchy which enables their existence in the first place.
 Proudhon’s relational ontology (ch. VI) has proven to be particularly 
helpful in that regard, and furthered an understanding about the constitution of 
political spaces through an assemblage of porous sovereignties.703 All politics, he 
proclaims in the Little Political Catechism, is, regardless of whether the theater is 
domestic or international, politics among natural groups. In its most basic terms a 
natural group can be any human association with a certain sense of solidarity.704 
These proto-polities are sustained through processes of agglomeration and 
commutation, and come into existed via the mobilization of either material or 
ideational collective forces.705  Volatility and dynamic change is then the 
ontological reality of international politics, since natural groups exist in a 
permanent stage of becoming: families, cities, communities grow; fractions split 
off and develop elsewhere. Material and ideational consensuses break down and 
reconfigure themselves.706
2.4 The politics of  space: geopolitics and anarchism
 Displacing substantialist claims in favor of anarchic ontologies opens 
room for additional conceptual maneuver through an engagement with the 
topographies of the global. Geopolitical developments, it was argued, are more 
and more characterized by the emergence of multi-nodal and multilayered 
structures: “international politics works as an increasingly complex institutional 
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and behavioural superstructure crisscrossing with both domestic politics, 
domestic and transnational society, and sub-units of states”.707  These multi-
dimensional political processes are not limited to patterns of strict horizontal or 
vertical linearity, and they cannot be monopolized by actors of a certain kind or 
location (i.e. by states acting within the international system). This observation is 
shared by the natural groups-approach, which differs strongly from system-centric 
theories. From a natural groups-perspective the global is constituted by an 
assemblage of proto-polities which project social force. Within these configurations 
certain groups are capable of wielding constituent power, which allows them  to 
inflict long-lasting, structural change upon the makeup of the global. The 
elevated position held by those polities allows them to act in a genuinely 
sovereign way, while lacking the discrete distinctiveness of the state: they are 
hence described as porous sovereignties (ch. VII). In order to increase IR’s 
understanding of how the global as a political space is constituted, it is necessary 
to understand how material and ideational resources are wielded by porous 
sovereignties, and how they relate towards each other. Their location, be it local, 
national, international, or global, as well as their socio-political function is only of 
secondary concern in that regard. What matters is their structural impact on the 
configuration of  global and transnational political realms.
A heightened awareness of anarchic ontologies, coupled with an increased 
susceptibility towards the topographies of the global, directs IR’s attention 
towards the multiplicity of non-territorial, non-discrete geopolitical spaces. 
Structural theories expose a strong and narrow fixation on Westphalian patterns 
of spatiality, and characterizes it “as a series of blocks defined by state territorial 
boundaries”.708  A critical approach would argue to take structural spaces into 
account as well if one wants to understand properly how global political 
outcomes are produced. An account on structural spatiality highlights the fact 
that the essence of global political space is first and foremost characterized by its 
constituting set of power relations, and not by its territoriality. From this 
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707 Cerny, “Reframing the International”, 15.
708 Agnew, “The Territorial Trap”, 55.
perspective the spatial makeup of ‘the global’ does not appear as a patchwork 
made up exclusively of discrete territorial realms, but presents itself instead as a 
complex interplay of structural spaces. Only a few of them can actually claim to 
own territory, while the vast majority fails to comply with this criterion. This fact 
diminishes only their ability to count as statist  sovereign, but leaves their capacity to 
perform functions of  a porous sovereignty completely intact.
2.5 Geopolitical spaces and the ethics of  porous sovereignty
 Last but not least it was suggested to acknowledge the normative potential 
inherent to porous sovereignties (ch. VIII). This potential is realized through an 
ethical interrogation of the spatializing practices inherent to contemporary inter-
state politics. Political spaces count as institutions whose existence is heavily 
dependent on the existence of intertwining power relations. Such spaces can not 
be reduced to simple regulative mechanisms, but also reflect a specific set of 
ethics: ways of acting, being, and relating towards each other (ch. VIII). 
Westphalian spaces, it was argued, convey an ethos of  survival: they are structurally 
dependent on ontological binaries, i.e. hierarchy/anarchy, inside/outside, or self/
enemy, and enforce narratives of self-help and survivalism  which legitimize statist 
practices.709 
 Two particular problems were identified in this regard: firstly, the supposed 
necessity upon which these binaries rest derives from  an image of the ‘other’ as a 
well-spring of violence, destined to be brought under control. It has been 
demonstrated that such depictions are merely based on speculations grounded in 
political theory, while lacking any support through empirical evidence. The 
narrative’s origins can be traced back to the Hobbesian state of nature, which still 
exalts a firm conceptual grip on IR, and impacts heavily on how the discipline 
justifies the existence of the state-form (ch. VIII).710 This narrative leads, secondly, 
to a monopolization of politics and ethics through the state, and crowns it as the 
principle polity, required to coordinate the circulation of violence in and across 
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709 Odysseos, “Dangerous ontologies”, 404 f.
710 Ibid., 406 ff.
territorially defined political realms. Statist spaces position themselves at the 
center of inter-human affairs: all political conduct must either by initiated or 
supervised by them, while every social relation is forged against the backdrop of 
territorially defined spaces. Global politics is reduced to international relations, 
and the provision of certain political goods (i.e. democracy) is supposedly 
possibly only within states, not across them.
 Employing porous sovereignties as an ethico-political principle creates room 
for agency in world politics, and reaches beyond the conceptual hegemony of the 
state. The nature of states as purpose-build war-machines, and the climate of 
enmity they create, has been problematize throughout the study. Porous sovereignties 
harbor the potential to break with the vicious circle of inter-state anarchy and 
self-help which rationalizes the existence of Westphalian polities. The primary 
interest of porous sovereignties can not be reduced to bare-bones survivalism. Their 
interests are instead multifaceted, and dependent on their respective socio-
political functions, as well as their location within a global political setting: 
workshops, unions, industries, NGOs, etc. do not usually succumb to the 
Hobbesian ethos of  survival. In an antinomic fashion they are instead driven by an 
anarchist ethos of  mutualism. Within the setting of what was termed the omniverse 
the outbreak of violence is certainly not off limits. Yet its likelihood is 
dramatically decreased, since sets of actors enter the scene whose differentia 
specifica is to marshall constituent power, while engaging in efforts to 
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